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Abstract
The present dissertation explores the role of financial intermediation in gener-
ating, propagating and amplifying disruptions within the financial sector. It
also discusses the role of banking regulation in the emergence and the collapse
of banking bubbles.
Financial Shocks, External Finance, and Macroeconomic Fluctua-
tions. The objective of this study is to investigate the macroeconomic effects
of shocks originating within the financial sector and the role of firms’ financial
structure in the propagation of these shocks. It develops an extended RBC
model, with financially constrained firms and an endogenous financial sector.
Firms finance their investment either by borrowing from banks or by issuing
new equity. The results suggest that financial shocks, represented by a sudden
drop in the return on financial intermediaries’ securities, generate a credit
crunch and reduce firms’ equity issuance. Financial shocks have stronger and
more persistent impact on economic activity than shocks originating in the
real economy. Financial contagion and credit constraints are key in explaining
the amplification and the duration of financial shocks. As firms’ funding falls,
the availability of capital plummets so the credit constraint becomes tighter,
and firms’ demand for loans decreases. This slows down the recovery of the
financial intermediation sector, and the economy as a whole. Empirical support
for these findings is provided.
Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Bank Wholesale Debt on
Loans and Output in the Euro-zone. This study explores the role of bank
wholesale debt on loans and output in the Euro-zone between 1999 and 2014.
It uses shocks to bank deposits and shocks to bank wholesale debt issuance
as instruments in a linear two stage least square specification to evaluate the
role of loan supply in affecting output. The findings show that banks’ changed
preferences for wholesale debt funding are important determinants of loan
supply, in particular during the crisis. We also find evidence that loan supply
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affects output significantly and positively. The validity of the model is also
tested by verifying the linearity assumption using non-parametric estimation
techniques.
Regulation and Rational Banking Bubbles in Infinite Horizon (joint
with Dr. Sarah El Joueidi). We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model in infinite horizon with a regulated banking sector, where stochastic
banking bubbles may arise endogenously. We analyze the conditions under
which stochastic bubbles exist and their impact on macroeconomic key variables.
We show that when banks face capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk,
two different equilibria emerge and can exist: the bubbleless and the bubbly
equilibria. Alternatively, under a regulatory framework where capital require-
ments are based on credit risk only, as in Basel I, bubbles are explosive and,
as a consequence, cannot exist. The stochastic bubbly equilibrium is charac-
terized by positive or negative bubbles depending on the tightness of capital
requirements based on Value-at-Risk. We find a maximum value of capital
requirements under which bubbles are positive. Below this threshold, and
as long as the bubble stays, the stochastic bubbly equilibrium with positive
bubbles provides larger welfare than the bubbleless equilibrium. In addition,
our results suggest that a change in banking policies might lead to a crisis
without external shocks.
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0. Introduction
The 2007-2009 U.S. subprime crisis led to the worst recession since World
War II (IMF, 2009). It has highlighted the importance of the financial sector
and its inadequate regulation in generating and propagating crises. Policy
makers (Bernanke, 2010a) and researchers (Gertler et al., 2016; Gerali et al.,
2010), impute recent events to disruptions in the banking sector. In particu-
lar, excessive leverage and financial innovation increased the banking sector’s
vulnerabilities (Basel Committee, 2010). In a speech to the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s chairman, Bernanke (2010a),
recognized that the system’s vulnerabilities, and the deficient regulatory and
policy tools available were crucial in explaining the severity of the last crisis.
Central bankers and policy makers failed to prevent the last financial crisis
(Bernanke, 2010b). Mainstream models used in central banks and supervi-
sory institutions (Smets and Wouters, 2007 for example) did not include an
explicit financial sector element. Only recently have macroeconomic models
incorporated the role of the banking sector, enabling studies of its role in the
propagation and amplification of crises. de Walque et al. (2010), Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) are breakthrough macroeco-
nomic models that incorporate an explicit banking market. The understanding
of the role of financial intermediation in affecting macroeconomic performance
is fundamental to designing solutions that are able to prevent future financial
crises.
This work is built on the idea that the transmission mechanism and the
macroeconomic consequences of shocks that affect banks are different from
those that affect households or firms. While there is now well established
literature on financial frictions in macroeconomics that focuses on the role of
credit frictions in propagating real shocks (Bernanke et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997 and Iacoviello, 2005), the literature
on the role of firms’ financial structure in the propagation of shocks originating
within the financial sector is scarce, thus calling for further research.
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Recent studies have explored how bank wholesale funds affect economic
activity, as the severity of the last financial crisis has been imputed to disruptions
in the bank wholesale market (Gertler et al., 2016; Hanson et al., 2011).
Wholesale funding, in contrast with retail deposits, is the most unstable source
of funding of banks, and may therefore raise uncertainty, raising systemic
risk. The wholesale banking sector includes inter-bank funding, and bank debt
securities. The potential adverse effects due to bank reliance on wholesale
funding is even greater in Europe, where banks have the highest share of
wholesale funding in total liabilities, 61% of total liabilities on average, in
comparison with Asia, emerging economies and the U.S. (Le Lesle, 2012). The
literature has mostly focused on the role of the inter-bank market and short
term wholesale debt in affecting economic activity. The understanding of the
role of long term bank debt issuance on output has not been assessed, and
this should help comprehend the contribution of variation in such funds in
macroeconomic fluctuation. In particular, testing whether bank loan supply
affects economic activity is an important question related to the understanding
of the transmission mechanism of financial disturbances to the real economy. It
requires dealing with large endogeneity issues. For example, identifying changes
in loans that are not due to a change in output requires identification strategies.
How financial crises arise remain a challenging question. Miao and Wang
(2015) argue that changes in agents’ beliefs about stock market value of banks
are suspected to explain sudden financial market crashes. The idea that the
assets can be sold at their fundamental price is part of most economic analysis.
Nevertheless, the crisis showed that prices can be severely distorted. Bubbles
arising in the financial intermediation sector, in contrast with housing bubbles
for example, may have large amplification effects (Brunnermeier and Oehmke,
2013). Moreover, works on the existence of bubbles in general equilibrium
models with infinitely lived agents is marked with few important contributions
(Miao, 2014). More research on asset price bubbles is needed (Bernanke, 2010b).
This dissertation contributes to the research on the role of financial inter-
mediation in macroeconomic fluctuations. It investigates theoretically and
empirically the effects of disruptions within the banking sector and the effects
of bank lending on real economic activity. In particular, it explores the role
of firms’ financial frictions in propagating and amplifying shocks originating
within the financial sector. It empirically evaluates the role of shocks to long
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term bank debt on economic activity. Finally, it studies how financial crises may
arise, in particular how banking regulation may contribute to the emergence of
bank asset price bubbles.
The first chapter studies the role of firms’ financial structure and credit
constraints in propagating shocks originating within the financial sector. It
develops an extended real business cycle model, with an endogenous financial
intermediation sector a` la de Walque et al. (2010). Firms finance their invest-
ment either by borrowing from banks or by issuing new equity. They also face
a credit constraint. The results suggest that financial shocks, represented by
a sudden drop in the return on financial intermediaries’ securities, generate
a credit crunch and reduce firms’ equity issuance. Financial shocks have a
stronger and more persistent impact on economic activity than shocks origi-
nating in the real sector. Financial contagion and firms’ credit constraints are
key in explaining the amplification and the duration of financial shocks. As
firms’ funding falls, capital plummets, the credit constraint becomes tighter,
firms’ demand for loans decreases, all of which slows down the recovery in the
financial intermediation sector, and therefore the whole economy. Empirical
support for these findings is provided.
The second chapter is empirical. It explores the role of bank funding shocks
on bank credit supply and output. Based on a linear specification, the study
tests whether changes in bank credit, that are triggered by disruptions of bank
wholesale funding, have significant effects on macroeconomic performance in
the Euro-zone between 1999Q1 to 2014Q4. In addition, I verify the linearity as-
sumption of the model by allowing non-linearities to arise, using non-parametric
techniques. I show that changes in banks’ preferences for wholesale debt funding
are important determinants of loan supply, in particular during the crisis. I
also find evidence that loan supply affects output significantly and positively.
The linearity assumption in the bank lending channel, using country specific
changes, is found to be adequate.
The third chapter develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
in infinite horizon with a regulated banking sector, where stochastic bubbles
on banks’ asset prices may arise endogenously. It objective is to determine
the regulatory conditions under which bubbles may exist and to evaluate the
impact of bubbles on the macro-economy. We find that, when banks face capital
requirements that account for market risk, that is, based on Value-at-Risk,
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two different equilibria emerge and can exist: the bubbleless and the bubbly
equilibria. In contrast, when capital requirements are based on credit risk, as
in Basel I, bubbles cannot exist. We show that positive or negative stochastic
bubbles may arise, depending on the tightness of capital requirements based
on Value-at-Risk. We find a threshold value of capital requirements below
which bubbles are positive. Above this threshold, bubbles are negative. Before
the bubble bursts, the stochastic bubbly equilibrium with a positive bubble
provides larger welfare than the bubbleless equilibrium. Most importantly, our
results suggest that a change in banking policies might lead to a crisis without
external shocks.
1. Financial Shocks, External
Finance, and Macroeconomic
Fluctuations
1.1. Introduction
The 2007-2009 U.S. subprime crisis led to, in most developed countries, the
worst recession since the World War II (IMF, 2009). Following these events,
there was a large number of works studying the role of the financial sector
in propagating and generating shocks (de Walque et al., 2010; Gertler and
Kiyotaki, 2011). Empirical studies find that financial crises last longer and are
deeper than ordinary recessions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). It has been shown
that the Euro-zone recession of 2008-2010 was largely due to shocks originating
in the banking sector (Gerali et al., 2010). Yet, the propagation mechanism of
disruptions within the financial sector - financial shocks - to the real sector is
poorly understood. For instance, while there is now a well established literature
on financial frictions in macroeconomics that focus on the role of credit frictions
in propagating real shocks (Bernanke et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997;
Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1997; Iacoviello, 2005), the literature on their role in
the propagation of financial shocks is scarce. The transmission mechanism and
the macroeconomic consequences if banks are hit by a shock are different to
shocks that affect households or firms. The understanding of the propagation
mechanism of financial shocks is crucial to prevent future crises and build an
adequate policy framework.
The objective of this chapter is to study the role of firms’ financial structure
in propagating shocks originating within the financial sector, financial shocks.
This chapter develops an extended real business cycle (RBC) model, with an
endogenous financial intermediation sector a` la de Walque et al. (2010). Firms
can choose between bank credit and equity financing.
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de Walque et al. (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2011) are the breakthrough and seminal studies that incorporate an explicit
inter-bank market. de Walque et al. (2010) build a dynamic general equilibrium
model with a heterogeneous financial sector, possibility of default for firms
and banks, and shocks to profits in the financial intermediation sector. They
introduce an inter-bank market to analyze the role of this market in business
fluctuations and liquidity issues. They are able to reproduce key U.S. business
cycles moments. They also study the role of endogenous default in generating
financial accelerators. Finally, monetary and policy analyses (Basel I and II)
are carried out. They find that Basel II requirements exacerbate financial crises.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) build a model in which banks can be financed
through wholesale inter-bank deposits in addition to retail deposits. There
are agency problems that lead to endogenous constraints for intermediaries in
collecting retail deposits. Their model incorporates a financial accelerator a` la
Bernanke et al. (1999) but applied to a heterogeneous financial intermediation
sector. It corresponds to amplifications due to balance sheet effects in the
presence of credit frictions. Their key contribution is twofold. First, they have,
to some extent, reproduced quantitatively the facts from the last financial
crisis. They show quantitatively that a financial accelerator in the financial
sector itself played a large role in the recent contraction of the U.S. economy.
Second, they have developed a model that shows that financial intermediation
can amplify disturbances to the real economy.
Gertler et al. (2012) build on Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), but go one step
further by developing a model in which balance sheet risk is chosen endogenously
by financial intermediaries. They are able to explain why banks opt for risky
balance sheets and how it, in turn, affects real economic outcomes. Their focus
is on the role of credit policy in mitigating financial crises.
The three last cited models emphasize the role of the inter-bank market in
amplifying financial shocks. Nevertheless, they do not study the role of firms’
financial structure in the transmission of such disruptions. Firms’ financial
structure may play an important role in the transmission of financial shocks.
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) develop an extended RBC model in which
firms’ financial structure matters for business cycles and the transmission of
shocks. Firms can choose between debt and equity. They face a collateral
constraint when borrowing from the financial sector. They find that exogenous
shocks to the tightness of the collateral constraint can explain the cyclicality
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of firms’ aggregate debt and equity over the business cycle. They also show
how firms’ credit frictions can have negative consequences on the demand for
labor. However, there are no frictions in the financial intermediation sector
and thus, banks play no role in the amplification of shocks. The collateral
constraint insures financial intermediaries and therefore deposit holders against
risk. Hence, a tighter credit constraint leads firms to substitute debt for equity.
Indeed, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) find that firms issue more equity and
less debt in times of crisis. However, financial crises can spread to cause asset
market stress (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012), and it may be too costly for
firms to substitute debt for equity. The empirical literature on aggregate debt
and equity (Covas and Den Hann, 2011; Covas and Den Haan, 2012; Levy and
Hennessy, 2007; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Choe et al., 1993) agrees on the
fact that firms that are most constrained financially issue less equity in bad
economic environments. Only Jermann and Quadrini (2012) document that
firms net equity issuance is counter-cyclical.
This chapter develops a model in which firms’ and banks’ financial frictions
can interact to propagate financial shocks. The model incorporates a govern-
ment, a representative firm, a representative household and an endogenous
banking sector a` la de Walque et al. (2010). By using bank default, de Walque
et al. (2010) introduce a simple way of incorporating frictions into the financial
sector. Therefore, their model includes the main inter-bank market characteris-
tics while keeping the mechanisms tractable. In addition to bank credit, the firm
can be financed through equity issuance. It also faces an enforcement constraint
when borrowing from the bank. This allows to analyze the role of firms external
financing constraints in propagating disruptions originating within the financial
intermediation sector. The role of such frictions in propagating financial shocks
may be different to their role in propagating crises originating in the real sector.
The model is able to reproduce key facts of the last financial depression and
key business cycle properties. Firms’ financial structure and credit constraints
are able to explain how financial shocks trigger a decrease in inter-bank lending,
and counter-cyclical labor. Shocks in the financial intermediation sector generate
recessions that are stronger and last longer than ordinary ones. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009), Boissay et al. (2016) and Caldara et al. (2013) find similar results.
Equity issuing is found to be pro-cyclical for financially constrained firms, as
in most of the literature on firms’ cyclicality of debt issuance. Furthermore,
results show that capital adjustment costs dampen the adverse effects on output
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of negative productivity and financial shocks. The impact of counter-cyclical
capital buffers for banks, as in Basel III regulation, on the economy is also
analyzed. Results show that the counter-cyclicality of buffers, as in Basel III,
can help mitigate financial crises.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. In Sections 1.2 and 1.3, the model
and its equilibrium are given. Section 1.4 displays the calibration of parameters.
Section 1.5 discusses how financial shocks are propagated to the economy when
firms’ funds are imperfectly substitutable. Section 1.6 discusses some moments
implied by the model. Section 1.7 analyses the impact of Basel III requirement
on the economy. Some discussion on the model assumptions and sensitivity
analyses are then presented. A conclusion is presented in the last section.
1.2. Model
The model developed in this chapter includes risk neutral firms, risk averse
households, two risk averse banks, and a government. Financial intermediaries
are modeled according to de Walque et al. (2010). There is one bank, called
the merchant bank that lends to firms and in turn borrows from the second
bank, called the lending bank. The lending bank collects retail deposits from
households. Banks are subject to regulatory requirements regarding their
balance sheet, as in Basel accords. The model assumes that the merchant
bank has the possibility to default on its inter-bank borrowings. The lending
bank cannot default. This is justified by the fact that, at least in OECD
countries, deposits are guaranteed. Firms maximize their profits using labor,
capital, equity and debt. They face a collateral constraint when borrowing
from merchant banks. Households are shareholders of firms, debt holders of the
lending bank, and supply labor to firms. The government collects taxes from
households and plays the role of an insurance fund for banks. For simplicity, it
also represents the supervisory authority that sets the bank capital requirements
and the default costs.
1.2.1. Firms
Firms are endowed with a production technology F (zt, kt, nt) = ztk
η
t n
1−η
t ,
0 < η < 1. Production is realized at the end of time t. The variable zt is
the stochastic level of productivity. It is known at the beginning of the time
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interval t, before the production is realized. The variable kt is the stock of
capital and is chosen at time t-1, and the variable nt is labor, chosen at the
beginning of the time interval t. The price of output is normalized to 1. Labor
payments are wt.
Investment expenditure can be financed by issuing new equity dt < 0 or, by
borrowing from banks Lt+1.
1 Dividend payments (dt > 0) or new equity issues
(dt < 0) are decided at the beginning of t, that is, when the realized value of
the productivity shock is known but production has not taken place yet. The
incentive for bank debt financing arises from a tax advantage and a cost from
issuing new equity. Firms pay interest Rt = 1 + r
b
t (1− τ) on debt, where τ is
the tax advantage over the real interest rate rbt on firms’ loans. Indeed, interest
on debt is often tax deductible, unlike dividends. The assumption on the tax
advantage ensures that firms’ financial constraints are binding by letting firms
have a preference for debt. It has many theoretical motivations. For example,
it is usually less costly to raise debt than new equity since raising debt does
not dilute the ownership structure of the firm. Some authors have also showed
that debt is less costly than new outside equity because of legal or accounting
reasons.2
Firms equity payout adjustment costs are κ
(
dt − d
)
2, where d¯ is the equity
payout long term value. The cost need not be interpreted as a pecuniary cost.
It can be interpreted as the preference managers have for dividend smoothing
(it is costly to deviate from the steady state value) or the speed at which firms
can substitute equity for debt when the financial conditions, represented by
the parameter κ, change. This is consistent with observations made by Lintner
(1956) and later confirmed by recent empirical and survey evidence.3 Indeed,
Lintner (1956) shows that dividend payout policy is a function of the firm’s
current profits scaled by a long term target payout ratio.
Because production is only available at the end of the period t, after employ-
ment and investment expenses have to be paid, firms borrow li,t = F (zt, kt, nt)
from the financial intermediary and are subject to a constraint on these lend-
1As in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), dt is defined as net dividend payouts (= sum of share
repurchases and dividends minus equity issues). It is interpreted as new equity issues if
dt < 0.
2See Narayanan (1988).
3Michaely and Roberts (2012), Lambrecht and Myers (2012) and Brav et al. (2005).
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ings.4 The financial intermediary is repaid at the end of the same period and
without interest, after production has occurred. This intra-temporal debt can
be understood as a shortcut to the fact that firms carry cash from one period to
the next. As in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the firm can decide to default on
its intra-period loan. If the firm decides to default, there is a probability ξt that
the lender can recover the whole value of the collateral, and a probability 1-ξt
that the lender cannot recover anything. In the remainder of this chapter, these
probabilities are assumed stochastic. They reflect unspecified market conditions.
Changes in their values will be referred to as liquidity shocks, indicating that
firms’ liquid funds lt can be easily diverted. An enforcement constraint is set by
the financial intermediary to ensure that, the firm’s expected value of defaulting
does not exceed its expected value of not defaulting. It limits the acquisition
value of capital to a weighted average of the total debt of the firm such that
F (zt, kt, nt) + ξtLt+1/
(
1 + rbt
) ≤ ξtkt+1qt+1,5 where qt+1 can be interpreted as
the Tobin’s q. Note that liquidity and productivity shocks are common to all
firms. The study can thus concentrate on a representative firm.
It is furthermore assumed that there are convex adjustment costs to capital,
φ/2(It/kt − δ)2kt. The variable It corresponds to capital investment. The
parameter φ is a scaling factor representing the size of the adjustment costs.
Capital adjustment costs imply that there are increasing marginal costs in
capital production, capturing the idea that firms want to smooth capital
investment over time. It is thus more costly to vary capital by a great deal
than by a small amount.
The entrepreneur maximizes the firm’s current value subject to its budget
constraint and an enforcement constraint. The firm’s current value, which is
the ex dividend price of the firm, depends on the sequence of future payoffs
(dividends), discounted by the household stochastic discount factor, mt+j . This
shareholder’s problem, maximizing the value of future cash flows, coincides
with the stakeholder’s problem, as the shareholder is also the final consumer,
the employee, and the household:
4The firm borrows the amount that it will be able to reimburse, li,t = F (zt, kt, nt). Not
less otherwise production and profits will be lower, not more otherwise, the firm cannot
reimburse.
5See Jermann and Quadrini (2012) for further details on the enforcement constraint.
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Max{dt,nt,kt+1,It,Lt+1}∞t=0E0
[ ∞∑
j=1
mt+jdt+j
]
,
subject to
F (zt, kt, nt) +
Lt+1
Rt
= wtnt + It + ψ (dt) + Lt +
φ
2
(
It
kt
− δ
)
2kt, (1.2.1)
F (zt, kt, nt) ≤ ξt
(
kt+1qt+1 − Lt+1
1 + rbt
)
, (1.2.2)
It = kt+1 − (1− δ) kt, (1.2.3)
ψ (dt) = dt + κ
(
dt − d
)
2, (1.2.4)
Rt = 1 + r
b
t (1− τ) . (1.2.5)
Write λt the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint (1.2.1), µt the one
associated with the enforcement constraint (1.2.2), and qt the multiplier of the
investment constraint (1.2.3). The first order conditions with respect to dt,
kt+1, It, Lt+1, and nt yield, in the interior solution, the equations:
6
λt =
1
ψdt
, (1.2.6)
qt = Et{mt+1
mt
ψdt
ψdt+1
[Fkt+1(1− µt+1ψdt+1) + qt+1(1− δ)
+
It+1
kt+1
φ(
It+1
kt+1
− δ)− φ
2
(
It+1
kt+1
− δ)2] + ξtµtψdtqt+1}, (1.2.7)
qt = 1 + φ
(
It
kt
− δ
)
, (1.2.8)
1 = RtEt
{
mt+1
mt
ψdt
ψdt+1
}
+ µtψdtξt
Rt
1 + rbt
, (1.2.9)
6ψdt = ∂ψ(dt)/∂dt.
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Fnt = wt
[
1
1− µtψdt
]
. (1.2.10)
Condition (1.2.6) shows that, in an interior solution, raising one more unit of
dividends must equal the marginal cost from raising dividends.
Equation (1.2.7) shows that the marginal value today of an additional unit
of capital kt+1, qt, must equal the discounted value of future marginal benefits
from capital plus the marginal benefit from relaxing the enforcement constraint.
Condition (1.2.8) displays demand for capital as a function of the shadow
value of investment qt. It reveals that investment in capital is a positive function
of the marginal value of an additional unit of capital, qt.
The demand for inter-temporal loans is displayed by (1.2.9). In an interior
solution, borrowing one more unit from banks must equal the discounted
lending rate, weighted by the dividend marginal costs plus the cost of raising
the tightness of the enforcement constraint. Taking prices rbt and Rt as given,
(1.2.9) shows that a fall in the firm’s collateral value ξt, tightens the enforcement
constraint. From (1.2.9) in the stationary steady state, defined by xt = xss for
all t, if τ > 1− (1− β) /βrb, the net interest rate paid on loans is smaller than
the one paid on stocks.7
The equality (1.2.10) displays how firms’ financial structure affects labor
demand. Indeed, both dividend marginal costs and the firm’s credit constraint
tightness impact the demand for labor. The larger are the marginal costs
associated with increasing one unit of each type of financing, the larger must
be the marginal benefit from raising one unit of labor. Intuitively, to see how
firms’ financial structure changes the demand for labor, assume there are no
capital adjustment costs, φ = 0, and use the budget constraint to rewrite the
enforcement constraint (1.2.2) as:
ξt
1− ξt [(1− δ) kt − wtnt − ψ (dt)− Lt] ≥ F (zt, kt, nt) . (1.2.11)
Suppose the enforcement constraint is binding. At the beginning of the period
the numbers kt and Lt are given. Given a level of inter-period loans Lt+1,
a negative productivity shock reduces the tightness of the constraint. As a
consequence labor demand and dividend payouts rise. If, the required dividend
payout rises for reasons that are exogenous to the firm constraint (an increase
7Hence, the enforcement constraint binds for large enough values of tax benefit.
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in risk on financial markets for example, such that households discount the
future more heavily, β′ < β), labor demand decreases.
1.2.2. Banking sector
Financial frictions on financial markets are introduced as in de Walque et al.
(2010). There are two distinct representative banks, the merchant bank and
the lending bank. Banks can make balance sheet decisions. The merchant
bank borrows on the inter-bank market, W bt+1, and decides how much to lend
to firms, Lt+1, taking as given the interest rate, r
b
t . The lending bank collects
deposits from households, Dt+1, and lends on the inter-bank market, W
l
t+1, at
an interest rate it. Retail deposits are remunerated at a rate r
l
t. Both financial
intermediaries receive payments from exogenous investment in securities Bit,
i = b, l. For convenience, it is assumed that Bit = B for i = b, l. In each period
t, there is a constant fraction 1− vi , i = b, l, of profits that are consumed and
a fraction vi that are used to increase buffer capital F
i
t , i = b, l.
A risk of default is introduced by assuming that the merchant bank can
choose to default and repay a fraction θt+1 of its total debt W
b
t with the lending
bank. The risk of default introduces financial frictions within the banking
sector. Therefore, banks may contribute to the propagation of shocks. They do
not only intermediate funds from households to firms. When the bank defaults,
it pays a pecuniary cost on the defaulted amount, ωb
[
(1− θt)W bt−1
]
2, the
period after having defaulted. It can be interpreted as a cost to find new credit.
Both banks are also subject to a market book shock, i.e. the financial shock,
affecting the return on securities ρt. The financial sector is thus characterized
by financial fragility from default and reduced bank profitability. Reduced
profitability in the banking sector can, in turn, affect real economic activity
by reducing loan supply. To alleviate such mechanism, the insurance fund
is a macro-prudential mechanism that requires both banks to pay a fraction,
respectively ζb and ζl, of their buffer capital F
i
t , i = b, l, to an insurance fund.
The insurance fund then returns a fraction τ l of the total amount the merchant
bank failed to reimburse last period. The merchant bank is subject to a capital
requirement constraint
F bt+1 > krr,t
(
ωLt+1 + w˜B
b
)
.
Similarly, the lending bank is subject to F lt+1 > krr,t
(
ωW lt+1 + w˜B
l
)
. Lendings
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Lt+1, W
l
t+1 and market book securities B
i
t, i = b, l are considered by the
authority to be risky assets and are assigned weights ω, ωt+1 and w˜. Banks
are required to hold a minimum fraction krr of their risky assets as buffer
capital. The minimum capital requirement is set by the authority and weights
are defined by the Basel accords.
Each bank’s objective is to maximize its expected inter-temporal utility, sub-
ject to its budget constraint and the accumulation of buffer capital constraints.
Their utility increases in their profits piit, i = b, l, in the cushion of buffer capital,
and decreases in a non pecuniary cost, db (1− θt+1) for the merchant bank only.8
This non pecuniary cost, db (1− θt+1) can be interpreted as a disutility from
reputation loss of defaulting. Respectively, write λit and γ
i
t , i = b, l, the shadow
value of profits and the shadow value of banks’ buffer capital accumulation.
The variables λit, i = b, l, are the prices, in dollars per unit of consumption, the
bank would pay for increasing the capacity of the production by one unit in
order to increase its profits. The variables γit, i = b, l, represent the price the
bank would pay for increasing banks’ buffer capital by one unit.
The Merchant Bank
The merchant bank optimization problem is to choose
{
W bt+1, Lt+1, θt+1, pi
b
t , F
b
t+1
}∞
t=0
in order to maximize its expected lifetime utility, subject to its constraints:9
Max{W bt+1,Lt+1,θt+1,pibt ,F bt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
Etβ
t{ln (pibt)− db (1− θt+1)
+ dF b
[
F bt+1 − krr,t
(
ωLt+1 + ω˜B
b
)]},
subject to
F bt+1 = (1− ζb)F bt + vbpibt , (1.2.12)
8The assumption that there is a non pecuniary cost of defaulting allows the avoidance of
indeterminacy.
9The term 1− vi > 0 , i = b, l is omitted when maximizing the consumption of the bank
because ln
[
(1− vi)piit
]
= ln (1− vi)+ lnpiti. The constant term 1−vi disappears because
the model is linearized.
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pibt = Lt +
W bt+1
1 + it
− θt+1W bt −
Lt+1
1 + rbt
− ωb
2
[
(1− θt)W bt−1
]
2 + ρtB
b. (1.2.13)
The first order optimality conditions with respect to θt+1, W
b
t+1, Lt+1, F
b
t+1,
and pibt yield:
λbtW
b
t = Et
[
βλbt+1ωb (1− θt+1)W bt 2 + db
]
, (1.2.14)
λbt
1 + it
= Et
[
βθt+2λ
b
t+1 + β
2ωbλ
b
t+2 (1− θt+2) 2W bt+1
]
, (1.2.15)
λbt
1 + rbt
= Et
[
βλbt+1 − dF bkrr,tω
]
, (1.2.16)
dF b = γ
b
t − Et
[
β (1− ζb) γbt+1
]
, (1.2.17)
γbt =
1
vb
(
λbt −
1
pibt
)
. (1.2.18)
The optimality condition (1.2.14) shows that, in an interior solution, the
marginal pecuniary gain from defaulting must be equal to its marginal cost.
The marginal cost from defaulting includes a pecuniary and a non pecuniary
cost. Thus, as long as there is a disutility from defaulting, db > 0, there is a
strictly positive pecuniary gain from defaulting at the margin.
Condition (1.2.15) establishes the demand for wholesale inter-bank borrowing
W bt+1. At the optimum, the marginal benefit from inter-bank borrowing must
equal its discounted marginal cost.
From (1.2.14), an increase in default raises the tightness of the profit con-
straint, thereby increasing the demand for inter-bank loans (see (1.2.15)).
Particulary, combining (1.2.14) and (1.2.15) and considering the stationary
steady state for simplicity, such that xt = xt+1 = x for all t, 1/ (1 + i) =
β
(
1− db(1− θ)/λbW b
)
. Therefore, the demand for inter-bank loans is nega-
tively sloped and the slope becomes larger with the default.
The supply of loans is given by (1.2.16). Taking prices as given, rbt , it shows
that the minimum capital requirement regulation krr,t is negatively related to
the tightness of the constraint λbt . If the regulatory constraint becomes more
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lenient, banks can supply more loans, making the budget constraint tighter.
Equation (1.2.17) establishes the demand for buffer capital. It shows that the
merchant bank’s shadow value of accumulating buffer capital is strictly postie
only if the utility from deriving a cushion of buffer capital above the minimum
requirement is positive, dF b > 0. It is also worth noting that the insurance cost
ζb changes the inter-temporal arbitrage condition of holding buffer capital.
Equation (1.2.18) shows that the bank’s marginal benefit from an additional
unit of profit is equal to, in an interior solution, the price, in dollars per unit of
consumption, the bank would pay to increase the capacity of production by
one unit. The marginal benefit from an additional unit of profits equals the
marginal utility the bank derives plus the shadow value of the bank’s buffer
capital resulting from the increase in buffer capital.
Then, combining (1.2.14), (1.2.15) and (1.2.16),
1 + rbt
1 + it
=
Et
[
1− db
βλbt+1W
b
t+1
β (1− θt+2)
]
Et
[
1− dFbkrr,tω
βλbt+1
] .
The merchant bank’s disutility of defaulting db and utility of satisfying the
capital requirement dF b introduce a wedge between the lending rate to the
firm rbt and the borrowing rate it on inter-bank wholesale funds. These wedges
are amplified with tighter capital requirements krr,t. Indeed, the tighter the
regulatory constraint is, the less the bank can lend and the larger the lending
rate rbt is. In addition, by raising the inter-bank rate, default reduces the
interest rate wedge.
The Lending Bank
The lending bank problem is to choose
{
W lt+1, Dt+1, pi
l
t, F
l
t+1
}∞
t=0
to maximize
its expected lifetime utility, subject to its constraints:
Max{W lt+1,Dt+1,pilt,F lt+1}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
Etβ
t
{
ln(pilt) + dF l
[
F lt+1 − krr,t
(
ωtW
l
t+1 + ω˜B
l
)]}
,
subject to
F lt+1 = (1− ζl)F lt + vlpilt, (1.2.19)
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pilt = θt+1W
l
t +
Dt+1
1 + rlt
−Dt − W
l
t+1
1 + it
+ τ l (1− θt)W lt−1 + ρtBl. (1.2.20)
The interior solutions given the optimality conditions with respect to Dt+1,
W lt+1, F
l
t+1, and pi
l
t are:
λlt
1 + rlt
= βEtλ
l
t+1, (1.2.21)
λlt
1 + it
= Et
[
βθt+2λ
l
t+1 + β
2τ lλlt+2 (1− θt+2)− dF lkrr,twt
]
, (1.2.22)
dF l = γ
l
t − Et
[
β (1− ζl) γlt+1
]
, (1.2.23)
γlt =
1
vl
(
λlt −
1
pilt
)
. (1.2.24)
The first order condition (1.2.21) displays the demand for deposits from the
lending bank. In an interior solution, the inter-temporal rate of marginal
substitution must equate the marginal cost of borrowing Dt+1. The supply of
inter-bank loans is given by (1.2.22). The marginal cost from lending W lt+1,
which includes the cost from reducing the cushion of buffer capital, must equal
its marginal benefit. The marginal benefit includes the insurance compensation,
through τ l, and the net return from lendings. The conditions (1.2.23) and
(1.2.24) are interpreted as in the problem faced by the merchant bank.
Neglecting the uncertainty, the combination of (1.2.21) and (1.2.22) yields
the interest rate spread between the borrowing rate rlt and the lending rate it
for the lending bank:
1 + it
1 + rlt
=
1
1−
(
1− βτ l λlt+2
λlt+1
)
(1− θt+2)− dFlkrr,twtβλlt+1
.
Similarly to the merchant bank, the utility from the safety regulatory cushion
dF l introduces a wedge between the lending rate to firms and the retail deposit
rate. Furthermore, bank default 1 − θt+2 increases the interest rate spread.
However, insurance compensation τ l reduces the impact from default.
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Altogether, abstracting from uncertainty, the interest spread resulting from
the inter-bank frictions is:
rbt − rlt =
dF bkrr,tω
βλbt+1
+
(
1− βτ lλ
l
t+2
λlt+1
)
(1− θt+2)
+
dF lkrr,twt
βλlt+1
− db
βλbt+1W
b
t+1
β (1− θt+2) .
The lending bank’s total cost from defaulting net of the insurance compensation
and the non-pecuniary cost of default, plus the utility derived from the banking
regulation cushion generate a wedge between the rate at which the lending
bank borrows funds from households, and the rate at which the merchant bank
lends to firms.
Banks’ minimum capital requirements are key components in the amplification
mechanism of financial shocks described above. This is because they determine
the degree of inter-bank financial frictions, the degree to which banks’ supply
and demand for funds reacts to shocks, and thereby, the extent of change of
loans to firms. An increase in capital requirements of banks, krr,t, increases
the marginal cost of inter-bank lending which reduces available funds for the
merchant bank and therefore, loans to firms. Since firms funds are imperfectly
substitutable, investment and output should be affected. As a consequence,
pro-cyclical weights on risky assets krr,t are expected to amplify shocks through
their negative effect on credit, while counter-cyclical capital buffers (such as in
Basel III) are expected to dampen adverse financial shocks.
1.2.3. Households
There is a continuum of infinitely lived homogeneous households.10 Given their
labor income wt, the deposits Dt they receive back from last period savings,
their net payout from owning shares dt and the market price pt from selling their
share, households choose how much stock to hold in each period st+1 and how
many hours to work nt, pay taxes Tt, consume ct, and decide how much deposits
to hold until the next period Dt+1. The variable r
l
t is the interest rate gained
from t to t + 1 by depositing money into the lending bank. The household
10To simplify the model, it is assumed that the continuum of identical households are of mass
one. Thus, the infinity of households is equivalent to a single representative household.
This is a standard assumption in the general equilibrium macroeconomic literature.
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maximizes its expected lifetime utility, subject to its budget constraint:
Max{ct,Dt+1,st+1,nt}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βtEt [U (ct, nt, Dt+1)] ,
subject to
wtnt +Dt + st (pt + dt) =
Dt+1
1 + rlt
+ ct + Tt + st+1pt. (1.2.25)
The household utility is a positive function of deposits, because of the trans-
actions services they provide as a means of payment. It is logarithmic in con-
sumption and leisure time. The utility function is written as U (ct, nt, Dt+1)=
ln (ct) + ϑln (1− nt)− χ/2
[
Dt+1/
(
1 + rlt
)−D/ (1 + rl)] 2.11 The number χ
corresponds to the money varying disutility term. The parameter ϑ is the
weight assigned to leisure.
The variable λHt corresponds to the shadow value associated with relaxing
the budget constraint. At an interior solution, the first order conditions with
respect to ct, nt, Dt+1, st+1 are
λHt =
1
ct
, (1.2.26)
wt =
ϑct
1− nt , (1.2.27)
λHt
1
1 + rlt
= βEtλ
H
t+1 − χEt
(
Dlt+1
1 + rlt
− D
l
1 + rl
)
1
1 + rlt
, (1.2.28)
pt = βEt
λHt+1
λHt
(dt+1 + pt+1) . (1.2.29)
Equation (1.2.26) shows that the marginal cost of raising consumption must
equal the marginal utility from it. Equation (1.2.27) is the household intra-
temporal condition between consumption and leisure, and gives the optimal
labor supply. Equation (1.2.28) gives the inter-temporal optimum condition
of the household. Assume for simplicity that χ = 0, then the present value
of consumption tomorrow, weighted by the discount factor β < 1 is equal to
consumption today. As displayed in (1.2.28), the marginal disutility of deposits
11For example, including money in the utility function has been done by Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996) and Sidrauski (1967).
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affects the inter-temporal decision of households. As in de Walque et al. (2010),
χ is set to be very small, and the steady state of deposits is calibrated to the
data.
Condition (1.2.29) yield the demand for shares. The combination of (1.2.28)
and (1.2.29) gives the household no arbitrage condition, Et (dt+1 + pt+1) /pt =
1 + rlt. This equality shows that, in an interior solution, where households invest
in both shares and deposits, the expected marginal return of buying shares,
Et (dt+1 + pt+1) /pt, must be equal to the marginal return on deposits, 1 + r
l
t.
12
Finally, the firm’s optimization problem is consistent with the problem of
households if the following equality holds:13
mt+j = β
jUct+j
Uct
. (1.2.30)
It shows that the firm must discount future payoffs with the household
stochastic discount factor.
1.2.4. Government
The government collects the insurance fund from both banks (ζb and ζl) and
taxes from households Tt to pay for the amount the lending bank recovers from
the merchant bank default (through τ l), and to finance the tax advantages on
debt to the firm. Government purchases are null. Its revenue is equal to its
transfers.
Tt + ζbF
b
t + ζlF
l
t = τ
l (1− θt)W lt−1 +
Lt+1
1 + rbt (1− τ)
− Lt+1
1 + rbt
.
1.2.5. Regulation
The regulatory authority sets the respective weights ω, ωt+1 and w˜ assigned
to lending to firms, Lt+1, inter-bank lending W
l
t+1 and the market books B
i,
i = b, l, . They are constant under the Basel I accords. Under the Basel II
accords these are endogenous variables, depending on the risks taken by banks.
Basel III accords extend Basel II by increasing the number of assets to put in
the coverage ratio of risky assets above the minimum capital requirement and
12If one was higher than the other one, households would only hold the one with the highest
return.
13This is calculated by forward substitution of (1.2.29).
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by incorporating a capital buffer (between 0 and 2.5 %) that is larger in good
times than in bad times.14 It also tightens the capital requirement constraint
by requiring banks to hold a larger amount of capital in good times. As in
de Walque et al. (2010), under Basel II accords, it is assumed krr,t = krr and
ω¯t = ω¯Et
(
θ
θt+2
)
ηl , (1.2.31)
where ηl > 0. Then, define yt = F (zt, kt, nt) . Under Basel III weights are
subject to (1.2.31). Additionally, there is a counter-cyclical buffer:15
krr,t = krrEt
[
1 +
(
ln
yt
yss
)
ηk
]
(1.2.32)
where the parameter ηk > 0.
1.2.6. Shocks
As mentioned, there are three types of shocks in this economy. There is a
productivity shock on firms’ production zt, a shock to the probability ξt the
merchant bank can recover the collateral value in case of default of firms, and a
shock to the return on banks’ market book assets ρt. The process for financial
shocks is taken from de Walque et al. (2010) while the liquidity shocks and
the productivity shocks follow Jermann and Quadrini (2012) estimation. The
shock processes are summarized in the auto regressive system:ẑt+1ξ̂t+1
ρ̂t+1
 = A
ẑtξ̂t
ρ̂t
+
u
z
t+1
uξt+1
uρt+1
 ,
where x̂t+1 are log deviations from their respective steady state values, u
z
t+1,
uξt+1, and u
ρ
t+1 are normally distributed, i.i.d.
1.3. Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is defined as sequences of:
14This is referred to as “counter-cyclical capital buffer” meaning that the capital buffer
demanded is intended to decrease fluctuations. See Basel Committee (2010).
15Angeloni and Faia (2013) use a similar function to model Basel III requirements.
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- allocations {dt, nt, kt+1, Dt+1, pilt, F lt+1,W bt+1,W lt+1, Lt+1, θt+1, pibt , F bt+1, ct,
st+1, Tt, ω¯t, yt, krr,t},
- prices
{
pt, wt, Rt, r
b
t , r
l
t, it, qt
}
,
- shock processes for {ρt, ξt, zt} as given above,
such that, taking prices as given, agents maximize their future expected payoffs,
the household and the firm’s problem are consistent, the government budget
is balanced at each period and markets clear. In particular, the following
equations hold: W bt+1 = W
l
t+1 and st = 1.
1.4. Calibration
This section discusses the calibration of parameters. We calibrate the parameters
closely to de Walque et al. (2010), so as to match U.S. historical quarterly
data from 1985Q1 to 2008Q2. The calibration of the banking sector is set to
match main U.S. banking sector ratios. Notably, there are twice as many retail
deposits in the economy than loans to firms, and twice as many loans to firms
than inter-bank lending. In addition, securities in the banking sector are four
times larger than the banking sector’s buffer capital. Therefore, Dl/L = 2;
I/L = 0.5; Bb/L = 1; (F b + F l)/(Bb +Bl) = 0.25.
Parameters in the banking sector, including regulatory weights, take the
same value as in de Walque et al. (2010), with one exception. It is assumed
that the lending bank is able to recover 90% of bad loans so that τ l = 0.9. It
is set to 0.8 in the study of de Walque et al. (2010). Given the model and
the calibration, a larger value of the default compensating rate τ l insures that
the shadow value of the profit constraint is large enough for the buffer capital
accumulation constraint (1.2.19) to bind. Indeed, from (1.2.24) in the steady
state, γb =
(
λb − 1/pib) /vb.
The real sector (households and firms) is calibrated as follows. The benefit
of debt over equity is set to 35% so that τ = 0.35, as in Jermann and Quadrini
(2012). As mentioned earlier, the parameter χ is set close to zero, χ = 0.01.
Also, the depreciation rate of capital δ which is set to the standard value of
0.025.16
There is no consensus as to the value of capital adjustment costs. The
16de Walque et al. (2010) use 0.03.
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estimated values range between 0 and 0.6.17 Furthermore, Lintner (1956)’s
model of dividend payout policy predicts that κ = 0.3. However, Brav et al.
(2005) suggest that the value of this parameter is slightly lower due to the
degree of freedom that share repurchases offer to firms. Lambrecht and Myers
(2012) and Skinner (2008) suggest taking κ = 0.55.18 Hence, the dividend
adjustment cost parameter is set to κ = 0.3 and the capital adjustment cost
parameter to φ = 0.1, so as to match the relative volatility with output of firms’
lending rate rbt after a 1% financial shock.
We now turn to the steady state values, defined by xt = xt+1 = x. As in
de Walque et al. (2010), labor in the steady state is n = 0.2, and the inter-bank
lending repayment rate is 99% such that θ = 0.99. The productivity, financial
and liquidity variables, in the steady state, take the following values: z = 1;
ρ¯ = 0.3; ξ = 0.1634. The liquidity variable is calibrated according to Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) estimations. The persistence of the productivity and
liquidity shocks also match estimations in Jermann and Quadrini (2012). The
persistence of the financial shock implies that it takes one year for the return
on financial assets Bi, i = b, l to go back to its initial value. Therefore, the
matrix defining the persistence of shocks is
A =
0.9457 −0.0091 00.0321 0.9703 0
0 0 0.5
 .
The steady state level of the inter-bank interest rate i and the deposit
rate rl differ from their values calibrated in de Walque et al. (2010). This is
explained by the introduction of the collateral constraint in the model. Indeed,
by equation (1.2.9), the equality µ = (1/R− β) (1 + rb) /ξ must hold. Thus,
for the constraint to be binding at the steady state, the inequality 1/R > β is
required, which implies that the borrowing cost, including the tax advantage,
is lower than the return on savings (R < 1 + rl). The values are therefore
set to rl = 0.011 and i = 0.013. It is, respectively, equal to 0.0035 and
0.007 in de Walque et al. (2010). The interest rate calibration implies that
β = 1/
(
1 + rl
)
= 0.99. It is set to 0.996 in de Walque et al. (2010).
17Bernanke et al. (1999) argue that capital adjustment costs convexity parameter is between
0 and 0.5. In their estimated DSGE model, Christensen and Dib (2008), estimate this
parameter to be equal to 0.59.
18Jermann and Quadrini (2012) set κ = 0.1460.
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Table 1.4.0.1. – Calibrated parameters
Banks Firm and household
krr = 0.08 ω = 0.8 vb = vl = 0.5 τ
l = 0.9 d=0.04 φ = 0.1
db = 4.41 w˜ = 1.2 ζb = 0.07 B = 2.49 τ=0.35 ϑ = 3.06
dF b = 1.37 ωb = 65.09 ζl = 0.036 ρ¯ = 0.3 δ = 0.025 χ = 0.01
dF l = 3.65 ω=0.2 β = 0.99 κ = 0.3 D¯ = 4.99
Given these calibrations, the implied steady state values and some aggregate
ratios are calculated. They are displayed in Appendix 1.10.A. In particular,
notice that the lending bank has less buffer capital steady state level than the
merchant bank’s, F lss < F
b
ss . This guaranties that the lending bank is a net
lender on the inter-bank market and borrows from the households.19
From the parameter and steady state values, we infer values of the default
cost ωb, insurance parameters ζb and ζl, the market book value B = B
b = Bl,
the deposit long run value D¯, and utility parameters db, dF b , dF l and ϑ. Table
1.4.0.1 gives the list of calibrated and inferred parameter values.
Table 1.4.0.1 shows that the values of the parameters are relatively similar
to the ones in de Walque et al. (2010). Only the implied values of the utility
parameters both banks derive the buffer capital cushion dF i , i = b, l are quite
different. It is smaller in the model developed in this chapter than in de Walque
et al. (2010). Indeed, the parameters are dF l = 53.4 and dF b = 6.71 in de Walque
et al. (2010).
The minimum buffer capital parameter krr shows that buffer capital has to
exceed at least 8% of the risk weighted assets, as required by Basel accords.
Because, market books bear an extra market risk, the weight for market book w˜
are assumed larger than the ones on loans ω. Depending on the asset category,
these weights vary between 0 and 150%. Hence, their values are set to 80% and
120%, as in de Walque et al. (2010).
The calibration also implies that the merchant and the lending banks pay,
19Precisely, it implies, that the merchant bank derives less utility from the cushion of buffer
capital above the minimum capital requirement which makes the merchant bank less
risk averse. The merchant bank thus has a preference for consumption today relative
to the lending bank. Preference for consumption today could eventually be modeled by
assuming that the lending bank has a lower discount rate (or a higher discount factor)
than the merchant bank. This assumption is often used in markets for borrowing and
lending. See for example Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) or Iacoviello (2015).
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respectively, 7% and 4.5% of their buffer capital to the insurance fund.
1.5. Transmission of financial shocks
This section discusses and compares the transmission mechanism of shocks
originating within the financial intermediation sector, financial shocks, with
two other types of shocks: productivity shocks to firms’ production and shocks
to the collateral value of firms, liquidity shocks. It also shows the role of each
financing friction in affecting the propagation of financial shocks.
Figure 1.5.0.1 displays the responses of some key macroeconomic variables
to a negative liquidity, productivity and financial shock that reduces output
by 1% on impact. It thus compares the role of shocks originating within the
financial sector with real shocks and liquidity shocks. Simulated results of the
model show that recessions induced by financial shocks are deeper and last
longer than productivity and liquidity shocks. This result is consistent with
Boissay et al. (2016), Claessens et al. (2012), and Caldara et al. (2013) who
find that financial shocks last longer than typical business cycles. Following
a financial shock, output yt, continues to decrease for eight quarters after the
initial disturbance. In contrast, output continues to fall during five quarters
after a negative productivity shock and converges back to its long run value
directly after the liquidity shock. The initial decrease in output is amplified
eight times in the case of the financial shock. It is also amplified after a
productivity shock, yet, by less than half the amount. In addition, while the
persistence of investment is about the same in all three types of shocks, labor
declines for ten quarters following a financial shock. This is in contrast to the
other two types of shock. The transmission mechanism of each shock to the
real economy are detailed hereafter.
A negative liquidity shock is an increase in the probability banks cannot
recover their intra-temporal loans ξt in case firms decide to default. It thus
corresponds to an exogenous rise in the enforcement constraint tightness (1.2.2),
which reduces the inter-temporal loan demand Lt+1. Furthermore, (1.2.11)
shows that the demand for labor nt and net dividend payouts dt fall. As a
consequence, firms substitute debt for equity financing. Since firms’ funds are
not perfectly substitutable, investment expenditure It and production yt are
reduced.
A negative productivity shock is explained as follows. Recall productivity
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Figure 1.5.0.1. – Shock comparison
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shocks occur before the intra-temporal loan is contracted. Thus, a nega-
tive productivity shock that exogenously decreases production leads to a fall
of the intra-temporal loan, lowering the enforcement constraint tightness.20
Consequently, from (1.2.11), there is an increase in labor demand, dividend
payouts and the demand for inter-temporal loans. Furthermore, the negative
productivity shock decreases the marginal product of capital which reduces
investment. Nevertheless, this effect is mitigated by the relaxation of the
collateral constraint.
As a consequence, the enforcement constraint leads firms to, after both
liquidity and productivity shocks, substitute one type of financing by another.
Therefore, firms financial structure allows firms to smooth the negative impact
both shocks have on investment.
The transmission mechanism of an adverse financial shock that decreases
profits of both banks is as follows. A fall in profits raises the shadow value
of resources of both banks and, thus, by (1.2.14), raises inter-bank default.
Moreover, from (1.2.12) and (1.2.19), the decrease in profits in period t decreases
banks’ buffer capital next period and hence, banks’ buffer capital cushion. As a
consequence, both banks decrease their lending. This corresponds to a leftward
shift of the supply of loans on the loan market to firms and on the inter-bank
market. Equilibrium is restored with an increase in the interest rate on these
markets (rbt and it). The inter-bank interest rate increases, furthermore, with
inter-bank default. Finally, the loss in banks’ profits raises the shadow value
of banks’ accumulation of buffer capital. Therefore, the lending bank demand
for deposits increases to enable it to build back its resources. Keeping the real
sector unchanged, the right shift in the demand for deposits is followed by an
increase in the interest rate on retail deposits rlt. On the market for household
savings, an increase in the interest rate goes along with larger retail deposit
supply Dt+1 from households. This is noticed in (1.2.28) assuming consumption
is constant.
In the model developed here, households can also invest in firms’ stocks.
Hence, the increase in the deposit rate leads to an increase in dividend payments
from the firm. Indeed, rising rates on financial markets increases the required
rate of return on equity shares. From (1.2.26) and (1.2.28), an increase in
the deposit rate leads to a decrease in the inter-temporal marginal rate of
20The firm borrows less ’money’ because, as output is reduced, it will be able to reimburse
less.
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substitution. Households and thus firms give less weight to tomorrow and
invest less in shares.21 As a consequence, firms’ value pt, inter-temporal
debt and net equity issuance decrease, with large negative consequences on
investment. Additionally, the rise in net dividend payouts increases the firm’s
enforcement constraint tightness, which raises the marginal cost of labor,
reducing labor demand. Output is furthermore diminished. Consequently, due
to the contagion of financial shocks to the equity market, both firms external
financing diminish, amplifying the reduction in investment and output. In
addition, output is furthermore reduced as rising costs tighten the collateral
constraint and decreases labor demand.
Therefore, the model predicts that financial shocks are amplified by the
financial contagion of the financial shock to the equity market, which leads
firms’ to reduce equity financing. Thus, the initial fall in external finance from
the credit crunch initiated by a fall in banks’ profits is amplified. The rise in
net dividend issuance tightens the credit constraint, forcing firms to decrease
their demand for labor, reducing further output.
To quantify the size of the amplifier generated by the model, I compare the
standard deviation of output from a negative financial shock with the one in the
model of de Walque et al. (2010). In the baseline specification and calibration,
an initial decrease of 1% in the return on securities held by banks (financial
shock) yields a standard deviation of output of 0.41. The standard deviation of
output in the baseline model of de Walque et al. (2010) is 0.06.22 This suggests
that our model generates a financial accelerator that is 6.8 times higher than
the one generated in de Walque et al. (2010).
Furthermore, the model adds features that are observed in the data. Indeed,
the model with financial shocks developed in this chapter is able to reproduce
the pro-cyclicality of asset prices and both firms’ debt and equity issuance.
This is in contrast to the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) study on financial
shocks driven business cycles. The pro-cyclicality of both firms’ debt and equity
financing is empirically and theoretically corroborated (Covas and Den Hann,
2011; Covas and Den Haan, 2012; Levy and Hennessy, 2007; Korajczyk and
Levy, 2003; Choe et al., 1993). The “financial shock” in Jermann and Quadrini
21The inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution equates, by consistency, to the stochastic
discount factor of firms.
22Notice that labor is constant in the model of de Walque et al., 2010 and banks and firms
can endogeneously default on their loans. When labor is not constant the standard
deviation is 0.31.
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(2012) is, however, different and corresponds to the liquidity shock. Due to
the collateral constraint, banks are insured against shocks that happen in
the production sector. A reduction in loan demand can be compensated for
by an increase in equity issuance. In the model developed in this chapter,
the combination of the credit crunch and the increased return on equity via
contagion of the financial shock to the equity market leads to firms distributing
more dividends. This result is consistent with empirical regularities found in
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012).
Financial shocks have also very persistent effects on the economy. While the
shock process implies that the financial shock lasts only for one year, output
moves away from its steady state for twice as long before converging slowly
to its steady state level (see Figure 1.5.0.1). The empirical and theoretical
studies of Boissay et al. (2016) and Caldara et al. (2013) also find that financial
shocks have very strong and persistent effects on the economy. This is due
to the feedback loop between the real and the financial sector. The initial
credit crunch combined with the decrease in equity issuance triggered by the
negative market book shock leads to depressed investment, lowering future
output and the demand for credit. Duchin et al. (2010) also find, in an empirical
study on the last subprime crisis in the U.S., that the persistent decrease in
firms’ external debt is rather a demand side effect as supply constraints weaken.
Banks need to increase their profits to rebuild their buffer capital, but it takes
time since credit demand is slowed by the credit constraint. As long as the
financial sector experiences difficulties, the equity and the lending market are
under stress, slowing the real sector’s recovery. Therefore, the model is able to
explain why crises originating within the financial sector last longer than other
recessions. The interaction of financial shocks with firms’ credit constraints are
key to generating persistent macroeconomic effects.
Most macroeconomic models are criticized because they generate no per-
sistence beyond the one that are already in the shocks. Considering serially
uncorrelated shocks, Appendix 1.10.B shows that financial shocks, unlike produc-
tivity and liquidity shocks, have large persistent effects on output, eventhough
they are themselves not persistent.
To summarize, collateral constraints are key in the amplification and per-
sistence of shocks occurring within the financial sector, and when firms can
imperfectly substitute bank credit for debt issuance.
Figure 1.5.0.2 shows the impact of the financing frictions on the transmission
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Figure 1.5.0.2. – Firms financial structure contribution to financial shocks
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mechanism of financial shocks to the real economy. It is assumed there are no
adjustment costs (φ = 0). It compares the impulse response functions of output
yt, investment It, loans to firms Lt+1, labor nt, retail deposits Dt+1, inter-bank
lending Wt+1 following a 1% negative financial shock, with two alternative
specifications. The first alternative corresponds to the baseline model in which
firms do not issue equity. Hence, households are no longer shareholders of firms
and invest only in deposits. This first comparison help to apprehend the role
of financial contagion via the banking sector. The second alternative considers
that firms do not issue equity and are not subject to an enforcement constraint.
Instead, firms default on 5% of their loans and are subject to default costs, as
in de Walque et al. (2010).23 This last comparison allows to pin down the role
of the enforcement constraint in the transmission of financial shocks.
Compared to the specification with only bank credit and the enforcement
constraint, the baseline model produces a greater volatility of output. Quan-
23Labor is constant, as in de Walque et al. (2010).
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titatively, an initial decrease of 1% in the return on securities held by banks
(financial shock) yields a standard deviation of output of 0.35 in the model with
debt financing only. It is 0.41 in the model with firms financial structure. Hence,
compared to the model with only firms’ bank debt, firms’ financial structure
choice amplify the volatility of output by 17%. Hence, financial contagion via
the banking sector is responsible for 17% of output’s volatility.
Moreover, the persistence of variables in both models are relatively similar.
The differences in the initial response of output and labor demand is worth
pointing out. Labor and output increase on impact in the model in which firms
cannot issue equity, while the increase is much less pronounced in the baseline
model. As financial shocks reduce the supply of loans, firms enforcement
constraint loosens and therefore, firms increase their demand for labor. In the
model with equity issuance, firms increase dividends, tightening their constraint.
Labor is unaffected at the time of the shock.
In what follows I compare the baseline model with the model in which there
are no enforcement constraint nor equity issuance, but firms’ default. In the
baseline model output yt, loans to firms Lt+1 and inter-bank lending W
l
t+1
decrease persistently after a negative financial shock. Retail deposits Dt+1, in
contrast, rise. Lower inter-bank activity and rising retail deposits have been
documented to happen following the onset of the last financial crisis in Europe
and the U.S. For instance, Meh and Moran (2010), Dib (2010), and Gerali et al.
(2010) all find that inter-bank deposits fall after financial shocks. The long
lasting fall in loans to firms, inter-bank loans and output contrasts with the
results of the model that incorporates only firms’ bank credit and exogenous
default, as in de Walque et al. (2010). Hence, the collateral constraint is able to
explain the persistent effect of financial shocks on key macro-economic variables
as well as the counter-cyclicality of inter-bank lending.
1.6. Moments
This section presents selected moments generated by financial shocks in the
model. To see how the model compares to the data and to similar studies,
they are compared to ones that are generated by the study of de Walque et al.
(2010). The results are displayed in Table 1.6.0.1.
The standard deviation of output is 0.06 in the model of de Walque et al.
(2010) and is 0.42 in the model, which is closer to standard RBC models results.
1 Financial Shocks, External Finance, and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 32
Table 1.6.0.1. – Moments comparison
relative std corr. with output first order autocorr
variables data Modf dW data Modf dW data Modf dW
rb 1.2 1.2 6.88 0.36 -0.12 -0.55 0.9 0.65 0.77
i 1.2 1.33 5.83 0.49 -0.13 -0.43 0.88 0.66 0.75
rl 1.2 1.31 5.66 0.47 -0.14 -0.46 0.88 0.66 0.75
γ .01 0.06 0.29 0.11 0.39 -0.21 0.87 0.85 0.87
n .99 1.04 0 0.88 0.09 1 0.88 0.74 0
y 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.95 0.95
Lb 4.03 8.60 30.54 0.36 0.47 0.24 0.79 0.83 0.80
Dl 1.38 2.23 28.41 -0.11 -0.99 -0.96 0.87 0.95 0.94
F 4.62 1.97 7.54 0.01 0.91 0.83 0.64 0.95 0.95
W s 8.21 5.43 53.13 -0.24 0.10 -0.78 0.81 0.79 0.94
W b 6.95 5.43 53.13 0.44 0.10 -0.78 0.87 0.79 0.94
pi 47.3 11.5 37.84 0.13 0.41 0.57 0.78 0.7 0.68
c 0.82 1.56 7.89 0.81 0.02 0.31 0.83 0.62 0.66
I 4 71.7 32.00 0.89 -0.33 0.25 0.92 0.38 0.80
w 0.38 1.44 1 0.12 0.03 1 0.66 0.52 0.95
Note: Variables except for interest rates and default rates have been logged. They all have
been hp filtered. Modf corresponds to our model, simulated with a 1% negative financial
shock. dW correspond to the moments generated by the model of de Walque et al. (2010)
with a 1% financial shock. The variable pi stands for the sum of the profits of both banks.
The variable F is the sum of each bank buffer capital. The other variables are as in the
description of the model. Real data have been taken from de Walque et al. (2010) study
except for labor and wages (King and Rebelo, 1999).
The model simulated with a 1% financial shock matches quite well the
observed relative standard deviations of interest rates, labor, deposits, and
inter-bank lending and borrowing. Compared to de Walque et al. (2010), the
model fits better all relative standard deviations except for banks’ profits and
investment. The volatility of banks’ profits generated by the model is lower
than in the data. In addition, financial shocks produce a much larger standard
deviation of investment than in the data. Financial shocks are amplified through
financial contagion to the equity market, reducing both external financing and
thus investment. The financial contagion leads firms to increase net dividend
payouts, increasing the firm’s enforcement constraint tightness and reducing
firms’ investment. This effect could be partly overcome by allowing heterogeneity
in firms’ degree of financial constraint. Nevertheless, the result of large volatility
of investment is in line with theoretical and empirical studies on financially
constrained firms (Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010). It is found that
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investment decline in times of financial disturbance is bigger for financially
constrained firms, particularly those firms relying the most on external finance
such as credit and equity finance (Duchin et al., 2010).
Compared to de Walque et al. (2010), the match to the data of the correlation
with output of interest rates, bank default, loans to firms, bank profits, inter-
bank lending and wages is also improved. In particular, it is able to reproduce
the pro-cyclicality of inter-bank repayment rate and inter-bank borrowing.
However, similarly to de Walque et al. (2010), the model predicts counter-
cyclical interest rates, as opposed to real data. Negative financial shocks reduce
lending, raising, in equilibrium, the lending rates. Investment is also counter-
factual: it is negatively correlated with output. This is partly explained by
the collateral constraint. Indeed, while investment decreases after a negative
financial shock, it goes back quickly to its long run value, unlike output which
exhibits more persistence.
The first order auto-correlations simulated are comparable to the data. The
first order auto-correlation generated by a financial shock are closer to real data
than the ones generated with the model of de Walque et al. (2010) for wages,
profits, loans to firms, labor, and output. The first order auto-correlations of
deposits and loans are slightly lower than in de Walque et al. (2010) but still
relatively close to observations. The persistence of interest rates, consumption
and investment are lower than in the data and in de Walque et al. (2010).
1.7. Policy analysis: Basel III
de Walque et al. (2010) analyze the effect of introducing risk-sensitive capital
requirements, as in Basel II, on subsequent business cycle fluctuations. The
regulation thus follows (1.2.31). They find that capital requirements based on
credit risk, as in Basel II, amplify the transmission of productivity and financial
shocks. This section analyses the effect of counter-cyclical capital requirements,
similar to those introduced in Basel III, where (1.2.32) is imposed.
It has been previously argued that pro-cyclical policy requirements, as in
Basel II, enhance output fluctuations during crises and that counter-cyclical
requirements, as introduced in Basel III, reduce fluctuations. Figure 1.7.0.1
shows the impulse response functions of output, yt, labor, nt, the interest rate
on retail deposits, rlt, and investment, It, following a 1% negative financial
shock, with constant risk weighting (Basel I) and counter-cyclical weights
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Figure 1.7.0.1. – Financial shocks, counter-cyclical buffer effect
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Note: Impulse response functions to a 1% negative financial shock. The variable yt is output,
nt is employment, r
l
t is the deposit rate, It is investment. All variables are in % deviation
from the steady state except for the interest rate.
(Basel III). As expected, compared to fixed capital requirement ratios, counter-
cyclical capital requirements introduced in Basel III reduce the negative impact
financial disturbances have on output and labor. They reduce minimum capital
requirements of banks in bad times. Hence, banks’ demand for deposits is
relatively larger. The interest rate on deposits is lower. By non-arbitrage,
dividend issuance is also lower, thereby, reducing dividend adjustment costs.
Lower adjustment costs allow firms to dampen their reduction in labor demand
and thus production.
1.8. Discussion
This section analyses the sensitivity of the results to three modeling assumptions.
The first part discusses the modeling of the dividend adjustment costs function,
but then uses an alternative that is more in line with the literature on firms’
dividend payouts. The second investigates the role of capital adjustment costs
on the outcome of the model. Finally, the problem of the two banks is slightly
modified to allow banks to choose how much to consume in each period, and
to suppress the banks’ insurance scheme.
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1.8.1. Dividend adjustment costs
Lintner (1956)’s study shows that dividend payout policy is a function of the
firm’s current profits, pt, scaled by a long term target payout ratio. He also
shows that firms smooth out dividend payouts from one year to the next. Also,
the change in dividend payouts between two time periods is a linear function
of the difference between the long term dividend target level (itself a function
of current profits, pt) and the dividend payouts dt−1 in the last period, and
earning shocks. The following way of modeling dividend adjustment costs is
thus more in line with observations made by Lintner (1956) and later confirmed
by recent empirical and survey evidence:24
ψ (dt) = dt + κ
[
(1− β)
β
pt − dt−1
]
2,
where the fraction that multiplies pt allows the dividend cost to be equal to zero
in the steady state. A recent study on Linter’s model application in recent times
(Lambrecht and Myers, 2012) uses the same function to empirically evaluate
firms’ dividend payout rules.
The first order with respect to dt becomes λt = 1+2κmt+1λt+1 [(1− β) pt+1/β − dt] .
This dividend payout function yields similar results to the one used in the
baseline model, for values of κ within the range suggested by empirical studies.25
1.8.2. Capital adjustment costs
Capital adjustment costs are introduced in the model in an attempt to bring
the model closer to reality and to analyze their consequences when a financial
shock occurs. In particular, it allows the price of capital to fluctuate and is thus
a channel through which exogenous shocks are transmitted. To understand the
role of capital adjustment costs in the propagation of shocks, the consequences
of the introduction of such costs is discussed for the financial shock and the
productivity shock. Figure 1.8.2.1 displays the response of output yt, loans
Lt+1, stock price pt, deposits Dt+1, the price of capital qt, and investment It to
negative financial and productivity shocks, with and without capital adjustment
costs. Adjustment costs associated with varying capital dampen the impact
both shocks have on the economy. The effect is larger for financial shocks than
24Michaely and Roberts (2012), Brav et al. (2005).
25Empirical studies suggest this value is between 0.1 and 0.6.
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Figure 1.8.2.1. – The effect of capital adjustment costs
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for productivity shocks. The intuition is as follows.
As discussed above, negative financial shocks lead firms to distribute more
dividends which raises the degree of the borrowing constraint tightness. Capital
adjustment costs raise the enforcement constraint tightness, dampening the
initial increase in dividend issuance. With capital adjustment costs, households
buy relatively less stock, reducing stock prices further, and deposit more with
the lending bank. Therefore, adjustment costs enable the financial sector to
recover relatively more quickly, dampening the credit crunch and therefore the
negative impact on output. Productivity shocks do not impact the financial
sector itself. The enforcement constraint hedges banks against the productivity
shock. Consequently, the dampening effect capital adjustment cost have on the
financial sector (via an increase in deposit funds) is not present.
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1.8.3. Endogenous bank consumption
In this subsection, I let banks endogenously choose their level of consumption
cbt instead of fixing consumption as a constant fraction vi, i = b, l of profits.
Moreover, the assumption that banks place a portion of their buffer capital
into an insurance fund (ζb > 0, ζl > 0) may be subject to discussion. Indeed,
expenses are deducted from profits rather than from their buffer capital. This
feature is needed in the baseline model in order to have stationary series of
buffer capital. This is no longer needed once bank consumption is endogenous.
I thus assume ζb = ζl = 0.
Nevertheless, banks buffer capital are often considered to be sticky.26 It has
been shown that there are costs to varying bank capital as it allows banks greater
risk tolerance. For example, Adrian and Shin (2010) show that banks target
a fixed leverage ratio. It is therefore assumed to have quadratic adjustment
cost in varying buffer capital: φF
(
F it+1 − F iss
)
2, i = b, l. It can be interpreted
as a pecuniary cost in varying banks’ buffer capital because of some fees or
regulatory requirements. This assumption allows to find the steady state value
of banks’ buffer capital. Finally, there are quadratic adjustment cost in varying
profits: φpi (piit − piiss) 2, i=b,l. It can be interpreted as a pecuniary cost in
varying profits. For example, fluctuating profits are badly regarded on financial
markets so that the bank has a worse credit rating if profits vary too much,
leading to some exogenous costs. This last assumption helps to determine the
steady state values of profits.
The merchant bank problem can be rewritten as (the lending bank problem
is symmetric except for default):
Max{Wt+1,Lt+1,θt+1,pibt ,F bt+1,cbt}
∞∑
t=0
Etβ
t{ln (cbt)− db(1− θt+1)
+ dF b
[
F bt+1 − krr
(
ωLt+1 + w˜B
b
)]},
subject to
26Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) conduct an empirical study on Italian banks during
1992-2001 and suspect that bank capital is sticky. They also suggest that adjustment
costs in raising capital are higher for less capitalized banks (in this model it would imply
that the adjustment costs are higher for the lending bank).
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F bt+1 = F
b
t + pi
b
t − cbt − φF
(
F bt+1 − F bss
)
2,
pibt = Lt+
Wt+1
1 + it
−θt+1Wt− Lt+1
1 + rbt
−ωb
2
[(1− θt)Wt−1] 2+ρtBb−φpi
(
pibt − pibss
)
2.
The main results do not change compared to the baseline model. The conse-
quences of a 1% negative market book shock on the firm’s financing decision
and on the real economy are similar with some rare differences. First, buffer
capital decrease is much less pronounced in the endogenous banking consump-
tion model. It is mostly due to the fact that it includes adjustment costs in
the variation of buffer capital. Second, for the same reasons, profits are less
affected by financial shocks. Since banks can now adjust their consumption,
after negative financial shocks, banks consumption decreases and thus the
budget constraint of banks does not tighten as much. As a consequence, the
decrease in lending is less than in the baseline model and the interest rate
increase is lower. More generally, the responses of real variables to a financial
shock are less volatile. Finally, the decrease in buffer capital generated by the
negative shock is more persistent in this second scenario, due to buffer capital
and profit adjustment costs.
1.9. Conclusion
This study develops a coherent framework in which the consequences of financial
shocks on firms’ external financing decisions, and the consequences for the
real economy, can be studied. It shows how financial intermediaries and firms’
financial structure can help propagate and amplify financial shocks. Negative
financial shocks raise bank demand for retail deposits, decrease inter-bank
lending, and raise real interest rates. The combination of the credit crunch and
the large costs of equity issuance have negative consequences on firms’ external
financing, greatly reducing investment, labor demand, and output. The study
also emphasizes, from a theoretical point of view, the role of credit constraints in
magnifying financial disturbances to the real sector.27 The constraint leads the
27Campello et al. (2010) and Chava and Purnanandam (2011) show the same from an
empirical ground.
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credit supply crunch into a credit demand crunch, preventing a faster recovery
of the financial sector and thus the real sector.28 It is also able to explain the
cyclicality of labor. The results suggest that, when a crisis originates in the
financial sector, policies should aim at increasing firms’ capacity to borrow,
such as tax cuts on external financing. This should highly mitigate the negative
effects of a financial crisis.
There are several extensions to this study that constitute future projects.
The most straightforward extension is to introduce firm heterogeneity. Only
some firms could then be financially constrained. It is expected to produce
more realistic business cycle moments. We could allow the model to exhibit
possible non-linearities in responses, and use an enforcement constraint that is
more in line with the literature. This can be done by simulating the model with
occasionally binding constraints. Finally, endogeneizing the market book to
allow banks to choose between two different assets would also be an interesting
extension.
28This mechanism is different from that of Bernanke et al. (1999) who emphasize the role of
asset prices in depreciating borrowers’ balance sheet.
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1.10. Appendix
1.10.A. Comparison
Table 1.10.A.1. – Comparison of steady states
variable Model de Walque et al. (2010) variable Model de Walque et al. (2010)
c 0.54 0.42 ρ 0.03 0.03
D 4.99 0.386 γb 16.93 107.01
L 1.997 0.193 λb 18.71 199.07
w 2.04 2.12 λl 67.62 592.7
n 0.195 0.2 γl 77.95 778.59
rl 0.011 0.004 F l 0.48 0.04
rb 0.016 0.016 F b 0.69 0.06
k 5.62 6.33 T -0.07 0.01
y 0.60 0.63 q 1
z 1 1 I 0.14
λ 0.993 0.998 p 3.64
pib 0.098 0.0069 R 1.01
pil 0.035 0.096 s 1
W 1.21 0.096 d 0.04
i 0.013 0.007 ξ 0.1634
θ 0.99 0.99 µ 0.0044
Table 1.10.A.3. – Implied steady state ratios
Baseline model de Walque et al. (2010)
k/y 10 10
d/y 6.6% 4%
c/y 86.7% 66%
ωb/2 [(1− θt)Wt−1] 2/
(
F b + F l
)
0.4% 0.3%(
pib + pil
)
/
(
F b + F l
)
11.4% 12%
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1.10.B. Shock comparison
Figure 1.10.B.1. – Shock comparison, with serially uncorrelated shocks
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
%
d
ev
ia
ti
on
fr
om
S
S yt
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−6
−4
−2
0
2
It
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
Lt+1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
dt
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
rt
b
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
nt
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
pt
Time aft. shock (quarters)
 
 
Financial shock
Productivity shock
Liquidity shock
2. Empirical Investigation of the
Effect of Bank Wholesale Debt
on Loans and Output in the
Euro-zone
2.1. Introduction
The last decades’ developments in the banking sector (shadow banking, securi-
tization, increased wholesale funding) have increased the interconnectedness
in the financial sector, raising systemic risk (Rajan, 2005), and increased the
responsiveness of banks to shocks (Disyatat, 2011).1 According to policy mak-
ers and researchers (Gertler et al., 2016; Hanson et al., 2011; Tarullo, 2013),
recent events have been triggered by disruptions in the wholesale banking
sector. Wholesale fundings are items of banks’ liability and account for nearly
half of total liabilities in the Euro-zone. They include inter-bank deposits,
short term securities (Money Market Fund shares) and bank debt issuance.
Wholesale fundings contrasts with retail deposits because they have factu-
ally shorter maturities and are easier to raise than deposits (Diamond et al.,
2001). Hence, wholesale fundings are largely conditioned by the macroeconomic
climate, raising uncertainty.
Increased reliance of the banking sector on wholesale funding raises funding
liquidity risk in case of a macroeconomic shock. Funding liquidity risk is the
risk that banks investors do not roll over their funding as they would in normal
times, and withdraw large amounts of funding during periods of stress. This
can trigger fire sales and thus erode bank capital, possibly leading banks to
1Systemic risk is the risk that the whole financial system fails, as opposed to the risk of
failure of a single entity.
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default (solvency risk), increasing systemic risk. Since capital erosion limits
banks ability to borrow, the reduction in banks’ funding is amplified. Moreover,
it increases the risk that banks are not able to meet their short term financial
demand (liquidity risk). Falling funds reduce the size of banks, possibly leading
to a cut in credit.
In this context, the literature has gained interest on the role of wholesale
funding of banks in generating and propagating crises (Adrian and Shin, 2010;
Lo´pez-Espinosa et al., 2012). Most studies concentrate on the role of the most
unstable wholesale funding, bank short term wholesale funding and inter-bank
funding, in affecting economic activity. The role of bank long term debt issuance
in the amplification and the propagation of the last financial crisis has not been
assessed yet. Their share in total liabilities in the Euro-zone is about 14%.
Although they are less volatile than other wholesale funds, they are nearly
twice as more volatile than deposits and by raising uncertainty and leverage,
can be a source of great instability (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014).
The objective of this study is to evaluate the role of bank long term debt
issuance in affecting loan supply and output in the Euro-zone from 1999Q1 to
2014Q4.
I present two contributions, one theoretical and one empirical. The theo-
retical model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) is extended in Section 2.4 by
incorporating a market for bank wholesale debt funding. I then follow Driscoll
(2004)’s empirical strategy by using a two stage least square instrumental
variable linear regression to identify shifts in the loan supply equation (Section
2.6). Driscoll (2004) uses shocks to deposits to instrument for loan supply.
His framework is extended by adding a second instrument which represents
changes in bank preferences for wholesale long term debt issuance. In addi-
tion to testing causalities between financial shocks, loan supply and output,
I test the validity of the functional form of the model, in Section 2.7, using
non-parametric instrumental variables (NPIV). Despite the theoretical evidence
(Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), the study of potential non-linearities of
loan supply on output remains unexplored. This is of particular concern for
policy and regulation in the banking sector. Indeed, a better understanding of
the effect of loan supply on output may help policy makers. Non-parametric
techniques are useful because they allow to reasonably fit the data without
making any assumptions on the parametric family of the data. They are used
as an explanatory tool and may help confirm an expected parametric form. To
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test the validity of the model I embed the linear empirical specification into a
more general class of model called General Additive Models (GAM) (Hastie
and Tibshirani, 1990), fitted with local linear kernel regressions.
Additionally, increasing the number of instruments allows precision of the
estimates to be increased, an improvement in the two stage least square (2SLS)
estimator efficiency, and the construction of a test for endogeneity of the
instruments (test for over-identifying restrictions). Moreover, the ability to
recover non-linearities in NPIV is positively linked to the strength of the
instrument (Newey, 2013).
The next Section 2.2 exposes published works on bank liability structure
and its effect on economic activity. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.5
presents the estimation of financial shocks, Sections 2.6 and 2.7 give the linear
and non-parametric 2SLS results. Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2. Literature
I first review the theoretical papers on the role of financial structure in affecting
loan supply and output. I show how potential non-linearities can arise. Then,
the empirical evidence on the effect of bank wholesale funds on loan supply
and loan supply on output is presented.
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) develop the benchmark theoretical model of the
role of financial structure on economic activity. The authors extend the standard
Keynesian IS-LM model by incorporating a market for banks’ loans. The IS-
LM model is a stylized framework in which short term economic transmission
mechanisms of shocks can be analyzed. There are three types of agents: a
government, a central bank, and a set of non bank agents (households and
firms). There are two financial assets, bonds and money, and consumption and
investment goods. Figure 2.2.0.1 shows the two curves that represent all the
equilibrium points on the goods market, the IS curve, and all the equilibrium
points on the money market, the LM curve. By clearing the goods and the
money markets, the bonds market automatically clears by Walras’ law. The IS
curve displays a negative relationship between output (y) and the interest rate
on the financial asset (rm) while LM shows that the interest rate is a negative
function of output. Point 1 on the graph is the only point in which all markets
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Figure 2.2.0.1. – IS-LM-Bank Loans
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Bernanke and Blinder (1988) introduce a third financial asset, loans that are
supplied by commercial banks. They also assume that bonds and loans are
imperfect substitutes due to asymmetric information or liquidity differences.
Therefore, investment is also affected by the lending rate. They thus define
a modified IS curve in which loans and bonds are imperfect substitutes, and
given that, the loan market also clears.
In the model, exogenous shocks to money affect the economy as follows. By
reducing the quantity of money in the economy (LM shifts to LM’), interest
rates rise, investment and output fall. Moreover, monetary policy decreases
bank reserves and thus bank loans. In the standard Keynesian framework,
since loans and bonds are perfectly substitutable, the reduction in bank loans
is completely offset by a rise in bonds. Hence, the story ends here. When firms’
funds are imperfectly substitutable, for a given interest rate, a decrease in loan
supply lowers investment. The IS curve shifts to the left (IS’) and output is
further reduced. The new equilibrium point is point 2 in Figure 2.2.0.1. This is
the so-called bank lending channel. It is the channel through which monetary
policy affects economic activity via credit. It should be distinguished from
the standard “interest rate channel”, where changes in the nominal interest
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rate affect output. The authors also empirically analyze the contribution of
credit and money demand shocks in affecting economic activity, but they do
not evaluate shocks arising within the financial sector.
The theory behind the lending channel is found notably in Froot and Stein
(1998) and Stein (1998). Froot and Stein (1998) present a theoretical analysis
showing that banks actively manage their balance sheet to hedge against risk.
Due to the inherent characteristic of a bank where the maturity of much of its
debt is short, as opposed to the long term maturity of its assets, banks may
face non hedgeable liquidity risks. Because some of the risk in the banking
sector is not hedgeable, banks are also concerned about liquidity and leverage
(in addition to profits) and thus hold non trivial amounts of capital (buffers).
Therefore, banks have a hedging strategy in addition to deciding the quantity
of debt they hold. In other words, the funding structure of the banking sector,
such as capital leverage and the quantity of liquid funds in total funds, matters
for the quantity of lending made. Stein (1998) offers some micro foundations
for the importance of bank liability structure. The author shows that adverse
selection problems between financial intermediaries and their investors give
theoretical grounds to adjustment costs in varying uninsured funds. Hence, this
points to the imperfect substitutability of banks’ balance sheet items.2 It is
assumed that investors are not perfectly informed about how the bank manages
its assets. There are thus some adjustment costs to be incurred when raising
new uninsured funds. There are no costs for insured funds as they assume that
they are the only way for banks to raise asymmetric-information proof external
finance.3 The further a bank attempts to substitute deposits for uninsured
funds, the higher are the potential adverse selection problems.
Recent macroeconomic models have included an explicit bank financial
structure. In particular, they have recently demonstrated heightened interest
in the role of banks’ wholesale funding in affecting macroeconomic stability.
Gertler et al. (2016) extend the macroeconomic model of Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2011) to include bank wholesale funding in addition to retail deposits. In
their model, there are possible runs on wholesale inter-bank funding, such that
creditors do not roll over inter-bank deposits. They argue that these specifics
2Examples of uninsured funds are wholesale CDs, subordinated debt, preferred stock, etc.
3Cornett et al. (2011) in fact shows that “deposits insulate banks from liquidity risk due to
the advent of government guarantees”. They are, as a consequence, less elastic sources of
funding.
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allow to better capture the development of the recent financial crisis. Disyatat
(2011) develops a model in which capital is distinguished from other banks’
funds. This work reformulates the bank lending channel to take into account
recent developments in banks’ market funding. In contrast with quantitative
effects of the bank lending channel, the author focuses on the role of endogenous
external finance premia and risk perception of banks regarding the impact on
loan supply.
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) develop a macroeconomic model in which
the illiquidity of capital raises uncertainty and can give rise to potential non-
linear effects of funding shocks on output by raising systemic risk. In their
theoretical setup, market illiquidity of capital (defined as the difference between
the first best price of capital minus the price to which prices may theoretically
drop) determines endogenous risk. The greater is market illiquidity, the greater
is the systemic risk because it raises market uncertainty. Consequently, the
authors suggest that shocks to bank funding can affect non-linearly output
in the sense that times of crisis are distinguished from normal times, by the
uncertainty.
This study is also related to the empirical literature on the role of bank
funding structure on bank lending, and to the literature evaluating the impact
of lending on economic activity.
Studying the effect of loan supply on output goes through two main difficulties.
The first is to identify a variation in loan supply. The difficulty of the task lies
mainly in that demand from supply effects can hardly be distinguished, because
credit supply and credit demand share common determinants (output, interest
rates). The second difficulty is to identify the effect on output. A decrease in
loan supply may well respond to a decrease in future expected output, and
output may fall due to a cut in loan supply. The difficulty of the question has
led to a large number of works testing if changes in loan supply affect output
growth. In what follows, I briefly review the most relevant of them with respect
to my study.
Based on Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model, Driscoll (2004) empirically
tests the existence of the bank lending channel in the U.S. between 1969 and
1998. The author exploits the panel dimension and the common currency
dimension of the U.S. to identify loan supply. He uses state specific shocks to
money demand to instrument loan supply in a linear two stage least square
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estimation procedure. By viewing the U.S. states as small open economies with
fixed exchange rates, any shock to money demand in one state is automatically
accommodated so that output is left unchanged.4 Nevertheless, the money
demand shocks change bank deposits, loan supply and thereby, may affect
output. Driscoll (2004) finds that, in the U.S., between 1969 and 1998 (annual
data), shocks to bank deposits affect bank lending. However, he finds no
evidence of a bank lending channel in the U.S. as loan variation is not found to
affect output.
Driscoll (2004) argues that it is possible to identify the effect of a change in
loan supply using shocks to deposits in the U.S. over the period studied (1969-
1998) as inter-state lending and deposits were legally made possible from 1996.
Still, state by state agreements on deposits and lending were made starting
in the early 80s and opened inter-state markets. To identify the bank lending
channel in a specific state, deposit and lending markets must be segmented
across states.
Cappiello et al. (2010) and Rondorf (2012) reproduce Driscoll (2004) method-
ology in ten Euro-zone countries. The Euro-zone banking market remains
segmented across countries.5 Cappiello et al. (2010) follow closely the estima-
tion procedure of Driscoll (2004) but include in the estimation of the effect of
money demand shocks on loans a variable representing the tightness of bank
credit standards.
In contrast with Driscoll (2004) who takes first differences of the data, Rondorf
(2012) estimates money demand with an error correction framework. As real
money balances and its determinants in the Euro-zone are non-stationary and
follow the same long run trend, money demand must be estimated with an
error correction framework, in which both the long run and short run variations
are taken into account.
Both Rondorf (2012) and Cappiello et al. (2010) find evidence of a bank
lending channel in the Euro-zone from 1999 to 2008, suggesting that firms and
banks’ funds are imperfectly substitutable during this period. Cappiello et al.
(2010) find, in addition, that not only have volumes of credit affected output,
but also bank credit standards.
4Real balances increase in that state and decrease in all other states
5The share of domestic deposits and domestic loans in total deposits and loans in all of the
10 Euro-zone countries is above 90% except for Belgium, Ireland (varies between 75 and
95%) and Austria and Finland in the years following the crisis (it falls to about 87%).
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In contrast with panel techniques, Gambetti and Musso (2012) and Hristov
et al. (2012) both use a VAR model to identify loan supply shocks and study
their role on economic activity in the Euro Area. The first study spans from
1980 to 2011 and the second from 2003 to the second quarter of 2010. Both find
evidence that loan supply has affected output. The VAR techniques abstract
from a solid theoretical background. They measure exogenous variations in
the supply of loans but do not identify the source of it. This is particularly
cumbersome if one intends to understand the underlying economic mechanism.
All these studies assume that the relationship between loan supply and
output is linear. There are few empirical studies that relate evidence on non-
linearities. Schleer and Semmler (2015) consider non-linearities between the
banking sector financial conditions and real economic activity. Based on a
VAR regime switching model, they find that financial sector shocks led to
large non-linearities and amplification effects in some Euro-zone countries, in
particular after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Bouvatier et al. (2014) use
smooth transition regime regression models in 17 OECD countries and show
that credit is non-linearly related to output variation. It is highly related to
business cycles in times of high volatility. To my knowledge, there are no studies
that investigate potential non-linearities that do not impose a functional form
on the data.
Changes in loan supply can be due to monetary policy changes, bank funding
shocks, or changes in market conditions such as increased risk perception.
Most of the literature focuses on the role of capital and reservable liabilities in
affecting loan supply. Recently, the literature has gained interest over the role
of non-reservable liabilities of banks in affecting loan supply. Deposits, although
theoretically liquid, are stable because they are insured. Wholesale funds
contrast with retail deposits because they have factually shorter maturities and
are easier to raise than deposits (Diamond et al., 2001). As a consequence,
wholesale debt funding is part of banks’ investment strategy and may have a
sizeable impact on bank lending.
Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2011) point out that the standard frame-
work of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) is not able to take into account recent
developments in the banking sector, as the role of deposits in bank funding
has decreased (non-reservable liabilities have been increasingly easy to raise).
The authors conduct an empirical investigation of the determinants of the loan
supply schedule. They consider the effect of monetary policy on the bank
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lending channel in 1000 banks among 14 European countries and the US, from
the first quarter of 1999 to the third quarter of 2009. They include a dummy
variable (from the third quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2009) to their
linear empirical specification to account for non-linear effects during the recent
financial crisis. They find that banks’ funding structure matters for lending in
that increased short term funding and/or additional funding via securitization
amplifies the cuts in bank lending during financial instability. Their result
suggests a non-linear effect on the monetary transmission mechanism (bank
lending channel), where crisis times and normal times are distinguished.
Cornett et al. (2011) study the role of bank liquidity structure in affecting
credit supply in the U.S. during the years 2006-2009. They use a panel of banks
on quarterly data. Their empirical model takes into account the fact that banks
hold cash and liquid assets in their hedging strategy (to manage liquidity risk).
They use four measures of liquidity risk management for banks and interact
each variable with the TED spread.6 The TED spread is a measure of market
liquidity conditions and is believed to have surprised banks during the crisis, so
that banks had to change their liquidity management policies. The spread thus
allows them to separate effects of the crisis period from normal times. They
find that banks with higher levels of liquidity risk exposure reduced lending
more than others in periods of high TED spreads. They did this by building
up liquidity buffers, for instance. It suggests that non-linearities in the loan
supply, arising by a change in banks’ funding structure, become larger with
bank liquidity risk. The authors also find that banks with more stable sources
of funding (such as deposits and equity capital) reduced lending less than other
banks during the last financial crisis, and that banks with less liquid assets
reduced loans to increase their liquid assets. Finally, the authors note that
bank illiquidity had peaked after the fall of Lehman Brothers (last quarter of
2008).
Therefore, the two previously cited studies suggest that unstable and short
term funding of banks affect non-linearly credit, in the sense that normal times
and crisis times have a different impact.
This study is also related to the literature on bank debt issuance. Rixtel
et al. (2015) investigate the determinants of bank wholesale long term debt
6The TED spread is defined as the difference between inter-bank rate minus the short term
government T-Bill.
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funding in 14 European countries.7 Their empirical specification is additive
and in log levels. The authors follow the banking literature, and the literature
on debt issuance choice of firms, to theoretically motivate a set of long term
bank debt issuance determinants. They use bank level data from 1999Q1 to
2013Q1 on 63 European banks as well as country level aggregated data. They
show that country specific risks were detrimental to bank bond issuance in
the euro-area. Notably, they find that financial market tensions affected more
strongly bond issuance during the Great Recession.
This chapter extends the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model by allowing
banks to be funded via wholesale long term debt in addition to deposits. I
construct an equation for the supply and the demand of bank long term debt.
Based on the theoretical model, and using an error correction framework, I
estimate shocks to the supply of bank debt, in addition to money demand
shocks as in Driscoll (2004) and Rondorf (2012). I investigate, using both a
linear and a non-parametric instrumental variable approach, the role of both
financial shocks in affecting loans and output. The macroeconomic impact of
disruptions in bank long term debt has not been assessed in the literature yet.
Non-parametric techniques do not impose any functional form and help verify
the validity of the linearity assumption of the model. Few studies have pointed
out the existence of non-linearities between funding shocks and loan supply as
well as between credit and output.
2.3. Data
This section describes and briefly comments the data used in the study. I
use quarterly data, from the first quarter of 1999 to the last quarter of 2014.
The countries studied are the eleven founder members of the euro except for
Luxembourg.8 There is thus Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France
(FR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal
(PT), and Spain (ES).
Country level output is measured by chained linked volumes of the Gross
7Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Portugal and non Euro-zone countries: Switzerland, Sweden and the
United Kingdom.
8The share of the financial sector in total GDP in Luxembourg is much larger than in the
other countries considered, rendering it an outlier.
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domestic Product (GDP) series, published in Eurostat, as in Rondorf (2012).9
The money supply is all the money in circulation (M3) minus currency and
traveler’s checks, as measured by countries’ respective central banks. The
monetary aggregate M3 includes bank deposits from the non-financial sector,
with maturity less than two years (76% of total deposits), short term wholesale
funds (Money Market Funds), and debt securities with maturity of up to two
years. The measure of bank wholesale funding in this study corresponds to
all domestic bank debt issuance with maturity of more than two years. All
the bank balance sheet series are from the European Central Bank (ECB)
website. The series are monthly outstanding amounts at the end of the period
to non monetary and financial institutions (domestic loans can be found in the
section domestic and cross border position of Euro area monetary financial
institutions, by country).10 Then, the outstanding amount of the last month
of each quarter is taken. The long term interest rate is the quarterly average
of monthly interest rates on the yield of a ten year government bond. It is
available on the European Central Bank website, in the financial data section.
Credit to GDP gap and exports are also used in the study, as instruments
for output in the estimation of money demand and bank debt issuance. The
credit to GDP gap variable is taken from the risk dashboard data of the ECB.
Exports are from Datastream. The deflator is the ratio of nominal GDP over
the chained linked volumes (2010) of GDP from Eurostat. Population series
are also from Eurostat.
All the series in the estimations are seasonally adjusted using the x-12-ARIMA
seasonal adjustment of the U.S. Census Bureau, deflated and per capita except
for interest rates.
I now analyze relevant balance sheet items and GDP series. The liability
items of the banking sector can be broadly decomposed into retail funds, called
deposits from non monetary and financial institutions (MFI), which are for
most insured liabilities, wholesale funds, and bank own funds. Table 2.3.0.1
exposes the general evolution of the Euro-zone financial structure and economic
activity, from 1999 to 2014. It displays some summary statistics on wholesale,
deposits, loans and GDP average growth rates in the Euro-zone. The coefficient
of variation (CV) reveals that wholesale funds are nearly twice as volatile as
9Quarterly population for Ireland is taken from the OECD website as it is not available on
Eurostat http://ec.Europa.eu/Eurostat/data/database.
10Quarterly domestic data is not available for the cross border positions.
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Table 2.3.0.1. – Bank financial structure, loans and output: mean growth rates
summary statistics in 10 Euro-zone countries
Correlations Mean CV
D W L GDP before
crisis
after
crisis
Deposits (D) 1 0.15 0.49 0.15 1.28 0.50 2.71
Wholesale (W) 1 0.54 -0.14 2.30 -0.49 4.23
Loans (L) 1 -0.09 1.65 -0.39 3.17
GDP 1 0.80 0.06 8.36
Note: CV is the coefficient of variation. Before crisis and after crisis correspond to, respectively,
before and after (excluded) 2008Q2. Deposits is total deposits from non MFI in the 10
Euro-zone countries considered over the period 1999Q1 to 2014Q4 (640 obs). Wholesale
corresponds to bank funds other than deposits to non MFI and bank own funds. Loans is
total loans to non MFI. The series are deflated by the chained linked volume GDP implicit
deflator. The data is taken from http://www.ecb.Europa.eu.
deposits. Insured funds are less subject to uncertainty and thus typically more
stable. All the series’ growth rates decreased after the onset of the crisis. The
growth rate of wholesale and lending even became negative. Furthermore, the
liability item the most correlated with loans is wholesale funds.
Bank wholesale funds cover Money Market Fund (MMF), bank debt issuance
and inter-bank deposits. In this study, I restrict myself to bank debt issuance
(held by European Union (EU) residents).11 The modeling characteristics of
the inter-bank market is very different from other markets. MMF shares are
already included in the money market and only account only for 1.5% of total
liabilities. Bank debt issuance are bank bonds with maturity exceeding two
years. Appendix 2.9.A gives summary statistics and a short description of each
banks’ balance sheet items, as classified by the ECB.12
Table 2.3.0.3 reports the growth rates, before and after the crisis, of bank
domestic and external liabilities (this includes foreign deposits, from non MFI)
and EU and non-EU debt issuance. It also reports their volatility (CV) and
their share in total liabilities. Of all, debt issuance (EU) is the most volatile
component. It accounts for over 14 % of total banks’ funds. In addition, the
growth rates of debt issuance (EU), external liabilities and total liabilities have
decreased after the Lehman collapse while deposits’ growth remained positive.
11Banks can target investors and therefore, the decisions to issue debt to other countries’
investors may depend on different factors that is not covered in this study.
12See also the ECB “Manual on MFI balance sheet statistics”, June 2012.
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Figure 2.3.0.1. – Banks financial structure evolution
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Table 2.3.0.3. – Growth and share of selected liability components
Variable before (Std) after (Std) CV share %
Debt issuance (EU) .09 (5.80) -.65 (4.72) -25.52 14.24
Debt issuance (non-EU) 3.51 (17.33) 1.70 (18.55) 6.46 9.39
Deposits (domestic) 1.28 (2.34) .51 (2.89) 2.71 31.80
External liabilities .26 (6.73) -1.62 (7.18) -13.46 16.31
Total liabilities 1.98 (3.04) -.21 (3.89) 3.33 100
Note: CV is the coefficent of variation. Before and after correspond to respectively, before
and after 2008Q2. External liabilities includes non Euro area residents’ holding of deposits
and repurchase agreements, MMF shares and debt securities with maturity of less than or
equal to 2 years. Debt issuance includes debt securities with maturity more than 2 years.
Domestic deposits are from non MFI. The series are deflated by the chained linked volume
GDP implicit deflator. The data is taken from http://www.ecb.Europa.eu.
Figure 2.3.0.1 depicts the evolution of output, domestic loans, domestic
deposits from non MFI, and debt issuance (EU) by country, since 1999Q1,
given countries’ banking sector size. It thus shows the evolution of banking
financial structure through time. It also shows the evolution of the banking
sector size in countries’ total revenue (GDP). The figure reveals a major change
in the growth rate of the share of loans after the Lehman collapse in all countries
except in IE, IT, NL. The direction of change is however heterogeneous across
countries. The share of loans increases in AT, BE, and FR after 2008. It remains
stable or decreases in other countries. Nonetheless, the share of domestic loans
in total banks’ assets is lower in the period after the crisis (relative to before
the crisis) in all countries, revealing a change in the asset structure of the
Euro-zone banking sector. The Lehman collapse was also suddenly followed
by an increase in the share of domestic deposits to non financial institutions
in all ten countries except in ES and FI. On the opposite, debt issuance have
decreased after the crisis in six out of the ten countries.13 They have remained
nearly constant or increased in other countries. As the share of banks’ retail
funding in banks’ size rose while the share of loans decreased in most countries
after the onset of the crisis, I therefore ask: Can the change in the banking
sector’s asset structure be explained by disruptions on wholesale debt markets?
To assess if there exists a significant relationship between bank debt issuance
and bank loans, I estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) fixed effect
regression of domestic loans on bank debt issuance (EU). Table 2.3.0.4 shows
the results of the regression before and after the crisis. During both sub-periods,
13AT, BE, DE, ES, FI and IE.
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Table 2.3.0.4. – Exploratory regression: Loans on debt issuance
OLS with fixed effects
(1) Before crisis (2) After crisis
Dependent variable ∆log(domestic loansi,t) ∆log(domestic loansi,t)
∆log(debt issuancei,t) .045** .111***
(.018) (.027)
∆log(total assetsi,t) .273*** .347***
(.056) (.086)
Constant .015*** .005***
(.002) (.001)
Observations 370 260
R2 .159 .3447
Ramsey R. test 13.58*** 10.26***
Note: The crisis corresponds to 2008Q2. Debt issuance are debt securities held
by EU residents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, ***
p<.01. The Ramsey reset test nul hyp. (H0): There are no non-linear omitted
variables.
for a given banking sector size, an increase in bank debt issuance is positively
associated with an increase in lending, and more so after the onset of the crisis.
Hence, banks’ liability structure matters for lending. Furthermore, the Ramsey
reset test from the exploratory regression rejects the null hypothesis that the
model is well specified. The regression model is hence misspecified, possibly
due to non-linear omitted components. In addition, this equation does not give
any possible causal interpretation due to endogeneity issues (reverse causality).
Indeed, on the one hand, debt issuance of banks may rise due to an increase
in the demand for loans. On the other hand, if bank debt funding increases,
banks may increase their lending supply.
The next section introduces the theoretical model of Bernanke and Blinder
(1988). The model is extended by allowing banks to be funded via wholesale
debt funding in addition to deposits. Based on the theoretical framework, I
construct in Section 2.5 an equation for the supply of bank wholesale debt.
I estimate, using an error correction framework, two instruments for loan
supply, money demand shocks as in Driscoll (2004) and Rondorf (2012), and
an additional instrument, shocks to the supply of wholesale debt. In section 2.6
and 2.7 I investigate, using both a linear and a non-parametric instrumental
variable approach, the role of these financial shocks in affecting loans and
output. Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.4. An extended Bernanke and Blinder model
The model of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) is a Keynesian macroeconomic
model with nominal rigidities where output is demand driven. The novelty
of the paper is the introduction of the financial intermediation sector, where
financial shocks can affect output via their impact on loans and investment.
2.4.1. Behaviors
There are four markets in this extended IS-LM model: the goods market, the
money market, the loans market and the bonds market. By clearing the goods,
the money and the loans markets, the bonds market automatically clears by
Walras’ law. There are also four types of agents: a government, a central
bank, a commercial bank, and a set of non bank agents (households and firms).
The central bank changes the monetary base mi,t − pi,t. The firms finance
themselves by issuing bonds at rate rt and taking loans at rate ρi,t. To the
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model I include the market for bank wholesale
long term debt. The balance sheet of banks is displayed in Table 2.4.1.1. On
the liability side of their balance sheets, banks hold deposits mi,t − pi,t that are
remunerated at the rate rdi,t, and long term debt Wi,t. They pay an interest
rate it to debt holders. These interest rates are assumed to be the same across
countries. This simplifying assumption is motivated by the fact that cross
border bank long term debt transactions are numerous within the Euro-zone.
Hence, by non-arbitrage, interest rates should be similar. Banks also hold other
liabilities such as own funds, Ki,t, inter-bank deposits and non EU funds. The
size of the banking sector, total liabilities, is denoted Ai,t. To keep the model
tractable I assume other liabilities (own funds, etc.) are exogenous. It can be
due, for example, to changes in banking regulation (eg.: the Basel accords). It is
assumed banks have an optimal debt structure because, on one hand, wholesale
debt funds have factually shorter maturities so they may help meet liquidity
needs, are easier to raise than deposits, and are cheaper than capital. On the
other hand, they are more prone to macroeconomic instabilities (Gertler et al.,
2016). As a consequence, wholesale debt funding is part of banks’ investment
strategy. On the asset side, banks hold loans li,t and earn a return ρi,t on it, and
bonds Bi,t which yield a return rt. As on the bank debt market, bonds rates
are assumed to be the same across countries. The robustness of the results to
this assumption will be tested. Variables are expressed in logarithm except for
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Table 2.4.1.1. – Commercial bank balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Bonds, Bi,t(rt) Debt issuance, Wi,t(it)
Loans, li,t(ρi,t) Deposits, mi,t − pi,t(rdi,t)
Other
the interest rates.
On the goods market, total income is a positive function of aggregate con-
sumption and investment, government total expenditure and net exports. Gov-
ernment spending is exogenous. Net exports are assumed to be a function of
output and an exogenous exchange rate. Investment is a negative function of
financing costs, the bond rate rt and the lending rate, ρi,t.
14 Consumption also
depends negatively on the interest rate on loans and bonds, as an increase in
both interest rates raises the cost of goods. By solving for output, the aggregate
demand is:
yi,t = −σrt − αρi,t + ηy∗t + ξyi,t. (2.4.1)
The variable y∗t represents components of the aggregate demand that are
common to all countries such as government spending and the international
environment. The variable ξyi,t is a disturbance term to the aggregate demand. It
can be due to fiscal policy changes, stock market crashes and booms, or changes
in preferences such as changes in confidence or expectations of non-financial
agents. If the demand for commodities is insensitive to loans (loans and bonds
would be perfect substitute, α = 0), (2.4.1) would collapse to the standard IS
curve: yi,t = −σrt + ηy∗t + ξyi,t. Output is increasing in government expenditure
and net exports. It is decreasing in the interest rate.
The bond rate rt is given by the equilibrium between the demand for bonds
from households and banks and the supply of bonds from investment firms. It is
assumed the bonds market is well integrated in the ten Euro-zone countries such
that the return on bonds are the same. Robustness checks to this assumption
will be done.
The interest rate on bank loans is determined by the equilibrium between
14Driscoll (2004) assumes the interest rate on bonds ri,t is the same for all U.S. states.
Interest rates on bonds differ across countries in the Euro-zone (as in Rondorf (2012)).
Euro-zone countries bond market is more segmented.
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bank loan supply and the demand for loans from firms. On the loans market,
the demand for loans is written as:
ldi,t = τrt − χρi,t + ωyi,t + ξl
d
i,t, (2.4.2)
where ξl
d
i,t is a disturbance term to the loan demand. The demand for loans
rises with the costs of the other form of finance, bond issuance, and the
revenue, and decreases with its cost ρi,t.
The supply of loans lsi,t from commercial banks is positively related to deposits
mi,t−pi,t, own funds Ki,t, wholesale debt Wi,t, and negatively to the opportunity
cost of lending rt. It is therefore assumed that deposits and wholesale funds
are imperfect substitutes in banks’ liabilities. The imperfect substitutability of
deposits and wholesale funds arises because deposits are typically more liquid
but limited while wholesale funds are more volatile and can be raised more
easily. The supply of loans is:
lsi,t = −λrt + µρi,t + β(mi,t − pi,t) + ζWi,t + ζ1Ki,t + ξl
s
i,t. (2.4.3)
The variable ξl
s
i,t is a disturbance term to the supply of loans. The parameters
β, ζ, and ζ1 take different values due to their different maturity, liquidity and
risk characteristics. Indeed, banks hold some non-trivial amounts of capital to
hedge themselves against risk (Froot and Stein, 1998). Banks also issue debt
to overcome deposit supply constraints (Diamond et al., 2001) and can thus
expand their assets.
The supply of deposits is equal to the demand for money. The demand
for money is a positive function of revenue yi,t and a negative function of the
opportunity cost of holding money, rt− rdi,t (investing this money in government
bond holding) and it − rdi,t (investing this money in bank wholesale funds). It
is thus assumed that bank wholesale funds, deposits (liquid assets) and bonds
are imperfectly substitutable in agents’ portfolios. The difference arises from
maturity, liquidity and risk of each asset. The aggregate equilibrium for money
is written
mi,t − pi,t = γyi,t − δ(rt − rdi,t)− δ′(it − rdi,t) + ξmi,t. (2.4.4)
The variable ξmi,t represents state specific shocks to money demand. It can be
due to differences in the institutional framework or preferences. For example,
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differences in the introduction of ATM across countries, differences in the
easiness of payment through the internet or credit cards across countries may
lead to country specific changes in money demand.
The interest rate on bank debt issuance it is determined by the supply and
demand for wholesale debt funding of banks. The supply of bank wholesale debt
funding is a negative function of deposits mi,t−pi,t as deposits supply constraints
lead banks to increase non-deposit liabilities (Diamond et al., 2001). Investment
opportunities, reflected through yi,t, also affect positively the amount of debt
to issue. Total assets Ai,t affect positively debt issuance as larger banks are
less prone to agency conflicts and asymmetric information (Smith and Warner,
1979) and can therefore be more leveraged. In addition, given banks’ size
Ai,t, the supply of wholesale funds is a negative function of country’s riskiness
(Rixtel et al., 2015), reflected in the interest rate on financial assets rt, and the
volatility on debt markets Vt. Debt issuance is expected to be negatively related
to banks’ own funds Ki,t as it can substitute debt issuance. Alternatively,
banks that are more capitalized Ki,t are considered less risky and are more able
to absorb risk, and can thus issue more bonds (Rixtel et al., 2015; Berger and
Bouwman, 2013). The supply is also a decreasing function of its cost it. The
equation for the supply of wholesale debt funding of banks is the following:
W si,t = χ2Ai,t − γ3 (mi,t − pi,t)− χ1Ki,t − ψit + β1yi,t+ηV ∗t − τ1rt + ξwsi,t .
(2.4.5)
The variable ξw
s
i,t is an exogenous shock to the supply of these funds. It captures
variations in the supply for wholesale funds that are not due to economic
fundamentals. It could capture, for example, a change in risk perception of
banks on the wholesale market, or a change in their preference for liquidity.
Households can invest in wholesale debt securities W di,t. The demand for
wholesale debt is modeled symmetrically to the demand for deposits. It is thus
a positive function of output yi,t, and a negative function of the opportunity
cost of investing in wholesale funds, rdi,t − it and rt − it:
W di,t = −φ(rt − it)− φ′(rdi,t − it) + γ1yi,t + ξw
d
i,t . (2.4.6)
The variable ξw
d
i,t is a shock to households preferences for bank wholesale debt.
It can arise from a change in market confidence in banks ability to repay its
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debt.
2.4.2. The relationship between output and loans
To see the innovation of my model with respect to Bernanke and Blinder (1988),
one can rewrite the model as follows. Clear the loans market by equating (2.4.2)
and (2.4.3), solve for ρi,t, and, then, plug the result in (2.4.1),
yi,t =
1
1 + ωα
χ+µ
{−
[
σ +
α (τ + λ)
(χ+ µ)
]
rt + ηy
∗
t + ξ
y
i,t
+
α
χ+ µ
[
ξl
s
i,t + ζWi,t + ζ1Ki,t + β (mi,t − pi,t)− ξl
d
i,t
]
}. (2.4.7)
By assuming that bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes, Bernanke and
Blinder (1988) model permits monetary policy to affect output through a
change in loan supply (α 6= 0 and β 6= 0), i.e. allows for an effective bank
lending channel. Since it is assumed that bank deposits and wholesale funds
are imperfect substitutes (ζ 6= 0), wholesale debt can have real effects as well.
Thus, my assumption extends the bank lending channel to a “bank wholesale
funding channel”.
To see the relation between output and loans, the system of equations (2.4.1),
(2.4.2), (2.4.3), (2.4.4), (2.4.5), and (2.4.6) can be rewritten in the following
way. For simplicity it is assumed rdi,t = 0, as in Rondorf (2012). First, solve for
ρi,t in (2.4.2) and then plug the result in the aggregate demand (2.4.1):
yi,t =
1
1 + α
χ
ω
{
−
(
σ +
α
χ
τ
)
rt +
α
χ
li,t + ηy
∗
t −
α
χ
ξl
d
t + ξ
y
i,t
}
. (2.4.8)
Loans affect output if loans and bonds are imperfectly substitutable, i.e. if
α 6= 0. Then, in (2.4.3), replace mi,t − pi,t by its value in (2.4.4), ρi,t by its
value in the loan demand (2.4.2), W si,t by its value in (2.4.5), and solve for it
by clearing the wholesale funds market such that equation (2.4.5) is equal to
(2.4.6). Assume that capital is a fraction ν of total assets and that the level of
capital is exogenous, given by country specific regulations and characteristics.15
15The Basel regulation imposes that capital should be a fraction of risky assets. Here, I
assume all assets are risky.
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Finally, solve for loans l (lsi,t = l
d
i,t),
16
li,t = c1rt + c2ξ
m
i,t + c3ξ
ws
i,t + c4V
∗
t + c5yi,t + c6ξ
ls
i,t + c7ξ
ld
i,t + c8Ki,t.(2.4.9)
If banks’ financial structure does not matter for lending because banks can
perfectly offset the reduction in one type of funds by another, then the coeffi-
cients β = ζ = ζ1 = 0, and thus c2 = 0. Then, the bank lending channel is not
effective and money demand shocks ξmi,t have no effect on loans. Furthermore,
the coefficient c3 = 0 and wholesale funding shocks ξ
ws
i,t have no effect on loans
neither.
Equation (2.4.8) shows that output is affected by credit and by the interest
rate on government bonds, rt. The interest rate rt captures the liquidity
preference channel. However, (2.4.9) suggests that loans might also be explained
by output. Loans are thus endogenous to output.
Define centered variables as x˜i,t = xi,t − (1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi,t. By demeaning all
variables by their cross sectional mean, the common effects to all countries are
eliminated. The interest rate channel (since the model concerns a monetary
union, the central bank cannot target a specific state) as well as any Euro-zone
wide shocks (such as oil shocks) are eliminated. In particular, potential common
non-linear effects (such as threshold effects) are eliminated. As a consequence,
only country specific variations (linear or non-linear) remain. The shocks ξji,t,
j = {m,ws, wd, ls, ld, y} are idiosyncratic. The equations (2.4.8) and (2.4.9)
with cross-sectionally centered variables are
y˜i,t =
1
1 + α
χ
ω
{
α
χ
l˜i,t − α
χ
ξl
d
t + ξ
y
i,t
}
, (2.4.10)
l˜i,t = c2ξ
m
i,t + c3ξ
ws
i,t + c5y˜i,t + c6ξ
ls
i,t + c7ξ
ld
i,t + c8K˜i,t. (2.4.11)
In (2.4.10) loans are correlated with the error terms ξl
d
i,t and ξ
y
i,t. The variable
l˜i,t is endogenous to y˜i,t and, as a consequence, the coefficient on loans l˜i,t in
(2.4.10) is biased. To deal with endogeneity issues, I use an instrumental variable
16where c0 = χ/ (χ+ µ), b0 = γ3γ + γ1 − β1 a1 = 1/ [(φ+ φ′) + ψ − γ3δ′] , a2 =
φ − τ1 + γ3δ, b = ζ (φ− φ′) − βδ′, c1 = c0 [−λ+ τµ/χ− δβ − φζ + a1a2b] , c5 =
c0 [ωµ/χ+ γβ + γ1ζ − b0a1b] , c2 = c0 (β − a1γ3b), c3 = c0a1b, c4 = ηc0 [ζ − a1b] ,
c6 = c0, c7 = c0µ/χ, and c8 = νc0χ2a1b− χ1a1b+ ζ1.
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approach. Assuming Corr(ξmi,t, ξ
ld
t ) =Corr(ξ
m
i,t, ξ
y
i,t) = 0 and Corr(ξ
ws
i,t , ξ
ld
i,t) =
Corr(ξw
s
i,t , ξ
y
i,t) = 0, the shocks to preferences for deposits ξ
m
i,t and the shocks to
bank debt issuance ξw
s
i,t become obvious choices of instruments and, therefore,
loan supply effects can be identified. These variables are correlated with loans
but not with the error in (2.4.10). This allows the system to be (over) identified.
The assumption on the correlations is reasonable since both money demand
shocks and bank debt issuance shocks are independent of real output yi,t. My
contribution with respect to Driscoll (2004) rests in the variable ξw
s
i,t . This
variable is a second instrument for loan supply. Alternatively, one could also
assume Corr(ξl
s
i,t, ξ
y
i,t) = Corr(ξ
ls
t , ξ
ld
i,t) = 0 so that shocks to the supply of
loans ξl
s
i,t can also be an instrument for loans in (2.4.10). The disturbance ξ
ls
i,t
measures, for example, changes in bank regulation (Basel II, III for example).
Then, the two simultaneous equations (2.4.10) and (2.4.11) between y˜i,t and
l˜i,t are:
y˜i,t = s1l˜i,t + e1,i,t, (2.4.12)
l˜i,t = s2ξ
m
i,t + s3r˜i,t + s4ξ
ws
i,t + e2,i,t. (2.4.13)
This system will be estimated in a 2SLS estimation. The error terms in the
two stages are called e1,i,t and e1,i,t. The first stage of the instrumentation
(2.4.13) verifies if country specific money demand shocks ξmi,t and/or variation in
bank preferences for debt issuance ξw
s
i,t affect country specific loan variation, l˜i,t.
Coefficients s2 and s4 statistically different from zero would imply that banks’
financial structure matters for lending. A value s2 6= 0 argues in favor of the
bank lending channel while s4 6= 0 argues in favor a wholesale funding channel
effect. The second stage verifies if country specific loan variation, instrumented
by idiosyncratic shocks to bank funds, affect countries’ output growth. It also
suggests that firms rely on bank credit for investment.
The next section presents how shocks to bank fundings are constructed and
estimated.
2.5. Estimation of financial shocks
This section unveils the computation of the two financial shocks: shocks to
money demand and shocks to bank long term debt issuance. First, the empirical
2 Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Bank Wholesale Debt on . . . 64
strategy to estimate money demand is presented. Then, the strategy to estimate
bank long term debt issuance is exposed.
2.5.1. Money demand shocks
The shocks to money demand ξmi,t are measured as residuals from the money
demand equation (2.4.4). Appendix 2.9.B shows that, at a 90% confidence level,
the variables in the regression are integrated of order one, that is, all series are
stationary once first differenced. Therefore, money demand is best modeled
in an error correction framework, where short and long run deviations can be
simultaneously estimated. Compared to regressions in levels, it avoids possible
spurious correlation of highly trended variables. Using first differences would
omit the long run relationships between variables, and the omitted long run
variables would then be captured in the error term. Then, estimated money
demand shocks would be biased and the model would be misspecified.
Therefore, I estimate (2.4.4) using an error correction framework, augmented
with a lagged dependent term, as in Rondorf (2012). The model is based on
Pesaran and Shin (1999). The short and the long run dynamics are assumed to
be the same across countries.
Fixed effects are included in the regression as they allow to account for the
long run heterogeneity of countries (such as different trends).17 The Nickell
bias (Nickell, 1981) arises in dynamic panel data models with fixed effects. The
inclusion of a fixed effect term combined with the dependent lagged variable
in the set of explanatory variable creates a correlation between the error term
and the lagged dependent variable. Therefore, the coefficient will be biased.
Here, the Nickell bias can be neglected because the time series length is large
(T=64) and the cross section length relatively small (N=10 countries). The
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) criterion suggests taking two lags of each
variable.18
The model to be estimated is a dynamic fixed effect model:
∆Y˜i,t = µi − c0Y˜i,t−1 + c1X˜i,t−1 + c2∆Y˜i,t−1 +
1∑
s=0
c3∆X˜i,t−s + ξmi,t, (2.5.1)
17The Hausman test strongly rejects the null hypothesis according to which there is no fixed
effect. The statistic is χ2(5) = 31.02∗∗∗ over the whole period studied.
18The Akaike criterium was chosen with maximum lag order four.
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where the variable Y˜i,t is the dependent variable (m˜i,t − p˜i,t) and X˜i,t is the set
of explanatory variables in the centered money demand equation (2.4.4). The
variables µi denotes country specific fixed effects. The ratio c1/c0 corresponds
to the long run income elasticity of money demand.
The Euro-zone is a common monetary union and the interest rate is considered
exogenous for each country.19 Hence, the IS-LM model predicts that any shock
to money demand in one country is automatically accommodated, so that
output is left unchanged. Real balances increase in this country and decrease
in all others. Hence, any country specific shock to money demand is translated
into higher deposits. Therefore, the endogeneity problem between output and
money in the money demand equation is, in theory, mitigated. However, under
the hypothesis of a lending channel, so that money demand shocks and output
are correlated,20 the estimated coefficients associated with current output in
the money demand estimation will be biased. To avoid the potential bias,
contemporaneous output growth in (2.5.1) is instrumented.
To confront endogeneity issues with an instrumental variable approach,
two conditions have to be met. First, the instrument has to be sufficiently
correlated with the endogenous variable. Second, the instrument has to explain
the dependent variable, money growth, only through the endogenous variable,
output growth, and must be uncorrelated with the error term in (2.5.1). I
instrument output growth by the contemporaneous level of exports, cross-
sectionally centered, X˜i,t. A high level of exports exposes a country to foreign
activity, increasing economic fluctuations. In addition, I postulate that they
explain the level of money only through output growth.
A two stage least square (2SLS) robust fixed effect estimation technique is
implemented. This is the baseline specification. In the first stage, I regress
output growth on all exogenous variables in money demand and the instrument,
X˜i,t. Then, the predicted value from the first stage is used instead of output
growth, the endogenous variable. Appendix 2.9.C presents the results of the
2SLS estimation of money demand (2.5.1) from 1999Q1 to 2008Q2 and from
1999Q1 to 2014Q4 in the ten Euro-zone countries. It also displays the results
of the money demand estimation, with no instrumentation of output growth.
As a robustness check to the assumption on the equality of bond rates rt in
19Consider small open economies with fixed exchange rates.
20Deposits in country i will change loans in the country. When firms are bank dependent,
investment and output are also affected.
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the Euro-zone, the estimation with heterogeneous bond rates are also reported.
The country specific bond rates are then measured by the ten year government
bond yield.
Concerning the first stage of the 2SLS money demand estimation, the F test
is larger than the threshold level of 10 given by the “rule of thumb” (Staiger
and Stock, 1997), which indicates that the instrument is sufficiently correlated
with the endogenous variable. Therefore, exports are strong instruments.
Turning to the estimation of the money demand, the coefficients associated
with the error correction terms confirm the cointegration relationship in all
specifications, when output is or is not instrumented by exports. The error
correction term suggests that the rate of convergence of variables to their long
run trend is slow. The magnitude of the long run coefficients on output, interest
rates and the error correction term are in line with earlier contributions on the
Euro-zone money demand (Rondorf, 2012). Regression (II), the regression in
which bond rates are heterogeneous, corresponds to the exact specification in
Rondorf (2012). Over the same period of estimation, in the pre-crisis period,
the coefficient associated with the long run effect of output and interest rates
are the same. The long run output elasticity of money demand is 1.84. The
speed of adjustment is 0.08. The coefficients in Rondorf (2012) are respectively,
1.44 and 0.09. Before the crisis, the long run interest rate semi-elasticity of
money demand has the right sign but is not significant. The small differences
in results may be attributed to the revision of the data. When output growth
is instrumented, there are slightly higher long run elasticities of output.
In the baseline specification (I), before the crisis, the long run income elasticity
of money demand is 1.58. It is 1.41 over the whole period. The short run
estimates of output growth are not significant, while they are when output
growth is not instrumented. This possibly indicates that there was indeed an
endogeneity issue.
As shown in Appendix 2.9.G, the residuals in the money demand are equally
spread around the zero line.
2.5.2. Bank debt issuance shocks
In the extension of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model developed above, the
determinants of bank long term debt issuance are described by
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W˜ si,t = χA˜i,t + β1y˜i,t − χ1K˜i,t − γ3 (m˜i,t − p˜i,t) + ξw
s
i,t . (2.5.2)
The set of country specific determinants used in the regression of bank debt
issuance are similar to the ones in Rixtel et al. (2015)’ country specific regression,
once variables are centered around their cross sectional mean, with a two
exceptions. First, they do not include total deposits in their country specific
analysis due to data limitations. Second, bank stock market value is used as
a regressor in their country analysis. The authors argue that larger values of
bank stocks increase bank equity issuance and, thus, banks can issue more
bonds (since they can absorb risk better, see Rixtel et al. (2015)). Equity is
considered exogenous in my theoretical model.
Appendix 2.9.B shows that, at a 90% confidence level, the variables in the
regression are integrated of order one, that is, all series are stationary once first
differenced. Short and long run deviations should be simultaneously estimated
to capture an unbiased error term, used to measure the shocks, ξw
s
i,t . Hence,
in contrast with Rixtel et al. (2015), I estimate (2.5.2) using a dynamic fixed
effect model in which all (semi) elasticities are the same for all countries, as
in the model for the money demand (2.5.1). Fixed effects are included as the
Hausman test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that there should not be
fixed effects in the dynamic model.21 Two lags of each variable are included
according to the AIC.22
Note that I assume that both output growth and asset growth, affect the short
run deviations of bank debt issuance. Indeed, Adrian and Shin (2010) argue
that commercial banks target a fixed leverage ratio. Banks that grow faster
issue more debt due to leverage targeting.23 Hence, the growth of bank leverage
and the growth of bank assets are strongly positively correlated. Furthermore,
debt leverage is pro-cyclical, suggesting that debt increases during booms and
decreases during crises (Adrian et al., 2012). This is in contrast with Rixtel
et al. (2015) who assume both variables affect the long run level of bank debt
issuance.
Appendix 2.9.D reproduces the baseline country level regression in Rixtel
et al. (2015), before the Lehman collapse, using country level data. It compares
21The statistic χ2(14)=43.01*** from 1999Q1 to 2014Q4. It is χ2(17)=42.19** when I use
country specific interest rate on bonds.
22The Akaike criterium was chosen with maximum lag order four.
23Marsh (1982) also shows that firms in the UK tend to target debt levels.
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the results with the ones estimated in Rixtel et al. (2015), in which they use
the sum of debt issuance over a sample of banks per country. Except for total
assets, the regressions display disparate results. The differences are attributable
to the missing variables (bank stocki,t is not included due to data limitations)
and to the differences in the sample of banks. During the period 2005 to the
end of 2013, the sum of assets of their selected sample is only one fifth of the
ten country sample. Moreover, between 2005 and 2008, debt issuance represents
1% of total assets in their bank level sample while it represents 15% in my
country level sample. Given these major differences, using country level data,
the explanatory power of the regression is poor, and most variables are not
significantly different from zero. This further motivates the use of an alternative
empirical specification.
In addition to differences in the modeling and the inclusion of variables,
an endogeneity bias between debt issuance and output is considered. Indeed,
reverse causality problems may arise. Banks may reduce wholesale debt because
economic activity is low. Moreover, a fall in bank debt issuance reduces
investment opportunities and thus may reduce economic activity.
As in the money demand, an instrumental variable approach with 2SLS is
used to correct for endogeneity. In the first stage I regress output growth on
some instruments and the exogenous variables in (2.5.2). The second stage
regresses bank debt issuance on the predicted value of output growth from the
first stage.
The instruments must satisfy the condition of sufficient correlation and
exogeneity noted earlier. Output growth is instrumented with five instruments:
the second lag of output growth, ∆y˜i,t−2, current and lagged level of exports,
X˜i,t and X˜i,t−1, and by the first and third lag change of the domestic credit to
GDP gap ratio (∆gapt, ∆gapt−3). The second lag of output growth is expected
to be correlated with contemporaneous output growth. It is less likely that
bank debt issuance affects past levels of output, although it is not excluded
that, output falls due to an expected decrease in future bank debt issuance.
Lagged and current levels of exports are highly correlated with output, and
should explain bank debt issuance only through their increase in economic
activity. The variable gapt is the change in the ratio of credit to output from
its long run trend, as measured by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
It measures either excessive growth or low output growth and, is therefore a
country specific indicator of macro-economic vulnerabilities. This variable is
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considered as a reliable early warning indicator for crises (Alessi and Detken,
2014). Therefore, ∆gapt should measure the speed at which excessive credit
growth changes. It is expected to be highly related to future output growth.
In an alternative scenario, it is possible that the speed at which lending grows
raises bank liquidity or maturity concerns, and leads to a change in bank debt
issuance. However, the validity of an instrument requires that it is correlated
with the dependent variable only through the endogenous variable. Given the
five instruments and the single endogenous variable, the model is said to be
over-identified. Endogeneity test can then be constructed for the instruments
and determine if the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in
the structural equation of debt issuance on output (test for over-identifying
restrictions).
The Hansen J test, displayed in Appendix 2.9.E together with the first stage
results, gives confidence that the set of instruments are valid. According to the
Hansen J test, I do not reject the null hypothesis that the set of instruments
are jointly uncorrelated with the error term.24 The Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F
statistic is also reported. This statistic is the robust counterpart of the F test
with multiple endogenous variables (Cragg-Donald Wald test). This value is
less than the threshold value of 10, given by the “rule of thumb” (Staiger and
Stock, 1997), indicating that the instruments are weak, in all the regressions.
Since the relevance of the instruments is questionable, the remainder of this
chapter presents the results, with and without the instrumentation of output.
Table 2.5.2.1 displays the results from the estimation of bank debt issuance
determinants, from 1999Q1 to 2014Q4. In the baseline specification (I), I
correct for the endogeneity of output. Specification (II) presents the results in
which output is not instrumented. In the second column of each specification, I
test the robustness of the results to the equality of bond rates in the Euro-zone.
Appendix 2.9.E shows the estimates of bank debt issuance determinants before
the crisis.
The coefficients associated with assets, deposits, and output in the long run,
and asset growth are larger once the endogeneity bias is potentially corrected
for, suggesting that there was a downward bias on these variables. The long
run elasticity of capital decreases once output is instrumented. In addition, the
long run level of output becomes significant while output growth is no longer
24More precisely, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the over-identifying restrictions
are valid.
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significant.
Table 2.5.2.1. – Debt determinants (1999Q1-2014Q4)
Dynamic Fixed Effects Dependent variable: ∆W˜i,t
Second stage No instrumentation
(I) (II)
Error correction -.033*** -.031*** -.027*** -.026***
(.009) (.009) (.005) (.004)
(m˜i,t−1 − p˜i,t−1) -.113*** -.122*** -.090* -.096*
(.035) (.037) (.045) (.047)
A˜i,t−1 .072*** .069*** .065*** .062***
(.022) (.023) (.016) (.014)
K˜i,t−1 -.020* -.017 -.031** -.028**
(.011) (.011) (.013) (.012)
y˜i,t−1 .193** .178** .145 .134
(.080) (.083) (.111) (.108)
r˜i,t−1 -.001 -.000
(.001) (.001)
∆y˜i,t -.439 -.454 .571* .550**
(.828) (.787) (.260) (.226)
∆y˜i,t−1 .027 -.007 .270 .239
(.302) (.296) (.213) (.177)
∆A˜i,t .467*** .473*** .411*** .418***
(.081) (.079) (.126) (.126)
∆A˜i,t−1 -.031 -.037 -.045 -.049
(.082) (.081) (.057) (.057)
∆(m˜i,t − p˜i,t) .140 .126 .129 .118
(.150) (.147) (.093) (.091)
∆(m˜i,t−1 − p˜i,t−1) -.297*** -.296*** -.322*** -.321***
(.075) (.074) (.055) (.047)
∆K˜i,t -.051 -.048 -.057 -.055
(.050) (.049) (.047) (.050)
∆K˜i,t−1 -.017 -.029 -.011 -.022
(.037) (.038) (.042) (.039)
∆r˜i,t -.004*** -.004*
(.002) (.002)
∆r˜i,t−1 .006*** .005***
(.002) (.001)
∆W˜i,t−1 .368*** .367*** .381*** .381***
(.050) (.050) (.050) (.053)
Constant .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Observations 600 600 620 620
log(likelihood) 1155.99 1160.51 1202.33 1206.74
R2 .315 .325 .339 .348
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
x˜i,t = xi,t − (1/N)
∑N
i=1 xi,t, where xi,t is deflated per capita and in log,
except for the interest rates.
The error correction term is negative and highly statistically significant in
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all the specifications of Table 2.5.2.1, indicating that debt issuance responds
to deviations from the long run equilibrium. It confirms that there is a coin-
tegrating relationship between the variables such that they converge to the
same long term trend. The speed of adjustment of the short run deviations
from their long run trend is slow. It is equal to -0.033 in the benchmark
estimation, the first column of specification (I). The coefficient associated with
deposits level m˜i,t−1 − p˜i,t−1 has the expected sign. It is negative, large and
statistically significant. Therefore, deposit supply constraints, in the long run,
do affect bank debt issuance choice. Bank debt issuance is positively correlated
with countries’ wealth y˜i,t−1. This evokes that banking sectors in wealthier
countries vary their debt by more. The elasticity of bank long run own funds
K˜i,t−1 is negative, indicating that capital and debt issuance are substitutes in
banks’ financing choice rather than complements. The growth of total assets
∆A˜i,t is positively and significantly associated with bank debt issuance. It
supports the leverage targeting theory according to which banks raise relatively
more debt when they grow more quickly. In addition, total assets is positively
correlated with bank debt issuance, supporting the asymmetric information
theory predicting a positive relationship between bank debt issuance and bank
size. The lagged variation of debt issuance is highly significant and positive,
suggesting that there is some persistence in banks’ debt issuance. Banking
sectors that raised debt yesterday are more likely to do so today. Finally, the
R2 statistic shows that 32% of the variance of bank debt issuance variation is
explained by the model in which output is instrumented.
The second column of specification (I) and the second column of specification
(II) of Table 2.5.2.1 show that the results are robust to the hypothesis on
country specific differences in bond rates. The estimated speed of adjustment
to the long run trend remains very similar. The size and significance of variables
are the same as in the benchmark estimation with one exception in the 2SLS
specification (I), the level of capital no longer affects bank debt issuance. It
is not excluded that capital is related to the change in risk on markets, when
interest rates are not included in the regression. The columns also show that
short run variations in the interest rate on bonds negatively affect debt issuance.
The coefficients on the variation of bond rates are statistically different from
zero. This indicates that country specific interest rates on the bonds market
are important short run determinants of long run bank debt issuance. Thus,
low interest rates variations are associated with higher risk taking and more
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debt issuance.
Appendix 2.9.E shows that all the results hold before the crisis. The size
and significance of the (semi) elasticities are stable, with the exception that
output and capital levels do not significantly affect bank debt issuance.
Appendix 2.9.G also assesses the model adequacy through the plot of the
residuals against the predicted values in all of the regressions, both before the
crisis and including the whole sample. The residuals are spread approximately
equally across the predicted dependent variable with some large values, in both
periods studied. Nevertheless, there is no systemic pattern.
2.5.3. Analysis of shocks
Figure 2.5.3.1 graphs the residuals of bank debt issuance ξw
s
t and money demand
shocks ξmt through time, considering the baseline specification, hence, with
output instrumented, and bond rates equal across countries, estimated over the
whole time frame. The shocks are spread equally around the zero line and their
variance is homogeneous along the timeline, except for some isolated points.
The variance of money demand shocks ξmt through time is, on average, smaller
than the variance of the debt issuance shocks ξw
s
t .
Figure 2.5.3.1. – Financial shocks
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2.6. Results, linear estimation
This section investigates the relationship between loans supply and output. I
first present the linear estimation of output on loans. I then present the results
from the 2SLS estimation, in which shocks to bank debt issuance and bank
deposits are used as instrumental variables. These shocks are measured by
residuals from the dynamic panel estimations of the money demand and the
bank debt issuance.
Appendix 2.9.B shows that loans and output are non-stationary. Hence, I
take first differences of variables. According to the Hausman test, fixed effects
are included in all the regressions. Indeed, fixed effects can capture country
specific variations that are not taken into account by other variables in the
model. For example, they can capture the different trends in output growth
of the different countries. In addition, as indicated by the country specific
AIC, two lags are included in the regressions.25 It reflects the fact that the
macroeconomic series of output and loans adjust slowly.
Table 2.6.0.1 verifies the relationship between output and bank loans. Columns
(a) correspond to the regressions in which government bond rates are considered
to be the same in all countries. Columns (b) show the regressions in which
heterogeneous bond rates have been included. Before the Lehman collapse, the
first lag of loan growth is statistically and positively correlated with output
growth. Over the whole period (until 2014Q4), lending is significantly and
positively correlated with output. The coefficient on the second lag of loans is
negative, and statistically significant. In the specification (a), an increase in
the contemporaneous growth rate of loans above the Euro-zone mean of one
percentage point in country i corresponds to an increase in the growth rate
of real GDP by .057 percentage points above the Euro-zone average. Since
the growth rate of real GDP per capita is on average 0.2% during the whole
period studied and since loans vary by 1.6 percentage points around the average,
loan variation can have rather important effects on output growth. However,
the estimates are likely to be biased due to reverse causality problems. Both
demand and supply effects can affect the correlation between bank credit and
output. Therefore, this regression does not allow one to conclude that causality
effects resulted.
To control for the endogeneity of loans, I use a 2SLS estimation with two
25The Akaike criterium was chosen with maximum lag order four.
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Table 2.6.0.1. – OLS regression of output on loans
OLS with FE Dependent variable: ∆y˜i,t
(a) (b) (a) (b)
1999Q1-2008Q2 1999Q1-2014Q4
∆l˜i,t -.029 -.034 .057** .059*
(.023) (.025) (.025) (.028)
∆l˜i,t−1 .033* .032** .034 .033
(.017) (.014) (.021) (.020)
∆l˜i,t−2 -.045 -.034 -.057** -.055**
(.026) (.028) (.021) (.022)
∆y˜i,t−1 -.344*** -.338*** -.197*** -.205***
(.064) (.054) (.055) (.055)
∆y˜i,t−2 -.105** -.106*** .022 .014
(.037) (.030) (.036) (.036)
∆r˜i,t -.001 -.001
(.005) (.001)
∆r˜i,t−1 -.010 .000
(.008) (.001)
∆r˜i,t−2 -.001 -.000
(.004) (.000)
Constant -.000*** -.000*** .000*** .000***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Observations 350 350 610 610
R2 .109 .126 .063 .068
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are
in parenthesis. Variables are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
instruments. Section 2.4 shows that shocks to money demand ξmi,t and shocks to
bank long term debt funding ξw
s
i,t can theoretically be used as instruments for
loan supply. The coefficients to be estimated are said to be over-identified as
there is one endogenous variable and two instruments. This is in contrast with
Driscoll (2004) and Rondorf (2012), who use only shocks to money demand
as an instrument. As noted in Section (2.5), instrumentation helps to deal
with endogeneity issues if they satisfy two conditions, sufficient correlation and
exogeneity.
Adding instruments allows to increase the precision of the estimates, and to
improve the 2SLS estimator efficiency. The literature suggests that unstable
bank liability items such as wholesale funds are important determinants of
loan supply. Furthermore, over-identification allows for the construction of
an endogeneity test for the instruments and determine if the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term in the structural equation of output on loans
(test for over-identifying restrictions). Nevertheless, it is important to make sure
that the additional instrument is sufficiently correlated with the endogenous
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variable, since weak instruments increase the bias of the 2SLS estimator. The
definition for sufficient correlation is developed in Staiger and Stock (1997). It
defines a threshold level for F-test values such that instruments are considered
as weak.
Tables 2.6.0.2 and 2.6.0.3 present the results from, respectively, the first and
the second stage linear estimation. The baseline regression (I) consider financial
shocks that are constructed instrumenting output growth. Specification (II)
does not consider endogeneity issues between output and money and output
and bank debt issuance.
Table 2.6.0.2. – First stage IV regression: Loans on financial shocks
OLS with FE Dependent variable: ∆l˜i,t
Instrumentation No instrumentation
(I) (II)
(99Q1-08Q2) (99Q1-14Q4) (99Q1-08Q2) (99Q1-14Q4)
ξmi,t .093*** .035 .113*** .037
(.023) (.027) (.027) (.027)
ξmi,t−1 -.048* .014 -.046* .016
(.022) (.016) (.025) (.016)
ξmi,t−2 -.002 .059** -.002 .064**
(.020) (.020) (.023) (.022)
ξw
s
i,t .054** .087** .045*** .068***
(.018) (.035) (.011) (.021)
ξw
s
i,t−1 .028 .034* .036 .036*
(.025) (.016) (.022) (.018)
ξw
s
i,t−2 .025 .030 .021 .029
(.019) (.029) (.028) (.033)
∆y˜i,t−1 -.028 -.043 -.004 .013
(.111) (.064) (.120) (.047)
∆y˜i,t−2 -.286** -.136 -.230 -.052
(.119) (.107) (.131) (.079)
Constant -.000*** .000*** -.000*** .000***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Observations 320 580 340 600
R2 .115 .062 .109 .046
Hansen J test, df=5 7.89 5.38 1.75 3.41
Finstr 4.84*** 6.06*** 5.27*** 4.60***
Fξm 4.50*** 1.91 5.90*** 2.20*
Fξws 4.72*** 9.26*** 3.99*** 6.36***
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Variables are
described in Table 2.5.2.1.
Considering the baseline specification (I), Table 2.6.0.2 shows that contem-
poraneous money demand shocks, are positively correlated with loan supply
variation from 1999Q1 to 2008Q2, and are highly significant. Therefore, an
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exogenous increase to bank deposits increases the aggregate loan supply. This
result confirms the findings in Rondorf (2012) that bank funds are imperfectly
substitutable in the Euro-zone from 1999Q1 to the Lehman collapse. An in-
crease in money demand shocks of one percentage point above the Euro-zone
mean increases loans’ growth by 0.093 percentage points above the Euro-zone
average in the first quarter. This effect is not negligible, even if money demand
shocks are small.
The coefficient on contemporaneous shocks to money demand have no sta-
tistically significant effect on loans once the crisis and subsequent periods are
included in the estimation. Only the coefficient associated with the second
lag is significant at the 95% confidence level. In contrast, the coefficients on
contemporaneous shocks to bank debt issuance are positive and significant in
all of the periods considered. In the baseline specification, before the financial
turmoil, an increase in shocks to bank debt issuance of one percentage point in
country i corresponds to an increase in the growth rate of real loans of 0.054
percentage points above the Euro-zone average. These estimates are 1.6 times
larger in the estimation including the whole time frame. Moreover, they are
more persistent. Indeed, there is a significant and positive effect of the first
lag of bank debt shocks from 1999Q1 to 2014Q4. Thus, the results show that
changes in bank preferences for long term debt were a significant driver of loan
supply, and more so during the last financial turmoil. The findings suggest that
the bank wholesale debt funding channel became important after the Lehman
collapse for loan supply decisions. This supports the theory according to which
wholesale fundings may have contributed to the severity of the crisis.
The Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions shows that, at the 99%
confidence level, at least some of the instruments are exogenous.
The estimation results in (II), in which the shocks are constructed without
an instrumentation of output growth, confirm the results from the baseline
specification. The coefficients associated with money demand are slightly
larger and the ones corresponding to debt issuance shocks are slightly smaller.
Additionally, Appendix 2.9.F shows that all the results are robust to the
assumption on the bond rates. It also shows that, from 1999Q1 to 2014Q4,
contemporaneous interest rates affect output significantly.
I now turn to the analysis of the strength of the instruments. Regarding the
regression including the whole time frame, the joint F statistic in specification
(II) is higher than in specification (I). The attempt to correct for endogeneity
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bias between output and money, and output and debt issuance gives estimates
of financial shocks that have jointly more explanatory power on loan growth. On
the contrary, before the crisis, the joint F test over all the excluded instruments
is larger in specification (II), that is, without the instrumentation of output in
the construction of the shocks. According to the “rule of thumb” (Stock and
Yogo, 2005), to reject the null that the instrumental variable is weak, the F
test on the joint restriction of coefficients associated with the instruments has
to be larger than ten. In all of the specifications in Table 2.6.0.2, the F test
is smaller than ten. However, before the Lehman collapse, the F test on the
excluded debt shocks is close to 10 and, as shown in Appendix 2.9.F, becomes
larger than 10 once heterogeneous bond rates enter the regression. Thus, in
the baseline specification (I), we can reject the null hypothesis of irrelevance of
the shock to debt issuance instruments ξw
s
i,t before the crisis.
Consider now the second stage of the instrumentation. As displayed in
Table 2.6.0.3, the baseline regression (I) shows that loan supply affects output
positively and statistically, before and including the crisis. Before the Lehman
collapse, the correlation of current loan growth with output growth is equal to
0.239 and is statistically significant. When the crisis and subsequent period
are included in the regression, an increase in the growth of loan supply of
one percentage point above the Euro-zone average in the country i yields to a
significant increase in the growth rate of output of 0.599 percentage points above
the Euro-zone mean. This is twice larger than before the crisis. Additionally,
the second lag of loan growth is found to be negative and statistically different
from zero in the long run.
It should be noted that the value of the estimated coefficients in the baseline
regression (I) contrasts with specification (II), the regression in which financial
shocks are constructed not taking into account potential endogeneity bias be-
tween output, debt issuance and money. In the regression (II), contemporaneous
loan growth is not statistically significant. The coefficients associated with loan
growth estimated over the whole period is 0.199, and it is equal to -0.007 before
the crisis.
Hence, by attempting to confront endogeneity issues, the results point out
that positive changes in loans that arise from a change in the preferences of
banks for debt issuance and exogenous changes in deposits are significantly and
positively associated with changes in output in the Euro-zone between 1999Q1
and 2014Q4. This result is driven by a strong positive relationship after the
2 Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Bank Wholesale Debt on . . . 78
crisis of 2008.
The results on the significance, the sign, and the size of the coefficients in
the baseline specification (I) are robust to the assumption on the heterogeneity
of the bond rate over the whole sample. This can be verified in Appendix 2.9.F.
However, before the crisis, the coefficient associated with contemporaneous
loan growth is lower and no longer significant.
Table 2.6.0.3. – Second stage IV regression: Output on loans
OLS with FE Dependent variable: ∆y˜i,t
Instrumentation No instrumentation
(I) (II)
(99Q1-08Q2) (99Q1-14Q4) (99Q1-08Q2) (99Q1-14Q4)
∆
ˆ˜
li,t .239* .599** -.007 .199
(.128) (.222) (.100) (.195)
∆
ˆ˜
li,t−1 .049 -.197 -.011 -.152
(.095) (.130) (.100) (.156)
∆
ˆ˜
li,t−2 .080 -.192*** .114* -.057
(.092) (.058) (.059) (.071)
∆y˜i,t−1 -.389*** -.198** -.343*** -.196**
(.111) (.071) (.081) (.068)
∆y˜i,t−2 -.037 .071** -.061* .032
(.045) (.028) (.029) (.032)
Constant -.000 .000*** -.000*** .000***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Observations 300 560 320 580
log(likelihood) 1060.803 1960.706 1132.150 2015.189
R2 .131 .115 .096 .046
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Variables
are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
The residual plot of the baseline regressions in the first and second stage,
and Wilk test of normality are reported in Appendix 2.9.G. Residual plots do
not reveal any non-linear functional pattern. Residuals are centered around
zero and equally spaced around the zero mean. Their variability is larger
than the predicted variable in both the first and second stage estimations.
Although the residual plot does not suggest potential non-linearities, results
from the linear estimation are driven by strong parametric assumptions. In
contrast, non-parametric regressions let the data reveal the information on the
distribution, instead of imposing one.
The Shapiro Wilk test of normality rejects the hypothesis of normally dis-
tributed data. The kernel estimate shows that the distribution kurtosis is too
large relative to a standard normal distribution. While the OLS method does
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not produce a bias in the estimates when residuals are not normally distributed,
the estimates are no longer efficient (the standard errors with OLS are no
longer the smallest). Although robust standard errors can compensate for the
standard errors, this potentially justifies the use of non-parametric regressions.
2.7. Investigation of non-linearities:
non-parametric instrumental variables
The literature suggests that unstable bank liability items such as wholesale
funds can raise uncertainty and systemic risk, and thus can be a source of
non-linearities in economic fluctuations. In this section, the validity of the linear
functional form is tested by estimating the two stage instrumental variable
regression with non-parametric techniques.
Assuming a parametric form may lead to wrong conclusions. For example,
parametric models give estimates that look more precise than they really are
since the parametric estimates are based on the assumption that the parametric
form is correct. The relevance of the parametric form imposed is particularly
important in this study as the literature pointed out potential non-linearities in
the relationship between bank funding shocks, loans and output. Specification
testing does not eliminate the risk of misspecification of the model as a failure
to reject a model does not imply that it is the correct one. Moreover, the
parametric model assumes the model does not change with the sample size. Non-
parametric models do not assume so. In particular, non-parametric techniques
are data driven methods that feature the information available from the data,
without imposing any functional forms.
There are very few applied studies using non-parametric instrumental vari-
ables (NPIV). Only recently has the econometric literature gained interest on
NPIV techniques. Horowitz (2011) shows that NPIV can be estimated in the
same way as in the linear estimation. The reduced form R2 statistic provides
information on the likelihood to find non-linearities in a non-parametric in-
strumental variable regression. Low R2 are associated with large variance of
non-linear coefficients (Newey, 2013). Therefore, the introduction of the second
instrument increases the probability to find non-linearities, if they exist.
In this section, I use a class of model called Generalized Additive Models
(GAM). This type of model allows covariates to non-linearly affect the dependent
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variable, while keeping the additivity between each regressor function in the
regression. A major advantage of additive modeling is that it helps with the
problem of “curse of dimensionality” that is associated with continuous random
variables (i.e., the variance of the estimator increases with the dimension of the
X). It can be shown that the statistical performance of the regression estimator
decreases as the number of predictors in the kernel regression increases, i.e.,
the rate of convergence becomes slower (Haerdle, 1990). The specification is
the following: Yit = α + Σdmd(Xdit) + eit, where i = 1, ...n and t = 1, ...T . It is
assumed that the covariates are exogenous (E[eit | Xdit] = 0, for all d). The
variables Yit and Xit are a random sample, eit are identically and independently
distributed with mean zero and finite variance. Considering a uni-dimentional
regression (d = 1), and exogenous X’s,26 the conditional expectation of Y on X,
E [Yit | Xit], is just the function md(Xit). Since conditional expectations are
functions of densities and conditional densities, it is possible to estimate this
function using densities. Intuitively, the functions md(), called the regression
functions, are estimated by dividing the sample Xd into small intervals, and
fitting these small intervals using kernel density estimates as weights for the
fit. The size of the interval, called the bandwidth, is crucial for the result of
the estimation.27 The cross validation method, standard in the non-parametric
literature, is used to calculate the bandwidth.28 The data is fitted with Gaussian
kernels estimators with local linear regression. The backfitting algorithm then
fits the additive components (the model) to the data. Therefore, the non-
parametric model is:
4 l˜it = mξwsi,t (ξ
ws
i,t ) +mξmi,t(ξ
m
i,t) + e1,it, (2.7.1)
4 y˜it = ml˜it(4l˜it) + e2,it, (2.7.2)
26Severini and Tripathi (2012) relax the assumption of exogenous regressors but then the
function m() may not be uniquely defined.
27A bandwidth that is too small reduces the asymptotical bias of the estimator but increases
the asymptotical variance. Inversely, a bandwidth that is too high reduces the variance
but increases the bias.
28See Li and Racine (2007) p.83 for further details.
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2.7.1. Non-parametric estimations
The literature points out potential non-linearities in the relationship between
loans and output due to banks’ large reliance on wholesale funding. Here, I
analyze if a loan supply variation above or below the Euro-zone mean in country
i, measured by country specific financial shocks, can affect output non-linearly.
The non-linearities are country-specific and are in the sense that the response
of output to small loan supply variations is distinguished from large variations.
The non-parametric techniques allow to have different marginal effects at each
point of the data. As in the linear regression, two lags of each variable are
included in each of the regressions.
The non-parametric regressions of the first stage, before 2008Q2 and over
the whole period, are displayed in Appendix 2.9.H. From 1999Q1 to 2008Q2,
the marginal effects estimated with non-parametric techniques are larger than
the linear estimate for positive variations of debt issuance shocks. Concerning
negative values of debt issuance shocks, the confidence interval of the non-
linear estimate does not incorporate the linear regression. The non-parametric
prediction for negative variations of debt shocks is smaller than the linear
prediction, and is not statistically significant, as it includes the zero line. The
non-parametric prediction of the effect of money demand shocks on loans is
larger at all data points except variations smaller than -0.05 percentage points
below the Euro-zone mean.
Turning to the estimation over the whole time period, the first stage non-
parametric prediction of the effect of financial shocks on loans matches the
linear prediction. Money demand and debt issuance shocks have a positive and
statistically significant effect on loan growth.
The data driven method second stage estimation before the Lehman collapse
is in Appendix 2.9.H. It depicts a correlation between loans and output weaker
than the one from the linear prediction.
Figure 2.7.1.1 displays the non-parametric and the linear estimations of
output on current and lagged loans, over the whole time sample. Both linear
and non-parametric techniques show a positive and significant correlation
between loan supply and output. The non-parametric confidence interval
includes the linear estimation except for variation of loans that are smaller
than 0.01 percentage point above the Euro-zone mean. Thus, according to the
non-linear estimates, the effect over this range of loan variation is weaker than
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Figure 2.7.1.1. – Non-parametric estimation of the second stage (1999Q1-
2014Q4)
Note: The variables
̂˜
li,t is the predicted value from the non-linear first stage
regression, as specified in the baseline regression.
predicted by the linear estimate. Finally, the non-linear estimate lagged loan
variation matches the one predicted by the linear regression.
2.8. Conclusion
This study investigates how long term bank debt affects lending and the
consequences for output. I estimate a linear two stage least square model
with two instruments, shocks to money demand and shocks to bank long term
debt issuance. Both shocks are constructed by estimating the money demand
and bank debt issuance determinants with an error correction framework. In
both estimations, output growth is instrumented. I find that both shocks
are important determinants of loan supply in the Euro-zone between the first
quarter of 1999 to the last quarter of 2014. Bank long term debt shocks
have a particularly larger impact during and after the last financial turmoil.
This confirms the suggestions found in the literature that disruptions on the
wholesale market have larger impact on the economy during crises than in
normal times. In addition, I find evidence that country specific variation in
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loan supply leads to country specific variation in output. The strength of the
response is larger after the Lehman collapse. Finally, I test for the validity
of the linearity assumption in the two stage least square estimation by using
non-parametric instrumental variables. The results confirm the assumption
about linearity of the functional form.
There are several extensions to this study. First, stronger instruments
of output growth in the construction of bank debt issuance may help to
better capture the relationship between bank debt issuance shocks, loan supply
and output. Second, non-parametric instrumental variable methods, such as
confidence intervals calculation, are still under explored and future research
may contribute to the better detection of non-linearities. Third, one could
measure changes in banking regulation and use it as an additional instrument.
Fourth, the question of the existence of potential common non-linearities should
also be investigated as the literature points towards possible threshold effects.
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2.9. Appendices
2.9.A. Balance sheet composition
Tables 2.9.A.1 and 2.9.A.2 classify balance sheet items according the European
Central Bank classification, and in increasing order of the coefficient of variation.
Table 2.9.A.1. – Banks Liabilities, shares (%) (1999Q1-2014Q4)
Variable Mean % Std CV
Total Liabilities 100% 100 .998
Total deposits, excl. MFI 33.894 8.987 .265
(Domestic deposits, excl. MFI) (31.801) (9.032) (.285)
Capital 6.603 2.08 .315
Total deposits, MFI 17.977 5.636 .315
Debt issuance (EU) 14.248 5.925 .416
(Domestic deposits, MFI) (11.957) (5.868) (.491)
Debt issuance (non-EU) 9.392 5.416 .577
External liabilities 16.316 9.479 .581
MMF shares 1.569 2.09 1.332
Note: CV is the coefficient of variation. MMF shares include short term
funds (with original maturity year) held by Euro area residents. Exter-
nal liabilities include non Euro area residents’ holding of deposits and
repurchase agreements, MMF shares and debt securities with maturity
of less than or equal to 2 years. Debt issuance (non-EU) includes debt
securities with maturity >2 years and held by non Euro area residents.
It can be found under Remaining Liabilities in the ECB website. Debt
securities (EU) are the ones held by Euro area residents with maturity
>2 years. The data is taken from http://www.ecb.Europa.eu.
Table 2.9.A.2. – Banks Assets, shares (%) (1999Q1-2014Q4)
Variable Mean % Std CV
Total loans, excl. MFI 41.071 10.6 .258
(Domestic loans, excl. MFI) (39.279) (11.271) (.287)
Debt securities 14.02 4.625 .33
Total loans, MFI 16.318 5.676 .348
Equity held 3.714 1.679 .452
(Domestic loans, MFI) (11.124) (5.653) (.508)
External Assets 15.645 9.259 .592
Remaining Assets 8.354 5.196 .622
Fixed Assets .763 .636 .833
MMF shares .117 .317 2.72
Note: CV is the coefficient of variation. MMF shares include short
term assets (amounts issued by euro area residents). External Assets
include holding of non Euro area residents of deposits, repurchase
agreements, MMF shares and securities with maturitiy of less than
or equal to 2 years. Remaining Assets are non Euro area residents
securities with maturity >2 years. Debt securities are Euro area
resident securities held with maturity >2 years. The data is taken
from http://www.ecb.Europa.eu.
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2.9.B. Stationarity tests
The Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root test verifies if all panels contain a unit
root. Therefore, the null is rejected if only one or two countries series are
stationary.
Since the test is only valid for serially uncorrelated error terms, I consider
the serially uncorrelated error by assuming lags=0 and the test in which two
lags of each variable are included in the test.29 The results from the serially
uncorrelated errors yield the same result as the test when I allow for serial
correlation but control for it.
Table 2.9.B.1. – Im-Pesaran-Shin Panel unit-root test (1999Q1-2014Q4)
Null hypothesis: Unit root
lags=2 lags=0
variables W¯ statistic z¯ stat
W˜ i,t 1.12 1.47
m˜i,t − p˜i,t .19 1.90
K˜i,t -.06 .09
y˜i,t 2.4 1.99
A˜i,t .34 .43
r˜i,t -1.67** 1.12
l˜i,t 1.32 .16
∆W˜ i,t -6.17*** -10.90***
∆(m˜i,t − p˜i,t) -4.53*** -10.16***
∆K˜i,t -15.85*** -9.53***
∆y˜i,t -8.73*** -16.47***
∆A˜i,t -7.07*** -15.14***
∆r˜i,t -6.28*** -8.82***
∆l˜i,t -4.65*** -11.44***
Note: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence
level, respectively. The alternative is that some panel
are stationary. Variables are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
29The command xtunitroot in stata assumes serially uncorrelated errors when no lags are
specified.
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2.9.C. Money demand shocks
Table 2.9.C.1. – First stage: Instrumentation of output growth in
the money demand
OLS with FE Dependent variable: ∆y˜i,t
(1999Q1-2008Q2) (1999Q1-2014Q4)
X˜i,t .031*** .029*** .020*** .020***
(.008) (.008) (.004) (.004)
∆y˜i,t−1 -.403*** -.387*** -.241*** -.252***
(.080) (.080) (.060) (.060)
∆(m˜i,t−1 − p˜i,t−1) .010 .013 .022 .024
(.015) (.016) (.017) (.017)
Error correction -.008 -.007 -.006 -.012*
(.010) (.010) (.006) (.007)
y˜i,t−1 -.034 -.048* -.025* -.044***
(.021) (.026) (.013) (.013)
∆r˜i,t .001 -.001*
(.004) (.000)
∆r˜i,t−1 -.006 .000
(.005) (.000)
r˜i,t−1 -.004 -.000***
(.003) (.000)
Observations 360 360 620 620
R2 .067 .099 .058 .066
KPW F1,#obs−15(−3) 13.03*** 14.62*** 20.30*** 20.45***
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis. The statistic KPW Fd,#obs−15(−3) is the Kleibergen-Paap
Wald rk F statistic where d is the degrees of freedom, to be compared to
the Stock and Yogo critical values. The variable X˜i,t is log of total exports
per capita and deflated, centered around its cross-sectional mean. Other
variables are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
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2.9.D. Debt issuance determinants: comparison with Rixtel
et al. (2015)
Table 2.9.D.1. – Rixtel et al. (2015)’ country specific results versus my estima-
tion, before crisis
(A) (B)
Dep. variable log(Total Issuancei,t) Dep. variable log( ˜Total Issuancei,t)
aggregate bank level FE country level
variables (1999Q1-2007Q3) variables (1999Q1-2007Q3)
term spreadj,t -.15* r˜i,t .03
(.08) (.30)
-.13**
(.06)
bank stockj,t 2.06**
(.92)
4Ai,t
Ai,t−1 6.68***
˜4Ai,t
Ai,t
-.62
(2.05) (.89)
K
A i,t 12.45**
K˜
A i,t -4.39
(6.18) (7.13)
Ai,t 2.01*** A˜i,t 2.04***
(.442) (.47)
4yi,t
yi,t−1 .01
˜4yi,t
yi,t−1 -.69
(.03) (.72)
Libor −OISt -.01** Libor −OISt
(.01)
V olt -.02*** V olt
(.01)
constant -15.32*** constant 1.99**
(5.90 ) (.47)
Observations 1120 Observations 340
R2 .72 R2 .55
dummies country and year dummies country
Note: *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level, respectively; robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. Specification (A) corresponds to the results from Rixtel
et al., 2015 study. The dependent variable is log of the total amount of bonds issued by banks
headquartered in country i and the data is monthly. In my estimation (B), variables denoted
with a tilde are centered variable as described in Table 2.5.2.1. The variable term spreadj,t
corresponds to the 10 year government bond yield minus the 3 month government bill rate
for country i. The variable V olt measures Implied Stock market volatility (VSTOXX). The
variable bank stockj,t is the stock market index of the banking sector in country i.
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2.9.E. Debt issuance shocks
Table 2.9.E.1. – First stage: Instrumentation of output growth in debt is-
suance
Ordinary least squares with FE Dependent variable: ∆y˜i,t
1999Q1-2008Q2 1999Q1-2014Q4
∆y˜i,t−2 -.196* -.190* -.077 -.090
(.108) (.101) (.059) (.060)
∆ ˜gapi,t−3 -.021 -.024 -.045** -.046**
(.035) (.035) (.022) (.022)
∆ ˜gapi,t -.029 -.028 -.056*** -.060***
(.027) (.026) (.019) (.019)
X˜i,t−1 .006 .007 -.021** -.020*
(.012) (.012) (.011) (.011)
X˜i,t .032*** .031*** .035*** .036***
(.012) (.012) (.011) (.011)
∆y˜i,t−1 -.530*** -.517*** -.315*** -.328***
(.095) (.088) (.058) (.059)
∆A˜i,ta .027 .025 .038** .035**
(.023) (.023) (.015) (.015)
∆A˜i,t−1 .044* .045* .015 .011
(.025) (.024) (.019) (.019)
∆K˜i,t -.017** -.016** -.018*** -.016**
(.007) (.007) (.006) (.006)
∆K˜i,t−1 -.010 -.010 .001 -.000
(.008) (.008) (.006) (.006)
∆(m˜i,t − p˜i,t) .058*** .057*** .042** .039*
(.019) (.018) (.021) (.022)
∆(m˜i,t−1 − p˜i,t−1) .010 .016 .012 .016
(.014) (.015) (.013) (.014)
∆r˜i,t .001 -.001*
(.004) (.000)
∆r˜i,t−1 -.008 .000
(.005) (.000)
∆W˜i,t−1 .003 .001 .009 .008
(.011) (.011) (.009) (.009)
W˜i,t−1 .001 .001 -.003* -.001
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)
m˜i,t−1 − p˜i,t−1 -.006 -.006 .002 -.004
(.012) (.012) (.008) (.009)
A˜i,t−1 .001 .002 -.007 -.007
(.011) (.011) (.005) (.005)
K˜i,t−1 -.000 -.000 .000 .001
(.004) (.004) (.003) (.003)
y˜i,t−1 -.035 -.041 -.017 -.028**
(.034) (.034) (.013) (.013)
r˜i,t−1 .000 -.000***
(.003) (.000)
Observations 340 340 600 600
R2 .33 .35 .32 .33
KPW F5,#obs−28(−3) 3.03** 3.16*** 5.52*** 5.90***
Hansen J test 2.29 2.68 5.74 5.55
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The
statistic KPW Fd,#obs−28(−3) is the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic where d is the
degrees of freedom, to be compared to the Stock and Yogo critical values. Variables
are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
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Table 2.9.E.2. – Debt determinants (1999Q1-2008Q2)
Dynamic Fixed Effects Dependent variable: ∆W˜i,t
second stage no instrumentation
(I) (II)
Error correction -.032*** -.033*** -.027** -.027**
(.011) (.011) (.009) (.010)
(m˜i,t−1 − p˜i,t−1) -.190*** -.198*** -.156** -.161**
(.048) (.046) (.060) (.058)
A˜i,t−1 .107* .125** .084* .090
(.063) (.062) (.044) (.054)
K˜i,t−1 .017 .018 .002 .003
(.021) (.020) (.014) (.015)
y˜i,t−1 .242 .293 .080 .131
(.168) (.187) (.238) (.262)
r˜i,t−1 .026 .023
(.018) (.039)
∆y˜i,t .635 .824 .564*** .628**
(1.113) (1.090) (.172) (.213)
∆y˜i,t−1 .498 .504 .403 .354
(.622) (.600) (.321) (.316)
∆A˜i,t .483*** .507*** .466*** .474***
(.135) (.124) (.137) (.122)
∆A˜i,t−1 -.089 -.092 -.093 -.090
(.133) (.133) (.160) (.155)
∆(m˜i,t − p˜i,t) .005 .037 .047 .080
(.189) (.178) (.099) (.090)
∆(m˜i,t−1 − p˜i,t−1) -.396*** -.395*** -.383*** -.381***
(.084) (.077) (.086) (.084)
∆K˜i,t -.043 -.032 -.081 -.075
(.068) (.064) (.060) (.060)
∆K˜i,t−1 -.039 -.045 -.038 -.039
(.058) (.059) (.084) (.083)
∆r˜i,t -.046* -.032
(.024) (.038)
∆r˜i,t−1 .009 .009
(.033) (.029)
∆W˜i,t−1 .325*** .320*** .347*** .341***
(.062) (.059) (.067) (.053)
Constant .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Observations 340 340 360 360
log(likelihood) 640.474 645.940 671.322 674.807
R2 .325 .347 .297 .311
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are in paren-
thesis. Variables are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
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2.9.F. Robustness checks: bond rate heterogeneity
Table 2.9.F.1. – First stage IV regression: Loans on financial shocks, with heteroge-
neous bond rates across countries
OLS with FE Dependent variable: ∆l˜i,t
Instrumentation (y) No instrumentation
(I) (II)
(99Q1-08Q2) (99Q1-14Q4) (99Q1-08Q2) (99Q1-14Q4)
ξmi,t .099*** .027 .114*** .032
(.024) (.027) (.027) (.028)
ξmi,t−1 -.047* .003 -.044 .007
(.025) (.020) (.028) (.019)
ξmi,t−2 -.005 .051** -.008 .058**
(.021) (.021) (.022) (.024)
ξw
s
i,t .050** .091** .045*** .072**
(.016) (.037) (.010) (.022)
ξw
s
i,t−1 .029 .040* .035 .042*
(.025) (.019) (.022) (.020)
ξw
s
i,t−2 .030 .032 .025 .032
(.018) (.029) (.030) (.034)
∆y˜i,t−1 -.026 -.015 .004 .042
(.100) (.054) (.124) (.037)
∆y˜i,t−2 -.301** -.105 -.246* -.025
(.111) (.102) (.122) (.074)
∆r˜i,t -.009 .002** -.002 .002**
(.006) (.001) (.003) (.001)
∆r˜i,t−1 -.005 -.000 -.008 -.000
(.005) (.000) (.006) (.000)
∆r˜i,t−2 .004 -.001** .010 -.001
(.004) (.000) (.007) (.000)
Constant -.000*** .000*** -.000*** .000***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Observations 320 580 340 600
R2 .123 .074 .118 .059
Hansen J test, df=5 8.68 4.00 1.75 2.16
Finstr 4.84*** 6.12*** 5.17*** 4.75***
Fξm 4.76*** 1.30 5.72*** 1.71
Fξws 4.50*** 10.21*** 3.99*** 7.24 ***
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Variables are
described in Table 2.5.2.1.
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Table 2.9.F.2. – Second stage IV regression: Output on loans, with heteroge-
neous bond rates across countries
OLS with FE Dependent variable: ∆y˜i,t
Instrumentation (y) No instrumentation
(I) (II)
(99Q1-08Q2) (99Q1-14Q4) (99Q1-08Q2) (99Q1-14Q4)
∆
ˆ˜
li,t .141 .541** -.045 .136
(.107) (.228) (.086) (.179)
∆
ˆ˜
li,t−1 .095 -.143 .041 -.092
(.104) (.139) (.094) (.163)
∆
ˆ˜
li,t−2 .121 -.104* .121 .026
(.110) (.050) (.076) (.052)
∆y˜i,t−1 -.374*** -.221** -.322*** -.204**
(.078) (.073) (.053) (.069)
∆y˜i,t−2 -.062 .039 -.066** .019
(.044) (.033) (.029) (.034)
∆r˜i,t .004 -.001* .003 -.001
(.009) (.001) (.008) (.001)
∆r˜i,t−1 -.013 .001 -.015 .000
(.010) (.001) (.011) (.001)
∆r˜i,t−2 .004 .000 .004 -.000
(.004) (.000) (.003) (.000)
Constant -.000 .000*** -.000*** .000***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Observations 300 560 320 580
log(likelihood) 1065.997 1958.282 1138.899 2015.385
R2 .161 .108 .134 .047
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Variables
are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
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2.9.G. Residual analysis
Table 2.9.G.1. – Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality
assumption on bond rates: rt ri,t
Time period Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2
1999Q1-2008Q2 .943*** .921*** .927*** .904***
1999Q1-2014Q4 .927*** .922*** .941*** .927***
Note: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The baseline specification (I) is considered. The null
hypothesis (H0) is: residuals are normally distributed. Variables are described in Table
2.5.2.1. The specification (rt) are the 2SLS estimations when the bond rate is considered the
same across countries. The regression ri,t is when a heterogeneous bond rate is used.
Figure 2.9.G.1. – Residual plot (1999Q1-2008Q2)
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Note: The graph plots the residual against the predicted values in the baseline specification
(I) with equal bond rates across countries. Variables are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
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Figure 2.9.G.2. – Residual plot (1999Q1-2014Q4)
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Note: The graph plots the residual against the predicted values in the baseline specification
(I) with equal bond rates across countries. Variables are described in Table 2.5.2.1.
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2.9.H. Non-parametric estimations
Figure 2.9.H.1. – Non-parametric estimation of the first stage (1999Q1-
2008Q2)
Note: The variables ξmt and ξ
ws
t
are, respectively, shocks to money demand and shocks to
debt issuance as computed in the baseline specification.
Figure 2.9.H.2. – Non-parametric estimation of the first stage (1999Q1-
2014Q4)
Note: The variables ξmt and ξ
ws
t
are, respectively, shocks to money demand and shocks to
debt issuance as computed in the baseline specification.
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Figure 2.9.H.3. – Non-parametric estimation of the second stage (1999Q1-
2008Q2)
Note: The variables
ˆ˜
li,t is the predicted value from the non-linear first stage regression, as
specified in the baseline regression.
3. Regulation and Rational
Banking Bubbles in Infinite
Horizon1
3.1. Introduction
The Great Recession of 2007-2009 has highlighted the importance of the banking
sector in the worldwide economy and its role in the propagation of the crisis.
Valuation and liquidity problems in the U.S. banking system are recognized to
be a cause of the crisis (Miao and Wang, 2015). In particular, Miao and Wang
(2015) argue that changes in agents’ beliefs about stock market value of banks
are suspected to explain sudden financial market crashes.
As a consequence, there has been a greater awareness among both academics
and policy makers about the failure of banking regulation in preventing crises.
The Basel committee on Banking Supervision was created in 1973 “to enhance
understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking
supervision worldwide”.2 They released the first Basel Accord, called “Basel
I” in 1988. The goal of Basel I was to create a framework for internationally
active banks, in particular seeking, to prevent international banks from growing
without adequate capital. Therefore, the committee imposed minimum capital
requirements which were calculated based on credit risk weights of loans. Credit
risk weights take into account possible losses on the asset side of a bank’s
balance sheet. The idea was that banks holding riskier assets had to hold
more capital than other banks in order to ensure solvency. This approach has
been criticized by researchers and regulatory agencies because it only considers
1This chapter is based on Chevallier and El Joueidi (2016)
2For more details, see The Basel Committee overview, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/.
98
3 Regulation and Rational Banking Bubbles in Infinite Horizon 99
credit risk and does not encompass market risk.3 Market risk refers to the risk
of losses from changes in market prices, which increases banks’ default risk.
The Basel committee has recognized this problem and released the Basel II
Capital Accord.4 This new accord also considers market values into the banking
regulation framework in order to take into account market risk of the trading
book. It allows banks to use an internal model based on Value-at-Risk to
quantify their minimum capital requirements. The idea of capital requirements
based on Value-at-Risk is to impose a solvency condition for banks which
requires that the maximum amount of debt that banks can hold, do not exceed
the market value of banks assets in the worst case scenario.5
Figure 3.1.0.1. – Banks stock price index
The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of banking regulation and in
particular, Basel II, on the development of stochastic bubbles on banks’ stock
prices. A stochastic bubble on a bank’s stock price is defined as a temporary
deviation of the bank’s stock price from the bank’s fundamental value. Figure
3For example, Dimson and Marsh (1995) analyze the relationship between economic risk
and capital requirements using trading book positions of UK securities firms. They find
that the Basel I approach leads only to modest correlation between capital requirements
and total risk.
4See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004).
5Basel III, released in 2011, also proposes to use the Value-at-Risk to measure the minimum
capital requirement. The difference with Basel II is that it is amended to include a
Stressed-Value-at-Risk (SVaR). It aims at reducing pro-cyclicality of the market risk
approach and insures that banks hold enough capital to survive long periods of stress.
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3.1.0.1 plots the price index of 168 banks listed in Europe from 1973 to 2016.
It shows that the price index has sharply increased from 2004, which coincides
with the release of Basel II. Therefore, we suspect that the Basel II regulatory
framework has allowed the existence of bubbles in the banking sector.
This chapter also focuses on the effect of bubbles on macroeconomic key
variables. Following Blanchard and Watson (1982) and Weil (1987), stochastic
bubbles are bubbles that have an exogenous constant probability of bursting.
Once they burst, they do not reemerge. We develop a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with three types of infinitely lived agents, banks,
households, and firms, as well as a regulatory authority. Banks raise funds by
accumulating net worth and demanding deposits (supplied by households) to
provide loans to firms. Firms produce the consumption goods, invest and are
subject to productivity shocks. The regulatory authority imposes two banking
regulations. The first requires that banks keep a fraction of deposits as reserves.
These reserves cannot be used to invest in loans (risky assets). The second
measure requires banks to have an upper limit on the quantity of deposits
based on Value-at-Risk capital requirements.
We show that bubbles emerge if agents believe that they exist. Thus,
expectations of agents are self-fulfilling. Results suggest that when banks face
capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk, two different equilibria emerge
and can exist: the bubbleless and the stochastic bubbly equilibria. Capital
requirements based on Value-at-Risk allow bubbles to exist. In contrast,
under a regulatory framework where capital requirements are based on credit
risk only, as in Basel I, banking bubbles are explosive and as a consequence
cannot exist. The stochastic bubbly equilibrium before the bubble bursts
is characterized by positive or negative bubbles depending on the tightness
of capital requirements. A positive (resp. negative) bubble is a ”persistent”
overvaluation (resp. undervaluation) of the banking stock price. We find a
maximum value of the capital requirement based on Value-at-Risk under which
bubbles are positive. Below this value and until the bubble bursts, the stochastic
bubbly equilibrium provides larger welfare than the bubbleless equilibrium.
The intuition is that, when agents consider that a bubble exists, lower capital
requirements lead to optimistic beliefs about bank valuation. Bubbles allow
banks to relax the capital requirement constraint, and thus banks demand more
deposits and make more loans. This effect reduces the lending rate and provides
higher welfare. Profits of banks rise which increases the value of banks. As a
3 Regulation and Rational Banking Bubbles in Infinite Horizon 101
consequence, initial beliefs about the value of banks are realized. In contrast,
above this maximum capital requirement, bubbles are negative leading to a
credit crunch and thus, reduce welfare. Therefore, our model shows that a
change in regulation might lead to a crisis, by shifting the economy from higher
to lower welfare. This can explain the existence of crises without external
shocks. We also show that the equilibrium with positive stochastic bubbles
exists if the probability that bubbles collapse is small. This is consistent with
Weil (1987) and Miao and Wang (2015). Moreover, as in Miao and Wang
(2015), our results suggest that after the bubble bursts, consumption, welfare,
and output fall. Consequently, a change in beliefs also modifies the equilibrium,
from higher to lower welfare. Finally, we simulate impulse response functions
to a negative productivity shock. The results show that bubbles do not amplify
the effect of a negative productivity shock on the economy.
This study is related to two strands of literature. First, it is related to the
literature on banking regulation. Indeed, there is a very recent move towards
macroeconomic models incorporating a banking sector (de Walque et al., 2010;
Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler et al., 2012; He
and Krishnamurthy, 2012; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014). In particular,
we focus on banking regulation and their impact on macroeconomic variables as
in Dib (2010) and de Walque et al. (2010). As in Dangl and Lehar (2004) and
Tomura et al. (2014), we study the impact of Value-at-Risk banking regulation
on the economy. Dangl and Lehar (2004) compare the effect of capital regulation
based on Basel I and Value-at-Risk internal model approach. They find that the
latter regulation reduces risk in the economy. Tomura et al. (2014) introduce
asset illiquidity in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and show
that capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk can lead banks to adopt
macro-prudential behavior. We contribute to this literature by showing that
capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk allow bubbles to exist. In contrast,
under a regulatory framework where capital requirements are based on credit
risk only, as in Basel I, bubbles are explosive and as a consequence cannot exist.
Second, this study is related to the literature on the existence and the effect
of rational bubbles in infinite horizon and, in particular, on stochastic bubbles.
The literature on the existence of bubbles in general equilibrium models with
infinitely lived agents is scarce and marked with few important contributions
(Miao, 2014). Therefore, the understanding of financial bubbles in infinite
horizon models is still under explored. Tirole (1982) shows that bubbles under
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rational expectations with infinitely lived agents cannot exist. In addition,
Blanchard and Watson (1982) argue that ”the only reason to hold an asset whose
price is above its fundamental value is to resell it at some time and to realize
the expected capital gain. But if all agents intend to sell in finite time, nobody
will be holding the asset thereafter, and this cannot be an equilibrium”. Such
behavior implies that agents over save so that they do not consume everything
they could. This cannot be an equilibrium since agents would deviate to increase
their consumption levels and, thus, the so called transversality condition (TVC)
is not satisfied. In contrast, Kocherlakota (1992) demonstrates that bubbles
may exist in an infinite horizon general equilibrium model with borrowing or
wealth constraints. These constraints limit the agent arbitrage opportunities by
introducing some portfolio constraints. Foremost, Kocherlakota (2008) shows
that equilibrium in which the asset price contains a bubble can exist with the
bubbleless equilibrium in the presence of debt constraints. The only difference
between the two states (bubbles and no bubbles) is that the bubbly one modifies
the debt limit. The author calls this result the “bubble equivalence theorem”.
We contribute to this literature by showing that banking bubbles may emerge
with banking regulation based on Value-at-Risk in an infinite horizon general
equilibrium framework.
Our study is mostly related to Miao and Wang (2015). They insert an
endogenous borrowing constraint and show that bubbles can emerge in an
infinitely lived general equilibrium framework without uncertainty. Bubbles
are introduced through the bank problem. We borrow the same methodol-
ogy to introduce bubbles. Nevertheless, our model contrasts with Miao and
Wang (2015) regarding four major characteristics. First, our key idea is to
introduce banking regulation in an infinitely lived agent model to analyze
whether stochastic bubbles can arise. Second, our model is a stochastic general
equilibrium. In contrast, Miao and Wang (2015) consider a deterministic model.
Third, negative bubbles as well as positive bubbles can arise, while they only
assume positive bubbles. Fourth, they consider an agency problem to justify a
minimum dividend policy that links dividends to net worth. Our model does
not impose a dividend policy.
The present chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model.
Section 3.3 and section 3.4 analyze, respectively, the bubbleless and the stochas-
tic bubbly general equilibrium. Section 3.5 compares both equilibria. Section
3.6 presents the calibration, explores local dynamics and compares impulse
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response functions to a negative productivity shock for both equilibria. Finally,
the last section concludes.
3.2. Model
We consider an economy with three types of infinitely lived agents, banks,
households, and firms, as well as a regulatory authority. In this model, banking
bubbles can arise. They emerge only if agents believe that banks’ stock prices
contain a bubble. The bubble is, thus, self-fulfilling. Banks, households, and
firms are respectively represented by a continuum of identical agents of mass
one. Households are shareholders of banks and owners of firms. It is assumed
that banks have the necessary technology and knowledge to engage in lending
activity while households do not. Thus, the latter do not lend directly to non-
financial firms and have recourse to banks. At the end of each period, banks
raise funds internally, using net worth, and externally, by taking deposits from
households. Using raised funds, they lend to firms which produce consumption
goods. In the model, a bubble is introduced through the bank problem, as in
Miao and Wang (2015). We consider a bubble with an exogenous probability
of burst, i.e., a stochastic bubble as in Blanchard and Watson (1982). Although
a bubble can only arise if agents believe in its existence, it is not an agent
choice. Agents are “bubble takers”. The optimization problem of each agent is
presented in this section.
3.2.1. Households
Households are represented by a continuum of identical agents of unit mass.
Each household starts with an initial endowment of stocks s0 and deposits D0.
At each period t, it receives net profits pit generated by firms, it chooses its
optimal consumption ct, amount of stocks st+1, and deposits Dt+1 for the next
period. It also receives dividends dt from the shares st it owns, sells its shares
at price pt+1 and obtains an interest rate rt on the amount deposited Dt in
the previous period. There is no uncertainty on savings and thus rt is the risk-
free interest rate. We assume that preferences of households are represented
by a linear utility function in consumption. Given their budget constraint
(3.2.1), each household chooses the optimal amount of shares, deposits and
consumption {st+1, Dt+1, ct}∞t=0 that maximizes its expected lifetime linear
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utility. Each household optimization problem is defined as follows:
Max{st+1,Dt+1,ct}∞t=0Et
∞∑
t=0
βtct,
subject to
Dt (1 + rt) + st (pt+1 + dt) + pit = Dt+1 + ct + st+1pt+1, (3.2.1)
where β ∈]0, 1[ is the discount factor and Et is the expectation operator.
The first order conditions with respect to Dt+1 and st+1, are given by
βEt (1 + rt+1) = 1, (3.2.2)
pt+1 = βEt (dt+1 + pt+2) . (3.2.3)
The combination of (3.2.2) and (3.2.3) gives the households no arbitrage condi-
tion, Et (dt+1 + pt+2) /pt+1 = Et (1 + rt+1). This last condition states that the
return on stocks is equal to the return on deposits. If it is met, households
are indifferent between both types of assets and both are held in the portfolio
of agents. However, if this condition is not satisfied, the optimal solution of
households yields to a corner solution, thus, only stocks or only deposits are
held, depending on which has the highest return.
Since the optimization problem has an infinite horizon, consider also the
transversality condition:
limt→∞βtptst = 0. (3.2.4)
Condition (3.2.4) ensures that the household spends all its budget and thus,
does not hold positive wealth when t → ∞. It is a necessary condition
for an optimum choice of the household. Tirole (1982) shows that bubbles
under rational expectations with infinitely lived agents cannot exist since the
transversality cannot be satisfied. However, in our framework, banking bubbles
satisfy this condition and therefore, may exist.
3.2.2. Firms
Firms are represented by a continuum of identical producers of unit mass. Each
firm starts with an amount of loans L0 to buy its initial capital K0. Firms
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are subject to productivity shocks. The shock process is defined by an AR(1)
process such that At = A
zA
t−1 exp (ut), where zA is a strictly positive persistence
parameter and ut is a normally distributed productivity shock with mean 0
and variance σ2z . After the shock, in each period t, firms produce yt using
capital Kt bought in the last period and reimburse their loans with interests
rlt such that the total reimbursement is Lt
(
1 + rlt
)
. Then, they distribute
net profits to households and choose their optimal amount of total loans and
capital for the next period {Lt+1, Kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize their future expected
discounted profits subject to their budget constraint (3.2.5) and the capital
constraint (3.2.6). Note that we consider capital that fully depreciates. Each
firm optimization problem is defined as follows:
Max{Lt+1,Kt+1}∞t=0Et
∞∑
t=0
βtpit,
subject to
pit = yt − Lt
(
1 + rlt
)
, (3.2.5)
yt = AtKt
ψ,
Kt+1 = Lt+1, (3.2.6)
pit ≥ 0 and Lt, Kt > 0,
where ψ ∈]0, 1[ is the output elasticity of capital. Using the Lagrange method,
the interior solution of the first order condition with respect to Lt+1 is given by:
ψEt
(
At+1L
ψ−1
t+1
)
= Et
(
1 + rlt+1
)
. (3.2.7)
In the optimum, (3.2.7) shows that the marginal product of capital is equal to
the marginal cost of loans.
3.2.3. Banks
The banking sector is represented by a continuum of identical banks of unit
mass. To provide loans Lt+1 to firms, banks raise funds by accumulating net
worth Nt+1 and demanding deposits Dt+1. The regulatory authority imposes
that banks keep a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1[ of deposits as reserves6
6Note that the reserve requirement φ is not crucial for the model nor for the bubble existence.
However, it is of interest as it allows the derivation of additional policy implications.
3 Regulation and Rational Banking Bubbles in Infinite Horizon 106
Rt ≡ φDt. (3.2.8)
Each bank has a balance sheet composed of deposit Dt and net worth Nt on
the liability side and of loans Lt and reserves Rt on the asset side such that
Rt + Lt = Nt +Dt. (3.2.9)
Thus, at the end of each period t, each bank accumulates net worth using
profits from assets earned in t net of deposit repayments and dividends. Let rlt
be the lending rate earned in t and rt the risk-free interest rate paid in t, so
that
Nt+1 =
(
1 + rlt
)
Lt +Rt −Dt (1 + rt)− dt − Ct, (3.2.10)
where Ct = τNt represents operational costs paid by banks such as accounting
and legal fees and management costs. The parameter τ ∈]0, 1] is the share of
operational costs in net worth. One can think about initial public offering fees
paid to a third party, for example to a business attorney or business service
companies, to get listed on financial markets. Indeed, banks often use a third
party such as large business service companies (KPMG, Deloitte) to prepare
the legal and accounting side of public offerings. Specialized firms ensure that
regulatory and legal compliance are met.
Banks are also subject to capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk as
recommended by the Basel committee in Basel II.7 This regulation imposes
that banks hold a minimum level off capital which is calculated with the aim of
avoiding banks becoming insolvent. The objective of the regulator is to preserve
a safety buffer, such that the market value of banks’ assets VAt is sufficient to
repay depositors. The market value of assets is given by
VAt = Vt (Nt) +Dt,
where Vt (Nt) is banks’ equity value. Therefore, the regulator imposes a solvency
condition which requires that the maximum amount of deposits banks can hold
does not exceed the market value of banks assets in the worst case scenario
such that
Dt ≤ (1− µ) VAt,
7See the BIS publication, the First Pillar Minimum Capital Requirements,
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm
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where µ ∈ [0, 1[ is a regulatory parameter which captures the loss in market
value of assets in the worst case scenario, as motivated by the Value-at-Risk
regulation. This regulation, based on market values, is the same as in Dangl
and Lehar (2004). The above equation is thus equivalent to
Dt ≤ ηVt (Nt) ,
where η = (1− µ) /µ > 0 is the Value-at-Risk regulation parameter. It
represents the maximum allowed leverage ratio in market value. We show in
Appendix A that without capital requirements, if
τβ (1− φ) > φ (1− β) , (3.2.11)
banks always hold the maximum amount of deposits. Indeed, when the marginal
benefit from holding deposits exceeds its marginal cost, banks always want more
deposits. From now on, we consider that (3.2.11) is always satisfied. Therefore,
the above constraint always binds and becomes
Dt = ηVt (Nt) . (3.2.12)
For low values of η, the regulation is severe. Indeed, the amount of authorized
deposits that banks can hold compared to banks’ value is low. However, for
high η, the regulation is considered as lenient.
The aim of our framework is to model the existence of stochastic banking
bubbles as in Blanchard and Watson (1982), Weil (1987) and Miao and Wang
(2015). In period t, agents may believe in a bubble or not. If agents do not
believe a banking bubble exists in period t, a bubble can never emerge. In
what follows, first, we present the problem of banks when agents do not believe
a bubble exists. We then present the problem of banks when agents believe
that it exists. In this latter case, following Blanchard and Watson (1982), we
consider that the bubble may burst in the future with a probability ξ ∈]0, 1[.
Note that once the bubble bursts, it never reappears.
Bubbleless path
At the end of period t, each bank chooses its optimal net worth to accumulate
for next period {Nt+1} in order to maximize its current dividends and expected
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present value of future dividends subject to the reserve requirement (3.2.8), the
balance sheet (3.2.9), the budget constraint (3.2.10) and the capital requirement
(3.2.12). If agents do not believe a bubble exists, the value of the bank in period
t is denoted V ∗t (Nt). The bank problem can be summarized by the following
Bellman equation:
V ∗t (Nt) = Max{Nt+1}
{
dt + βEt
[
V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
]}
,
subject to
dt =
(
1 + rlt
)
Nt +Dt
[
rlt(1− φ)− rt
]− τNt −Nt+1, (3.2.13)
Dt = ηV
∗
t (Nt) , (3.2.14)
Nt, Dt ≥ 0 for all t. (3.2.15)
We show in Appendix B that the solution of the above maximization problem
gives us the following form for the value function:
V ∗t (Nt) = q
∗
tNt, (3.2.16)
where q∗t ≥ 0 is the marginal value of net worth. It can also be interpreted as
the Tobin Q (Tobin, 1969). Define the bank’s stock price in t+ 1 by
pt+1 = βEt
[
V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
]
.
Proposition 1. When agents do not believe a bubble exists, the solution of
each bank maximization problem is given by the following system of equations.
Et
(
q∗t+1
)
=
1
β
, (3.2.17)
q∗t =
(
1 + rlt − τ
)
+ ηq∗t
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
. (3.2.18)
Proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix B.
When agents do not believe a bubble exists, the expected marginal value of
net worth given by (3.2.17) is constant. This comes from the fact the bank
is risk-neutral. Thus, by increasing one unit of net worth today, the bank
gets the expected discounted marginal value of net worth. Equation (3.2.18)
shows that an additional unit of net worth today gives the discounted return
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due to the increase in loans minus operational costs. It also allows the bank
to relax the constraint by taking η units of additional deposits (see equation
(3.2.12)). Then, the bank earns an additional return of
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
. Using
(3.2.17) and (3.2.18), results show that the lending rate is also constant, which
is consistent with the risk neutrality assumption.
Bubbly path
When agents believe that a bubble exists in period t, the bank’s value V Bt (Nt)
contains a bubble bt 6= 0. There exists a probability ξ ∈]0, 1[ that the bubble
bursts in t + 1 such that bt+1 = 0 and thus, that the bank’s value becomes
V Mt+1(Nt+1). Note that following Blanchard and Watson (1982), we assume that
once the bubble bursts, it never reappears. Therefore, the bank’s value can
take two different possible values in t + 1: V Bt+1 (Nt+1) or V
M
t+1 (Nt+1), which
occur, respectively, with a probability (1− ξ) and ξ. The timeline of events of
the bubble and the value function are summarized in Figure 3.2.3.1.
Figure 3.2.3.1. – Timeline of events
When a banking bubble exists in t, each bank chooses the optimal net worth
{Nt+1} in order to maximize its current dividends and expected present value
of future dividends subject to the reserve requirement (3.2.8), the balance sheet
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(3.2.9), the budget constraint (3.2.10) and capital requirements (3.2.12).
V Bt (Nt) = Max{Nt+1}
{
dt + βEt
[
V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
+ ξβEt
[
V Mt+1 (Nt+1)− V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]}
,
(3.2.19)
subject to
dt =
(
1 + rlt
)
Nt +Dt
[
rlt(1− φ)− rt
]− τNt −Nt+1, (3.2.20)
Dt = ηV
B
t (Nt) , (3.2.21)
Nt, Dt ≥ 0 for all t, (3.2.22)
where V Mt+1 (Nt+1) is the value of the bank if the bubble bursts in t+ 1 and is
defined by V ∗t+1 (Nt+1) in the bubbleless equilibrium. Note that the difference
between V Mt+1 (Nt+1) and V
∗
t+1 (Nt+1) lies in their initial values of net worth.
The last term of (3.2.19) represents the change in values when the bubble bursts.
Indeed, when the bubble bursts with a probability of ξ, the banks value shifts
from V Bt+1 (Nt+1) to V
M
t+1 (Nt+1).
We show in Appendix C that the solution of the bank maximization problem
with a bubble gives the following value function, until the bubble bursts:
V Bt (Nt) = q
B
t Nt + bt, (3.2.23)
where qBt ≥ 0 is the marginal value of net worth and bt 6= 0 is the bubble term
on the bank’s value. Variables qBt and bt are to be endogenously determined.
As it will become clear later, the bubble term is a self-fulfilling component that
can be increasing, decreasing or explosive. Note that (3.2.23) is the same as in
Miao et al. (2013). Define the stock price in t+ 1 when agents believe a bubble
exists and before the bubble bursts by
pt+1 = βEt
[
V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
+ ξβEt
[
V Mt+1 (Nt+1)− V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
.
Proposition 2. When agents believe a bubble exists in t, until the bubble bursts,
the solution of each bank maximization problem is given by the following system
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of equations.
Et
(
qBt+1
)
=
1− ξβEt
(
qMt+1
)
β (1− ξ) , (3.2.24)
qBt =
(
1 + rlt − τ
)
+ ηqBt
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
, (3.2.25)
(1− ξ)βEt (bt+1) = bt
{
1− η [rlt (1− φ)− rt]} . (3.2.26)
From the regulation based on Value-at-Risk, the regulator forces the bank to
satisfy (3.2.12) such that if bt+1 = 0, the value of q
M
t+1 is given by
qMt+1 =
1
η
Dt+1
Nt+1
. (3.2.27)
Proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix C.
Equation (3.2.24) shows that, by increasing one unit of net worth today, the
bank gets the expected discounted marginal value of net worth if the bubble
lasts plus the expected discounted marginal value of net worth if the bubble
bursts. The probability of a burst introduces a price distortion because it
changes inter-temporal arbitrage conditions. An increase in the marginal value
of net worth if the bubble bursts, decreases the marginal value of net worth if
the bubble stays. Therefore, the bank’s incentive to accumulate net worth if
the bubble remains is reduced, and then, the bank distributes more dividends
compared with when bt = 0 for all t. Equation (3.2.25) has the same intuition
than in the case where bt = 0 for all t. However, here, the lending rate is
not constant anymore and is positively correlated with the marginal value of
net worth. The intuition is that the larger the lending rate is, the larger the
incentive for banks to accumulate net worth is.
Equation (3.2.26) exists if and only if agents believe in the bubble such that
bt 6= 0. It represents the bubble growth rate. The idea is that the bubble
allows the bank to relax the capital requirement constraint by raising the
bank’s value and thus increases deposits. In particular, the bubble allows
to relax the capital requirement constraint while avoiding the operational
costs. By increasing additional units of deposits, the growth of the economy
becomes larger. Moreover, the larger the marginal gain from the bubble
η
[
rlt (1− φ)− rDt
]
is, the smaller the growth rate of the bubble is. Finally, the
bubble grows faster with ξ to compensate for the probability of bursting.
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Proposition 3. If
{
1− η [rlt (1− φ)− rt]} /β (1− ξ) < 1/β, (3.2.28)
the transversality condition of the household (3.2.4) is always satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix D.
Proposition 3 states that the transversality condition (TVC) is satisfied, i.e
bubbles are not ruled out, if the growth rate of the bubble does not exceed the
rate of time preference of households. The transversality condition insures that
individuals do not hold positive wealth when t→∞. An important point to
highlight here, is that without the capital requirement constraint the bubble
growth is given by Et (bt+1) /bt − 1 = 1/ [β (1− ξ)]− 1, which is ruled out by
the TVC. Therefore, the bubble cannot exist. In addition, the combination of
(3.2.24), (3.2.25) and (3.2.26) yield Et (bt+1) /bt−1 =
(
1 + rlt − τ
)
/
(
1− βξqMt
)
.
Thus, the growth rate is larger than 1/β when τ = 0, which is ruled out by
the TVC. The intuition is that operational costs (τ > 0) reduce the growth
rate of net worth and then, by no arbitrage, the growth rate of the bubble.
Therefore the bubble is no longer explosive and is not ruled out. Analogously,
Miao and Wang (2015) reduce the growth of net worth by assuming a minimum
dividend policy as a function of net worth. It is also straightforward that under
regulation based on book values as in Basel I, instead of on market values such
that with the Value-at-Risk, bubbles cannot exist.8
The bubble return can be written as:
bt
(
1
β
− 1
)
=
1
β (1− ξ)
{
η
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]− ξ} bt︸ ︷︷ ︸
dividend yield
+ Et (bt+1)− bt.︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital gain
(3.2.29)
This equation shows that the return on the bubble is equal to a capital gain
Et (bt+1)− bt plus a dividend yield. The dividend yield in the infinite horizon
model guarantees that the transversality condition does not rule out the bubble.
By relaxing the capital requirement, the bubble allows banks to raise η more
units of deposits and earn a return
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
on it.
8The Basel ratio Tier 1 is based on book values and takes the following form: Nt = χDt
where χ > 0 is a regulation parameter.
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3.3. Bubbleless general equilibrium
This section defines and analyzes the bubbleless general equilibrium where
variables are denoted x∗t .
Definition 4. A competitive general bubbleless equilibrium with bt = 0 for all
t, is defined as sequences of allocations, prices and the shock process
E*t =
{
d∗t , N
∗
t+1, K
∗
t+1, L
∗
t+1, D
∗
t+1, pi
∗
t , y
∗
t , c
∗
t , s
∗
t+1,q
∗
t , rt, r
l∗
t , p
∗
t , At
}∀t,
such that taking prices as given, all agents maximize their future expected
payoffs subject to their constraints and the transversality condition is satisfied.
Finally, the market for loans, deposits, and stocks (s∗t+1 = 1) clear. The
equilibrium consumption is given by the combination of the three budget
constraints (3.2.1), (3.2.5) and (3.2.10), such that
c∗t + τN
∗
t = y
∗
t − L∗t+1 − (R∗t+1 −R∗t ). (3.3.1)
Equation (3.3.1) is the condition on the goods market. The sum of households
and banks consumption c∗t + τN
∗
t is equal to output net of investment and varia-
tion in reserves. Households’ consumption decreases with the investment which
is represented by the amount of loans, the reserve variation and operational
costs.
Bubbleless stationary equilibrium
Here, we analyze a stationary bubbleless equilibrium when variables are constant
over time such that E∗0 = ... = E∗t = E∗ for all t. The equilibrium deposit rate
is given by (3.2.2) such that r = 1
β
− 1. The marginal value of net worth in
(3.2.17) is q∗ = 1
β
. From the regulation based on Value-at-Risk in (3.2.12) and
the value function (3.2.16),
D∗
N∗
=
η
β
. (3.3.2)
From (3.2.18), the lending rate is
rl∗ =
r (η + β) + βτ
β + η (1− φ) . (3.3.3)
3 Regulation and Rational Banking Bubbles in Infinite Horizon 114
Proposition 5. The lending rate rl∗ in a bubbleless stationary equilibrium
increases with the reserves φ and operational costs τ . In contrast, it decreases
with the Value-at-Risk regulation parameter η.
Proof of Proposition 5 is presented in Appendix E. The intuition is that
larger operational costs and reserves reduce the supply of loans, and as a
consequence increase the lending rate. In contrast, a larger Value-at-Risk
regulation parameter η allows banks to raise money using cheaply acquired
funds, i.e deposits. This effect raises banks’ size and reduces the lending rate.
For more insights, we also look at the interest rate spread, which is given by
β
(
rl∗ − r) = (1− β) η
β + η (1− φ)φ+
β2
β + η (1− φ)τ.
The above equation shows that the discounted interest rate spread increases
with operational costs τ and the fraction of reserves φ. For φ = 0, the interest
spread is only a function of operational costs. When there are no costs for the
bank such that φ = τ = 0, the lending rate falls to the safe rate r.
The stationary level of loans is given by the first order condition (3.2.7) so
that L∗ =
[(
1 + rl∗
)
/ψ
]1/(ψ−1)
. From the balance sheet constraint (3.2.9) and
(3.3.2), N∗ = L∗/ [1 + (1− φ) (η/β)]. Thus, the equilibrium consumption is
given by c∗ = (L∗) ψ − L∗ − τL∗/ [1 + (1− φ) (η/β)]. Denote W ∗ the welfare
in a bubbleless stationary equilibrium. Therefore, W ∗ = c∗. The Appendix F
shows that W ∗ and L∗ are decreasing in the lending rate rl∗.
3.4. Stochastic bubbly general equilibrium
This section defines and analyzes the stochastic bubbly general equilibrium
where variables before and after the bubble bursts at t = T are, respectively,
denoted xBt and x
M
t .
Definition 6. If a bubble exists in t such that bt 6= 0, until the bubble bursts
in T , a competitive stochastic bubbly general equilibrium is defined as
EBt = {dBt , NBt+1, KBt+1, LBt+1, DBt+1, piBt , yBt , cBt , bt, sBt+1,qBt , qMBt , rt, rlBt , pBt , At} ∀t < T,
such that taking prices as given, all agents maximize their future expected
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payoffs subject to their constraints and the transversality condition is satisfied.9
Finally, the market for loans, deposits, and stocks (sBt+1 = 1) clear. At t = T ,
the bubble crashes such that bt = 0 ∀t ≥ T, a competitive stochastic bubbly
general equilibrium EMt is defined as E*t ∀t ≥ T with NMT = NBT , such that
taking prices as given, all agents maximize their future expected payoffs subject
to their constraints and the transversality condition is satisfied. Finally, the
market for loans, deposits, and stocks (sMt+1 = 1) clear. As in the bubbleless
equilibrium, the condition on the goods market is given by (3.3.1), where
variables correspond to the ones from the stochastic bubbly general equilibrium.
For simplicity, as in Weil (1987) and Miao and Wang (2015), we study a
stochastic bubbly equilibrium with the following properties. The equilibrium is
constant until the bubble collapses at t = T , such that EB0 = ... = EBT−1 = EB
with b0 = ... = bT−1 = b 6= 0. We call it a semi-stationary equilibrium. At
t = T , the banking bubble collapses such that bT = 0 and the equilibrium
is denoted by EMT . Then, for all t > T , the equilibrium EMT converges to the
bubbleless stationary equilibrium E∗. Figure 3.4.0.1 shows the dynamic of the
price when a positive banking bubble exists and then bursts.
Figure 3.4.0.1. – Stock price’s dynamic when the positive bubble bursts
At t = T , the bubble bursts such that bt = 0 and stays at this value for all
t ≥ T . The price pBt falls to pMT . Then, the bank maximizes dividends and
expected discounted future dividends such that the bubble is over and will
never reappear. Therefore, the price converges to p∗ for all t > T .
The semi-stationary equilibrium, i.e until the bubble bursts, is characterized
by the following values. As in the bubbleless stationary equilibrium, the deposit
9Note that the bank marginal value of net worth qBt until the bubble bursts is a function of
the marginal marginal value of net worth after the bubble collapses qMt . Therefore, this
latter value is included in the equilibrium before the burst of the bubble and is called
qMBt .
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rate is given by (3.2.2) r = 1
β
− 1. The lending rate before the bubble collapses
is defined by (3.2.26) such that
rlB =
r(β + η) + βξ
(1− φ) η . (3.4.1)
Proposition 7. In a semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium, the lending rate in-
creases with the reserves φ and the probability of burst ξ. In contrast, it decreases
with the Value-at-Risk regulation parameter η.
Compared to the bubbleless lending rate given by (3.3.3), the lending rate is
independent of operational costs τ. This characteristic will be explained later.
The interest rate spread between the lending rate and the risk-free deposit
rate, until the bubble collapses, is
β
(
rlB − r) = 1− β
(1− φ)φ+
β (1− β)
(1− φ)
1
η
+
β2
(1− φ)
ξ
η
.
Hence, the spread is a function of the bank’s costs. It is increasing with a
large probability of burst to compensate for the risk and with high fraction
of reserves φ. In contrast, it decreases with less stringent capital requirement,
which is represented by a high η. If ξ = φ = 0, then the interest rate spread is
is equal to β (1− β) /η, which is proportional to the tightness of the regulatory
constraint.
The marginal value of net worth while the bubble lasts and when the bubble
collapses are, respectively, given by (3.2.24)
qB =
1− βξqM
β(1− ξ) =
1− τ + rlB
β(1− ξ) , (3.4.2)
and
qMB =
τ − rlB
βξ
. (3.4.3)
From (3.2.27), the leverage ratio is
DB
NB
= ηqMB. (3.4.4)
From the first order condition of firms (3.2.7), we obtain the equilibrium
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quantity of loans
LB =
[
1
ψ
(
1 + rlB
)] 1ψ−1
. (3.4.5)
From (3.2.8), (3.2.9), (3.4.4) and (3.4.5),
NB =
LB
1 + (1− φ) ηqMB .
It can be shown that NB is strictly positive if and only if qMB > 0 which is
equivalent to
τ > [r(β + η) + βξ] / (1− φ) η. (3.4.6)
Equation (3.4.6) is called the ”non negative net worth condition”. In what
follows, we consider that this condition always holds. From the regulation
(3.2.12) and the value function when the bubble exists (3.2.23),
b =
DB
η
− qBNB. (3.4.7)
Using (3.4.2), (3.4.4) and (3.4.7), the bubble term can be re-written as
b =
(
qMB − qB)NB
=
[
η (τ − ξ) (1− φ)− r (η + β) + βξ)
βξ(1− ξ) (1− φ) η
]
NB. (3.4.8)
The equation above shows that the bubble increases with large operational costs.
An increase in operational costs τ should, without bubble, raise the lending rate.
However, in the presence of a bubble, the increase in τ enlarges the bubble,
which relaxes the capital requirement constraint. Thus, loan supply increases,
canceling out the effect of τ on the lending rate. From (3.2.12) and (3.2.1),
the equilibrium consumption is cB =
(
LB
)
ψ−LB− τLB/ [1 + (1− φ)DB/NB].
Finally, we define the bubbly semi-stationary welfare as WB = cB. Compared
to the bubbleless stationary equilibria, the welfare has the same form. However,
it now depends on the bubble. Indeed, the bubble modifies the value of lending
rate by affecting the capital requirement constraint and thus, the equilibrium
quantity of loans. The stationary bubbleless and the semi-stationary stochastic
bubbly equilibrium are compared in the next section.
Using (3.4.8), the condition under which a semi-stationary stochastic bubbly
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equilibrium exists can be written as ξ 6= ξ¯, where
ξ¯ =
η [(1− φ)τ − r]− (1− β)
β + η(1− φ) . (3.4.9)
Therefore, the semi-stationary stochastic bubbly equilibrium exists if the prob-
ability of burst is ξ 6= ξ¯. It can be shown that a positive bubble exists for
small values of the probability of burst, ξ < ξ¯. This is consistent with Weil
(1987) and Miao and Wang (2015) who also find that positive bubbles exist
only for small values of the bursting probability. Suppose the bubble is positive.
Hence, a change in beliefs concerning the probability of burst might modify the
equilibrium, from a positive semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium to a bubbleless
stationary equilibrium.
Figure 3.4.0.2. – Bubble’s value in the parameter space
Figure 3.4.0.2 displays the bubble’s value in the parameter space (ξ,τ), for
a given η and φ. At ξ = ξ¯, the bubble term is zero. For ξ < ξ¯ (resp. ξ > ξ¯),
the bubble is positive (resp.negative). The slope of the line ξ¯ increases with
large values of the Value-at-Risk regulation parameter η. Thus, the parameter
space for the positive bubble widens. As the regulator becomes more lenient
such that η is high, the economy can enter a state in which bubbles are
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positive, increasing welfare in the economy. As explained above, the space
where ξ > [τ (1− φ) η − r(β + η)] /β does not exist as NB > 0.
Alternatively, we can also write the existence condition of a stochastic semi-
stationary bubbly equilibrium in terms of the regulation parameter based on
Value-at-Risk η such that η 6= η¯, where
η¯ =
1− β(1− ξ)
(τ − ξ)(1− φ)− r .
Proposition 8. Under (3.2.11), (3.2.28), (3.4.6) and η 6= η¯, a stochastic
semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium exists (b 6= 0). For η > η¯, the bubble is
positive. In contrast, for η < η¯, it is negative.
Proposition 8 suggests that the semi-stationary equilibrium with a stochastic
bubble exists if the regulation parameter based on Value-at-Risk is η 6= η¯.
Indeed, under the conditions described in Proposition 8, the transversality
condition is satisfied. As a result, a positive bubble exists only for large values
of the regulation parameter η. Thus, a reduction of the regulation parameter
η might modify the equilibrium, from the positive bubbly equilibrium to the
bubbleless equilibrium. Another important policy implication, here, is that
the reserve requirement parameter φ affects negatively the threshold η¯. As a
consequence, when φ is large, the regulation parameter η should be even greater
for the economy to be in the positive bubbly semi-stationary equilibrium.
Figure 3.4.0.3 shows the dynamics of the positive stochastic bubbly equilib-
rium for the marginal value of net worth qt, before and after the bubble bursts
at t = T . Suppose bt > 0 for all t < T .
Figure 3.4.0.3. – Transition path when the positive bubble bursts
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At t = T , the bubble bursts such that bt = 0 and stays at this value for all
t ≥ T . Since deposits and net worth are pre-determined variables, from (3.2.27),
the marginal value of net worth qB goes straight to qMT . Thus, the value of the
bank and the price become, respectively, V MT (N
B
T ) and p
M
T . Then, the bank
maximizes dividends and expected discounted future dividends such that the
bubble is over and will never reappear. Therefore, the bank net worth converges
from NBT to the net worth value in the stationary bubbleless equilibrium N
∗
on the path NMt and the marginal value from q
M
t to the bubbleless stationary
equilibrium marginal value of net worth q∗. Thus, the price pMt converges to p
∗
for all t > T .
3.5. Comparison of both equilibria
This section compares the stationary bubbleless and the stochastic semi-
stationary bubbly equilibria.
Proposition 9. If η 6= η¯ both equilibria with and without a bubble on stock
prices exist.
Proposition 10. If η > η¯, the bubbly equilibrium lending rate before that the
bubble collapses is lower than the bubbleless lending rate. Thus, welfare is larger
with a positive bubble. In contrast, a negative bubble (η < η¯) reduces welfare.
Proof of Proposition 10 is in Appendix G. Both stochastic bubbly and
bubbleless equilibria co-exist for all values of the Value-at-Risk regulation
parameter η except at the point η¯. This point can be viewed as a point
of reversal at which you may move from a positive bubbly equilibrium to a
negative bubbly stochastic semi-stationary equilibrium. At this reversal point,
the equilibrium can move from from higher to lower welfare. For η > η¯, the
capital requirement based on Value-at-Risk is less stringent. In that case, the
stochastic semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium provides larger welfare than the
bubbleless equilibrium. The intuition is that, when agents consider that the
bubble exists, a lower capital requirement leads to optimistic beliefs on banks
value. The bubble allows banks to relax the capital requirement constraint,
and thus banks demand more deposits, which raises their leverage, and make
more loans. This effect reduces the lending rate and provides better welfare. In
contrast, for more stringent capital requirement η < η¯, the bubble is negative
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leading to a credit crunch and thus, reducing the welfare compared to the
bubbleless equilibrium. An important point to highlight here is that a change in
banking regulation may modify the equilibrium and leads to crises, by reducing
welfare levels. This effect can explain the occurrence of crises without any
external shocks. In addition, using (3.4.9), results also show that a change in
beliefs about the probability of burst may also lead to a crisis, as in Miao and
Wang (2015).
The following table summarizes and compares the main results discussed in
this section.
Table 3.5.0.1. – Policy implication
η > η¯ η<η¯
variables
b b>0 b<0
rl rlB < rl∗ rlB > rl∗
L LB>L∗ LB<L∗
D
N
DB
NB
> D
∗
N∗
DB
NB
<D
∗
N∗
W WB>W ∗ WB<W ∗
Table 3.5.0.1 shows that, when agents believe a bubble exists, a positive
bubble arises for lenient regulatory Value-at-Risk constraints, η > η¯. It leads
to the highest equilibrium welfare level, highest equilibrium quantity of loans
and leverage levels. On the opposite, a negative bubble arises when capital
requirement based on Value-at-Risk are more stringent. The negative bubbly
semi-stationary equilibrium is characterized by the lowest equilibrium level of
welfare, credit and leverage.
3.6. Local dynamics and simulations
The present section, first, presents the calibration. Second, it analyzes local
dynamics around the bubbleless stationary equilibrium and the semi-stationary
stochastic bubbly equilibrium. Finally, we simulate and compare a negative
productivity shock from both equilibria.
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3.6.1. Calibration
Here, we calibrate the parameters and we report the implied values for variables
in the bubbleless stationary and bubbly semi-stationary equilibria. We present
a numerical example. We calibrate the discount factor β = 0.99, the capital
share ψ = 0.33, the probability of burst ξ = 0.1. The regulatory parameter
is µ = 0.09, which implies that η = 10.11. This calibration for µ allows us
to have a tier 1 ratio around 8% as recommended by the Basel committee.10
This ratio is 8.99% for the bubbleless stationary equilibrium and 7.12% for
the semi-stationary stochastic bubbly equilibrium. The reserve parameter
φ = 0.01 is set as required by the European Central Bank.11 Finally, we set
operational costs to a proportion τ = 0.15 of net worth. Under these values of
parameters, Propositions 9 and 10 show that the bubbly and the bubbleless
stationary equilibria, until the bubble bursts, exist and that the stochastic
bubbly semi-stationary equilibria has a positive bubble (η > η¯). Moreover,
under this calibration, the marginal value of net worth in T , once the bubble
has burst is qMT = 1.3021.
Table 3.6.1.1. – Bubbleless and bubbly equilibria
Bubbly > 0 Bubbleless
Variables
N 0.0132024 0.0166121
D 0.173818 0.169664
d 0.000171925 0.000167799
L 0.185282 0.184579
p 0.0170206 0.0166121
q 0.977657 1.0101
rl 0.0210922 0.0236939
b 0.00428355 0
W 0.386042 0.385514
Table 3.6.1.1 confirms results summarized in Table 3.5.0.1. Compared to the
bubbleless steady state, the quantity of loans supplied by banks is larger in
the stochastic bubbly semi-stationary equilibrium. This gives a relatively lower
lending rate rl, leading to a higher welfare W .
10This ratio is defined as total net worth over risky assets.
11See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/mr/html/calc.en.html.
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3.6.2. Local dynamics
To analyze the stability and uniqueness properties of the system, we log-
linearize the system around the stationary and the semi-stationary equilibria.
This results in a system of stochastic linear difference equations under rational
expectations. When agents do not believe a bubble exists, bt = 0 for all t, as
well as when agents believe a bubble exists, bt > 0 for t = 0, ...T , until the
bubble bursts, the eigenvalues associated with the linearized system around,
respectively, the stationary bubbleless and the stochastic semi-stationary bubbly
equilibria, show that the number of unstable eigenvalues (eigenvalues that lie
outside the unit circle) is equal to the number of forward looking variables.12
Thus, under this calibration, the system of equations when bt = 0 for all t and
when bt > 0 for all t < T , is determined and both the bubbleless and the bubbly
equilibria are stable and unique. This implies that given an initial value of N∗t
in the neighborhood of the stationary bubbleless equilibrium, there exists a
unique value of q∗t such that the system of linear difference equations converges
to the unique stationary bubbleless equilibrium along a unique saddle path
(see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980). Similarly, given an initial value of NBt in
the neighborhood of the stochastic semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium, there
exists a unique value of qBt such that the system of linear difference equations
converges to the unique stochastic semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium along a
unique saddle path, for all t < T .
3.6.3. Simulations
As an illustration, Figure 3.6.3.1 displays the impulse response functions of a
1% negative productivity shock from the stationary bubbleless and the semi-
stationary positive stochastic bubbly equilibria until the bubble bursts (for all
t < T ). To that end, we calibrate the persistence of the productivity shock zA
to 0.95. This is standard in the real business cycle literature.
From the bubbleless stationary equilibrium, a negative productivity shock
decreases firms profits and thus also the demand for loans. By the balance
sheet, the reduction in assets of banks leads to a fall in net worth accumulation,
which increases dividends (see equation (3.2.10)). Moreover, the fall in net
worth reduces the ability of banks to raise deposits. The reduction in loans
12Eigenvalues are reported in Appendix H.
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leads to a decrease in production and welfare. Since there is no uncertainty
about the bank’s value, the marginal value of net worth and the lending rate
are constant. Finally, the stock price falls following the decrease in net worth.
Figure 3.6.3.1. – Negative productivity shock
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The impulse response functions from the semi-stationary stochastic bubbly
equilibrium are similar to the ones from the bubbleless equilibrium. The main
difference lies in the fact that the uncertainty on the burst of the bubble changes
the inter-temporal substitution between net worth and dividends. A negative
productivity shock that decreases loans demand and decreases net worth raises
the marginal value of net worth. Indeed, a fall of net worth below its steady
state value raises the incentive to increase net worth, reducing the value of
holding investment in the bubble, and thus the bubble growth diminishes.
Therefore, net worth from the bubbly equilibrium falls by less than from the
bubbleless equilibrium.
In conclusion, impulse response functions from both equilibria show that the
effect of a productivity shock are similar. This suggests that the bubble does
not amplify the effect of shocks on real economic variables.
3.7. Conclusion
In this study, we develop a stochastic general equilibrium model in infinite
horizon with a regulated banking sector where a stochastic banking bubble may
arise endogenously. We show that a bubble emerges if agents believe that it
exists. Thus, expectations of agents are self-fulfilling. Results suggest that when
banks face capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk, two different equilibria
emerge and can exist: the bubbleless and the bubbly equilibria. Capital
requirements based on Value-at-Risk allow the bubble to exist. Alternatively,
under a regulatory framework where capital requirements are based on credit
risk only as specified in Basel I, a bubble is explosive and as a consequence
cannot exist. The stochastic bubbly equilibrium is characterized by a positive
or a negative bubble depending on capital requirements based on Value-at-Risk.
We find a maximum capital requirement under which the bubble is positive.
Below this threshold, the stochastic bubbly equilibrium provides larger welfare
than the bubbleless equilibrium. Therefore, this result suggests that a change in
banking policies might lead to a crisis. This can explain the existence of crises
without any external shocks. We also show that a semi-stationary equilibrium
with a positive (resp. negative) stochastic bubble exists if the probability that
the bubble collapses is small (resp. high). Consequently, a change in beliefs
about the bubble’s probability of burst also modifies the equilibrium, from a
higher to a lower welfare.
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Our model can be extended by the addition of different elements. Risk
aversion of households and endogenous labor choice can be considered. However,
endogenous labor choice will complicate the model without changing our main
results. Risk aversion can be introduced by a quadratic utility function for
households and thus, the emergence of bubbles can be studied in this context.
One can also add a probability of default on loans repayments in order to
model credit risk in the economy and analyze its impact on key macroeconomic
variables.
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3.8. Appendices
3.8.A. Appendix A
Here, we show that without capital requirement, each bank chooses to hold the
maximum amount of deposits.
Each bank maximization problem without capital requirement is given by
Vt (Nt, Dt) = Max{Nt+1,Dt+1} [dt + βEtVt+1(Nt+1, Dt+1)] ,
subject to
dt =
(
1 + rlt
)
Nt +Dt
[
rlt(1− φ)− rt
]− τNt −Nt+1,
Nt, Dt ≥ 0 for all t.
From the problem described above,
Vt(Nt, Dt) =
Max{Nt+1,Dt+1}
{
(1 + rlt
)
Nt +Dt
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]− τNt
−Nt+1 + βEtVt+1(Nt+1, Dt+1)
.
(3.8.1)
equation The marginal value from an increase in net worth and deposits are
given by
∂Vt (Nt, Dt)
∂Nt+1
= −1 + βEt∂Vt+1(Nt+1, Dt+1)
∂Nt+1
, (3.8.2)
and
∂Vt (Nt, Dt)
∂Dt+1
= βEt
∂Vt+1(Nt+1, Dt+1)
∂Dt+1
.
Using the envelop theorem,
∂Vt (Nt, Dt)
∂Nt
= 1 + rlt − τ,
and
∂Vt (Nt, Dt)
∂Dt
= rlt (1− φ)− rt.
Banks decide to hold an infinite amount of deposits if ∂Vt (Nt, Dt) /∂Dt+1 > 0,
which is equivalent to
rlt (1− φ)− rt > 0. (3.8.3)
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The interior solution for the net worth is given by ∂Vt (Nt, Dt) /∂Nt+1 = 0.
Equation (3.8.2) becomes
1 + rlt − τ =
1
β
. (3.8.4)
From equation (3.8.4), we get the following lending rate
rlt =
1
β
− 1 + τ.
Putting (3.8.2) in (3.8.3), we get the following condition
τβ (1− φ) > φ (1− β) .
If the above condition holds, banks always choose the maximum amount of
deposits, and consequently the capital requirement regulation always binds.
3.8.B. Appendix B
This appendix presents the proof of Proposition 1. From the bank bubbleless
maximization problem,
V ∗t (Nt) = Max{Nt+1}
{
dt + βEt
[
V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
]}
,
subject to
dt =
(
1 + rlt
)
Nt +Dt
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]− τNt −Nt+1,
Dt = ηV
∗
t (Nt) ,
Nt, Dt ≥ 0 for all t.
The Bellman equation becomes
V ∗t (Nt) =Max{Nt+1}
(
1 + rlt − τ
)
Nt + ηVt (Nt)
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]−Nt+1 + βEt [V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)] .
The marginal value from a net worth increase is given by
Et
[
∂V ∗t (Nt)
∂Nt+1
]
= −1 + βEt
[
∂V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
.
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By the envelop theorem,
∂V ∗t (Nt)
∂Nt
=
(
1 + rlt − τ
)
+ η
∂V ∗t (Nt)
∂Nt
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
.
The interior solution for the net worth is given by ∂Vt (Nt) /∂Nt+1 = 0. There-
fore,
Et
[
∂V ∗t+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
=
1
β
.
Since the problem is linear in N , we get
V ∗t (Nt) = q
∗
tNt. (3.8.5)
Replacing (3.8.5) in the maximization problem, the solution is given by the
following system:
Et
(
q∗t+1
)
=
1
β
,
qt =
(
1 + rlt − τ
)
+ ηqt
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
.
3.8.C. Appendix C
This appendix proves Proposition 2. From the bank maximization problem
when agents believe in a bubble such that bt 6= 0, we have
V Bt (Nt) = Max{Nt+1}
{
dt + βEt
[
V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
]
+ ξβ
{
Et
[
V Mt+1 (Nt+1)
]− Et [V Bt+1 (Nt+1)]}} ,
subject to
dt =
(
1 + rlt
)
Nt +Dt
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]− τNt −Nt+1,
Dt = ηV
B
t (Nt) ,
Nt, Dt ≥ 0 for all t,
where V Mt+1(Nt+1) is the value of the bank if the bubble bursts in t+ 1 and is
defined as V ∗t+1 (Nt+1) for the bubbleless maximization problem.
The Bellman equation becomes
V Bt (Nt) =Max{Nt+1}
{(
1 + rlt − τ
)
Nt + ηVt (Nt)
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]−Nt+1} .
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The marginal value from a net worth increase is given by
Et
[
∂V Bt (Nt)
∂Nt+1
]
=− 1 + βEt
[
∂V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
+ ξβEt
[
∂V Mt+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
− ∂V
B
t+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
.
By the envelop theorem,
∂V Bt (Nt)
∂Nt
=
(
1 + rlt − τ
)
+ η
∂V Bt (Nt)
∂Nt
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
.
The interior solution for the net worth is given by ∂V Bt (Nt) /∂Nt+1 = 0.
Therefore,
Et
[
∂V Bt+1 (Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
=
1− ξβEt
[
∂VMt+1(Nt+1)
∂Nt+1
]
(1− ξ) β .
Since the problem is linear in N , we get
V Bt (Nt) = q
B
t Nt + bt. (3.8.6)
Replacing (3.8.6) in the maximization problem, the solution is given by the
following system:
Et
(
qBt+1
)
=
1− ξβEt
(
qMt+1
)
β (1− ξ) ,
qBt =
(
1 + rlt − τ
)
+ ηqBt
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
,
(1− ξ)βEt (bt+1) = bt
{
1− η [rlt (1− φ)− rt]} .
3.8.D. Appendix D
This appendix presents the proof of Proposition 3. We show the condition to
ensure that the stochastic bubbly equilibrium until the bubble bursts satisfies
the transversality condition. The following transversality condition is required:
limt→∞ptβt = limt→∞Et−1
[
ξ
(
qMt Nt
)
+ (1− ξ) (qBt Nt + bt)] βt = 0.
It is satisfied if
limt→∞Et−1
[
ξ
(
qMt Nt
)
+ (1− ξ)NtqBt
]
βt = limt→∞Et−1 (1− ξ) btβt = 0.
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Since the bubble growth rate is
Et (bt+1)
bt
=
1
β (1− ξ)
{
1− η [rlt (1− φ)− rt]} ,
the TVC requires that
1
β (1− ξ)
{
1− η [rlt (1− φ)− rt]} < 1β .
Thus, the condition to allow a bubble to exist is
η
[
rlt (1− φ)− rt
]
> ξ.
3.8.E. Appendix E
This appendix proves Proposition 5. Here, we prove that the interest rate of
loans in the bubbleless stationary equilibrium is negatively correlated with the
Value-at-Risk regulation parameter η. Using (3.3.3), we have that
rl∗ =
r (η + β) + βτ
β + η (1− φ) .
Therefore,
∂rl∗
∂η
=
(1− β)− [1− β (1− τ)] (1− φ)
[β + η (1− φ)]2 < 0.
The numerator is negative if and only if τβ(1− φ) > φ (1− β), which is always
satisfied (see Appendix A).
3.8.F. Appendix F
The stationary bubbleless steady state welfare is given by the consumption
such that
W = Lψ −
(
1 +
τ
1 + (1− φ)D
N
)
L.
Therefore, the marginal impact of the lending rate on welfare is
dW
drl
= ψ
dL
drl
Lψ−1 − dL
drl
(
1 +
τ
1 + (1− φ)D
N
)
.
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Thus, dW
drl
< 0 if and only
ψLψ−1 <
(
1 +
τ
1 + (1− φ)D
N
)
. (3.8.7)
Since L =
[
(1 + rl)/ψ
] 1
ψ−1 ,
rl >
τ
1 + (1− φ) D
N
. (3.8.8)
In the stationary bubbleless equilibrium, the lending rate is rl∗ = r(η+β)+βτ
β+η(1−φ) .
Therefore the condition (3.8.8) becomes
rl∗ =
r (η + β) + βτ
β + η (1− φ) >
τ
β + (1− φ) η .
It is equivalent to
r (η + β) > 0.
which is always verified.
3.8.G. Appendix G
Here, we display the proof of Proposition 10. The spread between the bubbly
and the bubbleless lending rate is
rlB − rl∗ = rη + 1− β(1− ξ)
η(1− φ) −
1− β (1− τ) + ηr
β + η (1− φ) .
Therefore, rlB − rl∗ > 0 if
η <
1− β(1− ξ)
(τ − ξ) (1− φ)− r = η¯.
Hence, the bubbly lending rate is higher than then bubbleless lending rate if and
only if a negative bubble exists. For a positive bubble, we have rlB − rl∗ < 0.
As a consequence, it can be shown that the welfare is higher in the presence
of a positive bubble. In contrast, it is lower with a negative bubble.
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3.8.H. Appendix H
Table 3.8.H.1 displays eigenvalues associated with the linearized system around
the stationary bubbleless and the semi-stationary bubbly equilibrium.
Table 3.8.H.1. – Eigenvalues of the bubbly and bubbleless equilibria
bubbly (bt > 0) bubbleless (bt = 0)
values values
0 0
0 2.236 ∗ 10−55
0 3.012 ∗ 10−36
0 3.452 ∗ 10−36
1.456 ∗ 10−19 4.408 ∗ 10−19
9.661 ∗ 10−18 1.321 ∗ 10−17
9.161 ∗ 10−17 1.472 ∗ 10−17
0.95 0.95
1.01 1.01
1.038 1.915 ∗ 1039
∞ ∞
∞ ∞
∞
The computation of eigenvalues are given by Dynare.
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